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ABSTRACT 
Recently, most researchers have employed behaviour based detection systems to 
classify Portable Executable (PE) malwares. They usually tried to identify malicious 
Application Programming Interface (API) calls among the sequence of calls that made 
by a suspected application. They depended mostly on measuring the similarity or the 
distance between the suspected API calls with a set of predefined calls that collected 
from normal and malware applications. However, malwares always tried to keep their 
normality through hiding their malicious activities.  Within such behaviours, calls that 
made by PE malwares become more similar to normal, which in turn, challenging most 
distinguishing models. Even such similarity puts the accuracy of most classifier models 
in a very critical situation as many misclassified and doubtful results will be recorded. 
Therefore, this work has addressed the accuracy problem of the API call behaviour 
classifier models. To achieve that, the work has proposed a biological model that 
defined as Artificial Costimulation Classifier (ACC). The model can mimic the 
Costimulation phenomenon that occurred inside the Human Immune Systems (HIS) to 
control errors and to avoid self-cell attacking. Moreover, Costimulation can work as 
safety and balance processes inside the Artificial Immune System (AIS).  
To build the ACC model, this work has employed the Feed forward Back-Propagation 
Neural Network (FFBP-NN) with Euclidean Distance.  The work also used the K-fold 
cross validation method to validate the dataset. The results of our work showed the 
ability of the ACC model to improve the accuracy of malicious API call classification 
up to 90.23%. The results of the ACC model have been compared with four types of 
classifier models and it shows its outperformance. 
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ABSTRAK 
Pada masa ini, kebanyakan penyelidik telah menggunakan sistem pengesan perilaku 
untuk mengklasifikasikan Portable Executable (PE) malware. Mereka kebiasaanya 
mencuba untuk mengenalpasti panggilan API kod hasad sebagai jujukan panggilan yang 
dibuat oleh aplikasi yang mencurigakan. Mereka amat bergantung kepada pengukuran 
persamaan atau jarak antara panggilan API yang dicurigai dengan set panggilan 
pratakrif yang dikumpukan dari aplikasi normal dan hasad. Namun, perision hasad 
kebiasaanya berusaha untuk menjaga normality dengan menyembunyikan aktiviti 
subversif mereka. Dalam perilaku seperti ini, panggilan yang dibuat malware PE hasad 
menjadi lebih mirip dengan panggilan normal yang mengelirukan model pengkelasan. 
Bahkan, persamaan ini meletakkan ketepatan kebanyakan model pengkelasan dalam 
situasi yang kritikal kerana banyak kesilapan dalam pengkelasan dan hasil yang diragui 
direkodkan.  Oleh yang demikian, penulisan ini mensasarkan ketepatan masalah dalam 
perilaku panggilan API model pengkelasan. Untuk mencapai matlamat ini, kajian ini 
mencadangkan model biologi yang didefinasikan sebagai Artificial Costimulation 
Classifier (ACC). Model ini dapat meniru  fenomena Costimulation di dalam Sistem 
Imun Manusia (HIS) bagi mengawal kesilapan dan mengelakkan serangan sesama sel.  
Costimulation boleh berfungsi sebagai proses keselamatan dan pengimbangan di dalam 
Imun Sistem Buatan (AIS). Untuk membina model ACC, kajian ini telah menggunakan 
Feedforward Back-Propagation Neural Network (FFBP-NN) dengan Euclidean 
Distance. Kajian ini juga turut menggunakan pendekatan K-fold cross validation untuk 
menguji set data. Hasil penemuan daripada kajian ini menunjukkan kemampuan model 
ACC untuk memperbaiki ketepatan pengkelasan panggilan API kod hasad sehingga 
90%. Hasil daripada model ACC ini telah dibandingkan dengan empat model 
pengkelasan dan menunjukkan hasil yang memberangsangkan. 
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Chapter One 
 
1. Research Orientation 
 
1.1 Introduction and Background 
 
Recently, most malware classifier researchers have depended on tracing the behaviours 
of malwares rather than looking for knowing signatures (M Alazab, Venkataraman, & 
Watters, 2010; Peng, 2011; Wagener, State, & Dulaunoy, 2008). The reasons behind 
this trend are going back to the number of malwares that crossed (80) millions 
(Spafford, 1990), and the defeat techniques (Polymorphic and Metamorphic) that used 
by malwares to change old malwares’ signature to new ones. Although these two 
reasons have challenged signature based classifier models, they have encouraged 
malware classifier researchers to employ the behaviour based classifier models rather 
than other types of malware classifier model (Y. Hu, Chen, Xu, Zheng, & Guo, 2008; 
Lanzi, Sharif, & Lee, 2009; Park & Reeves, 2011; Tian, Islam, Batten, & Versteeg, 
2010; Trinius, Willems, Holz, & Rieck, 2011; Zolkipli & Jantan, 2011). 
The fundamental work of any type of behaviour-based classification system depends on 
learning the behaviours of known malwares and subsequently scanning other 
applications to detect similar behaviours (Cohen, 1987). Along this direction, 
researchers have studied the behaviours of numerous malwares to build different kinds 
of behaviour-based classifier systems. The memory access behaviour, the codes that are 
more frequently used by malwares, and the system files that register record-
modification activities are among the behaviours that frequently studied by researchers 
to build different kinds of behaviour-based detection systems (Ding, Jin, Bouvry, Hu, & 
Guan, 2009; H. J. Li, Tien, Lin, Lee, & Jeng, 2011; Rieck, Holz, Willems, Düssel, & 
 3 
 
Laskov, 2008; Rozinov, 2005; Wang, Pang, Zhao, & Liu, 2009; Yoshiro Fukushima, 
Akigiro Sakai, Yoshiaki Hori, & Sakurai, 2010; C. W. J. P. R. Zhao & Liu, 2009). 
One of the most important behaviour that researchers have focused more is monitoring 
and tracing the behaviours of application programming interface (API) calling. This 
behaviour is utilized to build API call behaviour-based detection systems. This 
monitoring system is employed more frequently because malwares, as normal 
applications, should call API functions during implementation. Based on different ways 
of calling, API call behaviour-based classifier systems, ideally, can identify malicious 
calls among normal calls. As a result, the classifier system can reveal the behaviour of 
malwares in applications (M. Alazab, Layton, Venkataraman, & Watters, 2010; M 
Alazab et al., 2010; Bai, Pang, Zhang, Fu, & Zhu, 2009; Cheng Wang, 2009; S. Choi, 
Park, Lim, & Han, 2007; Dabek, Zhao, Druschel, Kubiatowicz, & Stoica, 2003; 
Dunham, 2011; Focardi, Luccio, & Steel, 2011; K.-S. Han, Kim, & Im, 2011; J-Y. Xu, 
2004; Kwon, Bae, Cho, & Moon, 2009; Miao, Wang, Cao, Zhang, & Liu, 2010; Nakada 
et al., 2002). 
The calling behaviours that classified by an API calls classifier model can be extracted 
from some specific fields inside Portable Executable (PE) file format(Microsoft, 2008). 
PE is a type of the file format that followed by a wide range of applications, especially, 
the ones that can be executed under Windows Operating System (OS) (Y. Huang, 
2003). This application’s format has some fields where the name and the address of the 
required API functions that called by an application during its execution can be found 
(APIMonitoring.Com, 2010). Malwares as normal applications can keep the addresses 
of the required API functions in these fields and can use these addresses to find any API 
function that necessary during their execution. 
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Malwares that can infect any PE applications are known as PE malwares, which also 
known as Win32 malwares (Bradfield, 2010). PE malwares can call API functions as 
normal PE applications do, and Windows OS responds to PE malwares’ calls as its 
respond to normal PE applications. Windows OS cannot make any differentiate between 
the calls that made by PE malwares and PE normal applications (Szor, 2000). This 
situation encouraged PE malwares to misuse or abuse these API functions, and to hide 
their malicious activities from behaviour classifier models.  For instance, the API 
function RegQueryValuExA ( ) that called during installation of new PE applications, 
probably can be called by PE Trojan horse malwares to conduct communication with 
their resources so that they can get new updates. Therefore, a classifier model cannot 
easily decide either calling such functions is for malicious purposes or it is normal. 
Accordingly, cases like this call are either misclassified or correctly classified but with a 
low certainty degree (doubtfully classified) (K. S. Han, Kim, & Im, 2012b). This 
situation affects negatively on the accuracy degree of any classifier models.  
The accuracy of classifier models is directly affected by errors that may occur during 
the process of classifying objects. Errors, which mean misclassifying objects or objects 
that doubtfully classified, can be measured by computing parameters in two directions. 
In the first direction, the two types of False Alarms (FA), False Positive (FP) and False 
Negative (FN), should be obtained. This direction determines the number of objects that 
are incorrectly classified. The second direction defines the level of certainty with 
respect to the correct classification of objects. To obtain a high degree of certainty, 
classifier models usually depend on computing of the Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) 
(Yoshiro Fukushima et al., 2010). With respect to both directions, API call classifier 
models have low accuracy because they have a high FA rate, which indicates 
misclassification, and have high RMSE rate, which means objects have been classified 
doubtfully.  
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Researchers, in the past years, employed many tools and techniques to build API calling 
behaviour classifier models, although they have high FA and RMSE rates’ problem (M. 
Alazab, Venkatraman, & Watters, 2011; Fei Chen, 2009; Marhusin, Larkin, Lokan, & 
Cornforth, 2008; Miao Wang, 2009; Sami, Yadegari, Peiravian, Hashemi, & Hamze, 
2010). In each work, researchers have looked for different solutions to overcome the 
accuracy problems. Moreover, researchers studied different parts of API behaviour-
based detection systems to obtain features that more relevant to the accuracy problem 
(Father, 2004; Kwon et al., 2009). Accordingly, researchers proposed different API 
calling behaviour classifier models (K. S. Han, Kim, & Im, 2012a; Islam, Islam, & 
Chowdhury, 2012). Researches, even, tried to find some bio-oriented solutions from the 
Immune System (IS) algorithms to improve the accuracy of API calls classifier models 
(Khaled, Ab d ul-Kader, & Ismail, 2010). Bio-oriented models, sometimes referred as 
biological models, are inspired by several phenomena and algorithms that occur inside 
the Human Immune System (HIS) (Abdulalla, Kiah, & Zakaria, 2010; Zakaria, 2009). 
Since 1994, when the idea of the biological model was coined, different IS algorithms, 
such as Negative Selection, Clonal Selection, and Danger Method, have been widely 
used in different works and fields, particularly in malware detection models(Jieqiong 
Zheng 2010). Most IS algorithms depend on pattern-recognition and shape-matching 
processes. Many researchers found that biological models suffer from a high rate of FA 
(Xiao & Stibor, 2011). The most recent algorithm, Dendretic Cell Algorithm, which is 
considered as a second-generation algorithm for Artificial Immune System (AIS), has a 
problem in setting an appropriate threshold value for classifier models (Xiao & Stibor, 
2011). Hence, all AIS algorithms based models that used to classify malicious API calls 
need accuracy improvement as well.  
To provide this improvement, the current work intends to find a method that can control 
errors. The present work has found that a biological phenomenon, which is called co-
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stimulation and occurs inside IS, has been utilized as an error controller. The IS uses 
this biological error controller to eliminate errors occurred when a self-cell is classified 
as non-self-cell. This process means minimizing FA rates inside IS. Further, the 
phenomenon does not occur independently; it always comes in parallel with other IS 
activities to improve the detector’s ability (D Dasgupta, 2007). For this reason, this 
phenomenon is defined as a safety and balancing procedure within the work of AIS 
(Jieqiong Zheng 2010). Therefore, this present research proposes employing the 
functionalities of this phenomenon to overcome the exist drawbacks in the malicious 
API call classifiers.  
The aim of utilizing the concept of this phenomenon in malicious API call classification 
is to control the errors first, and subsequently start implementing improvements. The 
improvements that the current work intends to apply include increasing the certainty of 
objects that are doubtfully classified, which subsequently means improvement of the 
RMSE. The improvements also included minimizing the misclassification rate, and 
consequently, means decreasing the FA rate. As a result the accuracy can be improved. 
 
1.2 The Motivation of the Research 
 
Many recent studies have traced and analysed API calls that were made by suspected 
applications to detect and identify the PE malwares inside computer systems (M. Alazab 
et al., 2010; M Alazab et al., 2010; Miao et al., 2010; Sami et al., 2010). These were 
performed because malwares can bypass the valid AV software and can challenge them 
by using different signature-defeating techniques (M. Alazab et al., 2011). Secondly, 
with defeating techniques, such as encryption and polymorphic techniques, malwares 
can make changes on malware signatures but cannot make any changes on the type and 
the sequence of API calls (J-Y. Xu, 2004). In addition, any cancellation, deletion, or 
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modification of an API function during a PE execution would generate an end error 
message (Father, 2004). Therefore, the type and the way that API functions, as called by 
any PE malware, will not be changed even if the signature or the structure of codes has 
been modified. Furthermore, malwares should call the required API functions in order 
to be executed smoothly and correctly (Zhu & Liu, 2011; Zolkipli & Jantan, 2011). All 
above confirmed that for each malware a sequence of API functions is existed, and this 
sequence cannot be encrypted or changed for a specific malware unless the behaviour 
and the codes of the malware is changed totally (Szor, 2006).   
API behaviour-based detection systems have effective features and characteristics for 
classifying malicious API calls. The systems can nullify the effect of many defeating 
techniques and can provide indication on existing malicious API calls. More 
justifications have been structured and organized to explain the trends in using API call 
monitoring (Bayer, Habibi, Balzarotti, Kirda, & Kruegel, 2009; Peng, 2011; Tabish, 
Shafiq, & Farooq, 2009; H. Zhao, Zheng, Li, Yao, & Hou, 2009; Zhu & Liu, 2011). 
However, malwares usually challenge these trends by making their behaviour of calling 
API functions appear as normal. Malwares use the same procedures and ways to call 
API functions to hide their malicious and non-privileged behaviours from detection 
systems and the users’ eyes. Malwares try to display themselves as normal as possible 
by following the call sequences of some normal APIs (F. Y. Zhang, Qi, & Hu, 2011a).  
These malware behaviours negatively affect most malicious API call classifiers, and 
lead to misclassify cases as well as doubtfully classify objects, which in turn, puts the 
accuracy at a weak level. The existing similarity of API call sequences between normal 
and malware applications affects the accuracy of most malicious API call classifiers. 
By solving the similarity problem and improving the accuracy, API behaviour classifier 
models can attain relevant features and characteristics. Therefore, the current work 
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offers a bio-oriented solution that can improve the discrimination between two different 
cases that have similarity in behaviours. The present work can insert a part that is 
missed in most malicious API call classifiers, and can bring about improvement in 
accuracy. Furthermore, classifier techniques that are applied to sensitive cases or have 
numerous doubtful points can depend on the proposed model to achieve accurate 
results. By evaluating malwares, this work offers a new definition that explains 
malwares more at the detection stage. The proposed new version of malware definition 
can help malware analysts, and can explain malwares from the viewpoint of detection 
systems. 
 
1.3 The Problem Statements 
 
This research work targets to address the accuracy problem of the classifier models that 
distinguish malicious API calling behaviours. The work evaluates different types of 
malicious API calling classifier models with respect to the three types of features that 
are relevant to the accuracy problem. The features are False Positive (FP), False 
Negative (FN) and Root mean Square Error (RMSE). 
The accuracy of any malicious API classifier models will be affected negatively when 
they classify a malicious API sequence that has some similar characteristics with 
normal API sequences. Moreover, when a classifier model depends on some statistical 
measures, such as probability or frequency, their accuracy will be also affected 
negatively when the probability or frequency measure of a malicious API call came 
within the same range that a normal API call has. These problems are clearly illustrated 
in Figure 1-1 and Figure 1-2. 
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Figure ‎1-1 Comparison between normal and malware applications in a number of 
calls conducted for only six types of API functions 
 
To clarify the accuracy problem that related to Figure 1-1, we need to explain the 
concept of statistical based malicious API call classifier models. The concept of the 
classifier models that depend on statistical aspects states that if an API function called 
very frequently by malwares and very rarely by normal applications, such API call 
could be considered as distinguisher (Merkel, Hoppe, Kraetzer, & Dittmann, 2010). 
Figure 1-1 shows the result of a test that performed by this work on the most popular 
API functions that called by (400) malware and normal applications (More details of 
these tests are presented in later chapters). The work focused on six API functions and 
four types of PE applications (normal, virus, Trojan horse, and worm), as shown in 
Figure 1-1. The figure shows the percentage of calling an API by each types of PE 
application. From the figure, if we want to define a range for an API function with 
regard to each type of PE application we can see many crossing areas between them, 
where an API call will be either misclassified or doubtfully classified.  
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Figure 1-2 shows the result of a clustering technique that more frequently used by 
researchers to distinguish malicious API calls (Bayer, Comparetti, Hlauschek, Kruegel, 
& Kirda, 2009; Kinable & Kostakis, 2010; P. Li, Liu, Gao, & Reiter, 2011). Examples 
for classifying or clustering methods are Support Vector Machine (SVM) and Self-
organizing Maps (SOM) (Ando, Takahashi, & Suzaki, 2009). These type of classifier 
models depend on measuring the distance between the classes’ centre and the point that 
needs to be classified (B. Zhang, Yin, & Hao, 2006; Zou, Han, Liu, & Liu, 2009). The 
current work has employed the SOM method to cluster 24,526 vectors that represent 
normal and malicious API calls only, the details of which are presented in a latter 
chapter. The results shown in Figure1-2 illustrate that not all similar objects have the 
closer distances to a specific centre. With this situation many misclassified results as 
well as doubtful classified objects are expected.  
 
Figure ‎1-2 SOM classification and FA generation 
 
The two tests that mentioned before and some other tests that are explained in later 
(chapter 5), show the weak capability of many classifier models to distinguish malicious 
API calls. Results from these tests showed how the similarity between malicious API 
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calls and normal API calls negatively affect the accuracy of classifier models. The low 
accuracy is caused by the continuous inclusion of misclassified and doubtful points by 
the output from classifying malicious API calls with normal API calls.  
The main improvement that this work aims to achieve is to minimize the FP, FN and 
RMSE rates. As these three features have inverse relation with accuracy, minimizing the 
rates of these features means improving the accuracy. Moreover, to improve the rate of 
these features another problem should be solved, which is the instability of the threshold 
value that used as a distinguisher in malicious API calling classifier models. The 
outcomes of the clustering and classification based models are generally compared with 
a threshold value to distinguish and discriminate cases. Researchers have defined a 
value between 0.5 and 0.65 to formulate the threshold value (K. S. Han et al., 2012b; 
Zolkipli & Jantan, 2011). Even within this range, however, tests and evaluations 
showed that results are not clear with regard to misclassification points. Researchers 
usually change this value to minimize the FA rate and to improve the accuracy (Bayer, 
Comparetti, et al., 2009; Kinable & Kostakis, 2010; P. Li et al., 2011). Therefore, the 
aim of this work is also to present a new formula that enables a threshold value to work 
as an error controller beside case distinguisher.  
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1.4 The Research Questions 
 
This research intends to improve the accuracy of malicious API call-classifier models 
through using a bio-oriented solution. Therefore, the main question that this work wants 
to answer is how to devise an artificial classifier model which exactly can imitate an 
accurate biological classifier phenomenon. Other questions that this work wants to 
address in regard to this are: 
 
1. What are the problems in the malicious API calls classifier models that led to 
misclassify objects or doubtfully classifying objects? 
2. Which biological phenomenon is used by human Immune System (IS) as a 
classification error controller? 
3. What is the suitable tool or technique that can function as an artificial error 
controller?  
4. How the artificial error controller can function within an artificial classifier 
models? 
5. How is the effectiveness of the proposed ACC classifier model? 
 
  
 13 
 
1.5 The Objectives of Research 
 
The main objective of this work is to develop a bio-oriented model that can minimize 
the FP, FN and RMSE rates in malicious API calls classifier models. In order to achieve 
the main objective, this work focuses on the following sub-objectives: 
1. To study the relevant literatures on the API behaviour classifier models with 
respect to their accuracy; 
2. To determine a biological phenomenon that can avoid errors during classifying 
biological objects or cells; 
3. To propose an appropriate artificial error controller; 
4. To develop an Artificial Co-stimulation Classifier (ACC) model; and 
5. To test and evaluate the developed ACC model. 
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1.6 The Significant of the Study 
 
The study of classifying PE malwares with normal applications took another direction 
during the past years. Instead of investigating the detection of unseen signatures, 
researchers proposed different studies to reveal unseen PE malwares through classifying 
their API calling behaviours(Fu, Pang, Zhao, Zhang, & Wei, 2008; K. S. Han et al., 
2012a; Kwon et al., 2009; Sami et al., 2010; M. K. Shankarapani, Ramamoorthy, 
Movva, & Mukkamala, 2011). Through their studies, researchers have proposed 
different classifier models, and they employed different methods to distinguish 
malicious API calls. However, the behaviours’ similarity between normal and malware 
applications in calling API functions and system’s responding always challenges this 
direction of researching as an open source problem. This is because the existing 
behaviour’s similarities puts many API calling cases in a doubtful area or misclassified 
them. As a result, it impacts negatively on the accuracy of the classifier models.  
The project’s goal that designed by this work is for improving the accuracy of the 
malicious API calling classifier models. Through achieving this goal, the new direction 
of malware classification studies could be taken to better level of accuracy. Moreover, 
projects that need to classify different objects that have similar characteristics can get 
benefit from the proposed design.  
The goal that proposed by this work can be achieved through implementing a new bio-
oriented model. The proposed model, ACC, extracted from the functionality of a 
biological phenomenon that called co-stimulation. The phenomenon is occurred inside 
Human Immune System (HIS). Therefore, this work introduces a new functionality in 
the field of artificial immune system that supports, in general, pattern recognition 
projects, especially, the biological based projects.  
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1.7 The Scope of the Research 
 
In general, Figure 1-3 explains the scope that this research has considered. The scope 
covers two parts, namely, platform or OS and the applications. Details on the work 
scope are mentioned below: 
1. For OS, this work has covered only Windows OS. (details in sections 2.6,2.6.1, 
2.6.2, 3.3.1) 
2. This work has focused more on the PE structured type of application. 
3. PE malware is the only type that has been analysed in this work. However, only 
three families of the PE malware are considered, namely, viruses, Trojan horses, 
and worms, beside applications as normal PE. 
4. With regard to detection system, this work has focused only on the behaviour-
based detection system, in which the API calls in each application have been 
monitored. 
5. Only four major behaviours of PE applications have been monitored in this 
research, which are Application, Access, Register, and I/O with System Files.  
 
Figure‎1-3 The Underlined Scopes in this research 
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1.8 Organization of this study 
 
The flow between each chapter and inside each chapter is summarized as below: 
1.  In general, there are four sections in chapter 2: 
a. A section is related more on the current behaviour based and API 
calls monitoring models that used to detect malicious API and PE 
malwares. 
b. Another section illustrates the current biological algorithms and 
artificial immune system works that proposed as malware detection 
systems.  
c. A section illustrates the biological functionalities and activities of 
HIS. 
d. Last section shows the details of the theories and methods that used 
by this work to build and simulate the ACC model. 
2. Chapter 3 is more related to the methodology of this work. It explains the main 
framework of the ACC model. The chapter gives more details about each part of 
the ACC model. The functionality of each part and the theory that used to 
achieve each part are also explained. 
3. Chapter 4 illustrated the execution parameters and characteristics of each part in 
the ACC mode. It includes the results that obtained through model execution. 
4. Chapter 5 shows testing some major classifier models. Through this chapter, this 
work has evaluated results that have been obtained for testing these models. A 
compression between the tested classifier models and ACC modes has been 
illustrated in this chapter.  
5. Chapter 6 explains the conclusion and contributions of this research. The chapter 
also explains the achievements of the current research.  
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Chapter 2 
 
2. Classification of malicious API calls in PE malwares: Literature 
Review 
 
2.1 Introduction and Background 
 
Malwares are increasingly infecting more PE applications. As these applications 
supported by all versions of the Windows platform (Symantec, 2010), and malware 
authors easily find new vulnerabilities in such file structures. The PE structure has many 
fertile fields that malwares can use for hiding codes and data (Hamlen, Mohan, & 
Wartell, 2010). Moreover, Windows dynamically loads and maps all applications to the 
main memory. This platform also provides all required dynamic link library (DLL) 
functions to any application during execution. Such facilities smoothly and correctly 
execute any application, even malwares (Dabak, Phadke, & Borate, 1999; Schreiber, 
2001). Moreover, the facility allows PE malwares to become parts of the system. Thus, 
the integrated malwares can abuse system resources to propagate. Malwares can then 
easily exploit OS vulnerabilities through executor infection. 
Valid detection systems that reveal malwares face many challenges. First, unknown PE 
malwares can easily defeat signature-based detection systems (S. Yu, Zhou, Liu, Yang, 
& Luo, 2011). Therefore, behaviour-based detection systems can offer a ray of hope for 
the detection of unseen malwares. However, the accuracy of behaviour-based detection 
systems needs to be improved because these systems depend on discriminating normal 
behaviours from abnormal ones. In most cases, many overlapping areas exist. Such 
similarities in behaviour result in weak classification and detection.  
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This chapter covers subjects relevant to the main targets of our work. These subjects are 
divided into two classes related to a specific field. The first field is computer security; 
more precisely, computer malware and detection systems. This part concerns PE 
malware with behaviour-based detection systems that trace and monitor API calls. The 
second field is the biological field, which concerns the HIS phenomenon. This review 
intends to support the search for a bio-oriented approach that would improve the 
accuracy of classifying malicious API calls in PE applications.   
 
 
 
Figure‎2-1 The flow of literature review 
. 
Figure 2-1 illustrates the steps for the literature review in both fields. It also shows and 
explains the kind of relationships expected between each equivalent part in both fields. 
It explains the concept and the reason for a bio-oriented inspiration in a detection 
system.  
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2.2 Computer Security 
 
Computer security is a branch of computer systems known as information security. 
Although it is difficult to describe and specify a definition for computer security, in the 
context of computer science, it is almost meaning protecting and preventing accessing 
and altering information by unauthorised users (Salomon, 2010). Based on the areas 
associated with, computer security covered three main topics: 
1- Confidentiality; which means accessing information only by authorised person.  
2- Integrity; information should not be altered by unauthorised person in such a 
way that authorised users cannot detect it. 
3- Authentication; means users are the authorised persons. 
This work more concerned to keep integrity in computer security systems as malwares, 
which are unwanted or unauthorised softwares, can access and alter information inside 
the system in undetectable ways (Szor, 2006).  
Computer security has some functions such as detection, prevention, and recovery that 
usually used to analyse what the security system can do (Solomon, 1993). However, in 
this work the detection function is more concerned as the work deals with infected PE 
applications.  
Finally, computer security systems have some domains that define the level they can 
work there. Each domain mutually depends on one or some other domains. For instant, 
this work is more concerned with system security and network security domains 
because they related more with unwanted softwares that use networks to change system 
files and integrity.  
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Next section gives more details about those unwanted softwares which known as 
computer malwares, which they have ability to breach system security and alter system 
integrity.  
2.3 Computer Malwares 
 
The term “malware” covers all malicious types of software that are used for unwanted 
applications (Idika & Mathur, 2007). Although the term malware, which is shortened 
from malicious software, was coined to cover all types of unwanted applications, most 
computer end-users continue to use the term computer virus, instead of malwares, for 
unwanted software, such as Trojan horses and worms. The reason for such a mistake is 
related to the similar targets of these types of software attack in a computer. The term of 
malware is also used for those kinds of software or applications that interrupt and deny 
computer system operations. Malwares include applications that gather information and 
lead to loss of privacy or exploitation. Applications that gain unauthorized accesses to 
computer system resources can also be considered as malwares (Bradfield, 2010). 
The unwanted activities that used by malwares are to control execution flows of the 
infected applications and to achieve their payloads. Malwares also used the same 
unwanted actives to propagate inside the same victim host or infect more networks. 
Malwares usually try to propagate and infect successfully through defeat techniques or 
by checking for the system’s vulnerabilities (Szor, 2000). Through these techniques, 
malwares can overcome and bypass detection and prevision systems. Different 
malwares use different defeat techniques to hide themselves inside computer systems as 
well as conceal the system resources they abuse. At the same time, they use different 
vulnerabilities to penetrate computer systems (Bradfield, 2010). 
The variety of activities that malwares perform affects their definition and classification. 
As a definition, malwares are recently described as software designed to realize 
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malicious and shady goals on attacked computers or networks. Malwares are often 
described through some malicious activities (S. Yu et al., 2011). For instance, a new 
definition proposed recently (Vinod, Laxmi, & Gaur, 2011) is that malwares are 
exploiters of Internet vulnerabilities, network ports, OS resources, and peripheral 
devices. 
Malwares are defined through possible abusive activities performed during and after the 
infection cycle. The definition is a result of tracing the malware through behaviour 
monitoring. In both definitions, only the functionalities and misuse activities of 
malwares are explained. The definitions reflect the features and parameters used in the 
models to reveal the malwares. 
On the other aside, categorizing malwares mostly depends on the type and strategy 
performed by these applications for infecting and propagating (Bradfield, 2010). 
Accordingly, malwares fall under different families and classes, such as viruses, Trojan 
horses, and worms. In addition, the verity of platforms, programs, and hardware in 
computer systems display malwares in different structures and codes, using different 
programming languages. With such dependencies, malwares can only infect a special 
type of application.  
Although there are several classes of malwares and many activities performed by them, 
next section of this work gives more details about the main three types of malware and 
their behaviours inside the infected system. 
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2.4 Classes and Behaviours of Malwares 
 
Malwares infect and propagate in different ways. Classes of malware are properly 
identified by the way they are introduced into the target system and the policy these 
intend to breach (Szor, 2006). The three common types of malware are viruses, worms, 
and Trojan horses. Classes of malwares include spyware, bots, and backdoors. 
However, most of these are considered subclasses of the three main classes. To cover 
most of the activities that are considered to classify malware, researchers need to 
monitor the following behaviours (Ahmadi, Sami, Rahimi, & Yadegari, 2011; M. 
Shankarapani, Kancherla, Ramammoorthy, Movva, & Mukkamala, 2010) 
 
1- Some classes of malware need a user interface to start execution. Thus, they 
depend on execution, such as viruses and Trojan horses. Other types that can self-
execute, such as worms, do not need a second part (Lee, Im, & Jeong, 2011). 
2- After a malware is executed, either dependently or independently, it can replicate 
itself. Such a malware can insert a copy of itself inside new files or applications. 
Worms and viruses can perform such activation; however, Trojan horses cannot 
perform this replication (Rieck et al., 2008).  
3- Malwares can be either host-based or network-based. After replicating, a malware 
is going to find a new victim. If the malware can send a copy of itself over a 
network and the Internet, it is considered a network-based malware (worm). 
However, a malware that is limited by its search engine within the same victim 
computer is classified as a host-based malware (virus) (Fosnock, 2005; 
Technology, 2010).  
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Although malwares classified based on the above mentioned three main behaviours, 
another characteristic is also important to define classes for malwares, which is platform 
dependant. As mentioned in (Szor, 2006), it is difficult for malwares to be a multi-
platform infectors. Therefore, malwares are classified also based on the platform that 
they can penetrate. For example, PE malwares can only infect applications that follow 
the PE structure, and then they can penetrate platforms that support this structure. For 
instance, Windows-based applications support the PE structure. Therefore, malwares in 
such a structure can be considered platform-dependent. PE malwares are also called 
Win32 malwares (X. Hu, 2011). 
Next section gives more details about PE malwares and some of their behaviours. 
 
2.5 PE Malwares 
 
Based on the platform-dependant classification, PE malwares or Win32 malwares are a 
special class of malwares. They are called such because of the type of applications they 
infect. PE malwares only infect applications and files that follow the format of the PE 
structure (Merkel et al., 2010). As they infect only Windows-based applications, they 
are also defined as Win32 malwares. A sub-classification of PE malwares are included 
the main three classes of malware that mentioned in section 2.5. Accordingly, the name 
of these three groups of malware becomes PE virus, PE Trojan horse, and PE Worms.  
PE malwares take advantage of the vulnerabilities they find in the structure of PE 
applications. They find areas to hide their codes and payloads. Many malware authors 
prefer to infect PE applications because they knew  that malwares can survive over 
different versions of Windows OS (Szor, 2000). Analysts consider them the most 
frequently unwanted software, and AV vendors place them on top of the list of newly 
detected malwares.  
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Many AV vendors and malware analysts reported that new variants of known PE 
malwares could be generated more efficiently than other types of malware. Moreover, a 
very wide range of normal applications follows the PE format. Thus, malware authors 
find the second point as a reason to focus more on PE infectors than the other types 
because unseen malwares can be generated easily, and may infect a wide range of 
uninfected applications. 
Subsequent section explains the most important fields and sections located inside PE 
format and has strong relation with vulnerabilities that considered by PE malwares.  
2.5.1 PE Format 
 
The PE format is the executable file structure developed within the Windows NT 
version 3.1 OS. The format draws primarily from the Common Object File Format 
(COFF) specification common to UNIX OS (Microsoft, 2008). The format significantly 
changes the development environment and applications. One of the most important 
changes is the compatibility between the previous versions and all descendant versions 
of Windows. A PE file is organized as a linear stream of data. It is the native Win32 file 
format used by all Win32 executable formats. It contains many fields and sections, in 
addition to the data and codes for the application itself. The fields and sections are 
structured properly and are used to store data. Some of these data are used to address 
locations needed when a PE file is mapped on the main memory. Other data are used to 
find the addresses of these functions and the sub-routines required during the execution 
of a PE application. Therefore, sections either belong to the data or to the codes 
(Chappell, 2006; Pietrek, 1994).  
The structure of any PE file, as shown in Figure 2-2, starts with two fields with MS-
DOS compatibility. These two parts inform computer users that PE applications cannot 
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be executed outside MS-DOS. The subsequent parts, which are PE Header, PE 
Optional Header, Section Header, and Sections, are associated with PE execution.  
The PE Header contains information about the physical layout and properties of the 
file, whereas the PE Optional Header contains information about the logical layout of 
the PE file. The PE header tells the system how much memory is needed to set aside for 
mapping the executable format into the memory. 
 
Figure ‎2-2Format of PE applications (HZV, 2010) 
 
The PE Header file has 20 bytes and seven members. However, malware analysts are 
more frequently concerned with only two of the members (Microsoft, 2008, 2011) . 
1- NumberOfSection. It gives the number of sections a PE file has. Typically, the 
number is nine. However, applications may need more or less sections; thus, the 
number changes from one application to another. A malware can then insert a new 
section into the victim file and modify the content of this field.  
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2- Characteristics. It contains many flags that point to a specific situation. For 
example, a flag is used to identify whether a PE file is executable or is considered 
as a DLL. 
We move on to the next part, the PE Optional Header. This section comprises 224 
bytes. The last 128 bytes contain the DataDirectory. However, the first 96 bytes contain 
30 members. Members of the optional header that are closely related to malware 
activities are listed below (Y. Choi, Kim, Oh, & Ryou, 2009; Jajodia, 2009). 
1- AddressOfEntryPoint. It contains the relative virtual address (RVA) of the first 
instruction that is executed when the PE loader is ready to run the PE file. 
Malwares usually change this RVA to ensure execution of their codes within the 
PE instructions. 
2- SectionAlignment. The value in this field adjusts the sections of the PE in the main 
memory. It usually creates unused spaces between section offsets. 
3- FileAlignment. The value in this field adjusts the PE sections in the file. It also 
creates unused spaces between section offsets inside PE files. Malware can use 
these slack areas for inserting codes. 
4- SizeOfImage. With reference to the SectionAlignment, the value of this field 
displays the size of all headers and sections of a PE file inside the main memory. 
If a malware needs to increase or decrease the number of sections, the value inside 
this field would be modified. 
5- SizeOfHeaders. It is the size of all headers in a PE file, such as the DOS header, 
PE header, and section table’s header. Malwares need to modify the contents of 
these fields to make changes inside any section.  
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6- DataDirectory. It is an array of 16 structures. Each structure is related to an 
important data structure in the PE file, such as the import address table that is 
responsible for allocating the address of required API functions. Our work focuses 
only on two data directories: export and import data directories. These two data 
structures are better related to the addresses of API functions that may respond 
by/to the subroutines of the PE file during execution. 
 
The following section is on the section header, which is sometimes called the section 
table. It contains a number of structures in an array form. The number of structures 
should be equal to the number of sections in the section table. Each structure has 12 
members. However, only two members are more closely related to malware 
behaviours (Basics, 2010).  
 
1- VirtualSize. This field gives the exact size of each section’s data in bytes. 
Malwares modify the information in this field to correspond with the 
modifications they make.  
2- Characteristics. This field explains the status of each section in terms of the ability 
to read or write inside the section. It also explains whether the data are initialized 
or uninitialized. An important behaviour of malwares is inserting initialized data. 
Therefore, monitoring this field indicates monitoring an important behaviour of 
malwares. 
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The last part is specified for sections’ contain. Here, the sections contain the main 
content of the file, including codes, data, resources, and other executable information. 
Each section has a header and a body. The header is stored in the Section Header. The 
body, which is the section itself, is not properly structured. However, a linker can still 
organise them because the header contains enough information to decipher the content 
data (Hamlen et al., 2010; Y. Zhang, Li, Sun, & Qin, 2008). 
Typically, an application for Windows NT has nine predefined sections, namely, .text, 
.bbs, .rdata, .data, .rsrc, .edata, .idata, .pdata, and .debug. Each section is specific for a 
particular function mentioned below (Y. Choi et al., 2009; Hamlen et al., 2010; Jajodia, 
2009).  
1- .text section. Windows NT keeps all segments of executable codes inside this 
section. It is also contains the entry point codes of PE applications. In addition, it 
contains the jump thunk table that points to the import address table (IAT), which 
facilitates the search for the API functions called by a subroutine.  
2- .bss section. Any PE application has uninitialized data, including variables that are 
declared as static within a function or source model. This section is used to 
represent such data. 
3- .rdata section. This area is used to keep recent read-only data. 
4- .data section. This section keeps initialized variables and variables used globally 
in applications and modules. 
5- .rsrc section. This section keeps resource information for a module or application. 
6- .edata section. It keeps the Export Directory for an application or DLL. When 
present, this section contains information on the names and addresses of exported 
functions. 
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7- .idata section. This section contains different information about imported 
functions, including the Import Directory and IAT. 
8- .debug section. This section contains different information about imported 
functions, including the Import Directory and IAT. 
 
Above sections and fields are mostly targeted by PE malwares as vulnerabilities. Next 
section gives some explanations on these vulnerabilities.   
2.5.2 The Vulnerabilities in PE Format 
 
Permitting malware authors to insert new or modify existing codes and data inside 
sections and fields of PE files considered as the simplest vulnerability. A PE is 
organized into a linear stream of data. It contains many fields and sections, aside from 
the data and codes for the application itself (Szor, 2000). Any PE Explorer software can 
exploit the structure of PE applications and then reveal information and data inside each 
section and field (Bayer, Kruegel, & Kirda, 2006). Moreover, tools such as text/HEX 
editor or WinHex can manually edit the contents of each section and field in a PE 
application (Technology, 2010). Therefore, malware authors can easily open and view 
the format of any PE application to look for vulnerabilities (Basics, 2010).  
The second vulnerability is going back the structure of the PE format itself. It helps a 
malware move through the old to the latest versions of the Windows OS because the PE 
file format has not changed since its development in Windows NT 3.1. Therefore, 
escaping between versions is not difficult for malwares because the above-mentioned 
vulnerabilities still remain (Szor, 1998).  
Another important vulnerability is the slack and free area that exists in all PE files, 
which is attributed to the memory alignment procedure. All PE files use information in 
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the FileAlignment and SectionAlignment fields for blocking the codes and data sections 
accordingly. The size specified by the FileAlignment identifies the memory alignment 
on the disk drive, whereas SectionAlignment identifies the mapping process on the main 
memory. However, the entire space of a block may not be filled with codes and data (M. 
Alazab et al., 2010). Thus, free spaces are left in some sections.  
Malware authors use information in six fields to find spaces and slack areas that are left 
by mapping data and codes into sections: VirtualSize, VirtualAddress, 
PointerToRawData, SizeOfRawData, FileAlignment,and SectionAlignment (Dunham, 
2011). Malwares misuse these free areas to inject codes and instructions for their 
payload. Figure 2-3 shows the status of a slack area that could be found in any section 
and block in a PE format. 
 
 
Figure‎2-3Memory block with filled and free space area 
 
Another vulnerability of a PE format is the possibility of editing the contents of the 
fields (Milenkovi , Milenkovi , & Jovanov, 2005). Malware authors can find the RVA 
of the original entry point (OEP), where the first code of a PE format is executed, using 
any PE viewer. After injecting its codes and instructions, a malware needs to execute 
them to achieve payloads and propagations. A malware can control the path of 
execution by modifying the address in the OEP. It changes the exiting OEP into a new 
Free area 
Filled-up area 
VirtualSize 
SizeOfRawData 
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OEP that references the start point of the malware’s codes. Afterward, it can use the 
FreeLibrary function to start executing malware codes and then return the control back 
to the normal codes of the infected PE. Through this process, a malware can execute its 
codes and propagate to infect other files. However, the process requires some API 
functions that could be achieved dynamically through the PE format (Focardi et al., 
2011).  
Finding the name and the address of any API function can be achieved smoothly and 
correctly through the PE format. The process merely needs two API functions to find 
the name and address of other API functions. Applications normally use the 
LoadLibraryA function to link with a DDL file and then use the GetProcAddress to find 
the address of the API function that is expected in the loaded DDL file. The export table 
and import table of the API function responds to both the LoadLibraryA and 
GetProcAddress functions (Microsoft, 2008). A malware misuses this vulnerability as 
well (Sami et al., 2010). It uses this dynamic process of the PE format to find the name 
and the address of any API function it needs during execution (Cheng Wang, 2009). 
Malwares, maliciously, can call API functions by knowing their addresses or the 
addresses of their addresses, as shown in Figure 2-4. With one of the codes below, 
Windows provides the API function requested by a program (M. K. Shankarapani et al., 
2011; Szor, 2002).  
 
Call EBX   ; EBX = pointer to function address 
   ; of GetProcAddress or LoadLibraryA 
 
Call [EBX]  ; EBX = address holding function 
   ; address of GetProcAddress or 
   ; LoadLibraryA 
 
Figure‎2-4Using both types of calls to find addresses of an API function 
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New malicious API calls by malwares always used whenever malware authors discover 
new vulnerability / ies inside the structure of the PE. On the other side, malware 
detection researchers also perform studies on such formats to trace the fingerprints of 
malicious API calls of new PE malware (Szor, 2006).The next section shows the 
purposes that a PE malware makes malicious API calls for.  
2.6 Abusing API Function Behaviours of PE Malwares 
 
As mentioned in section 2.3, PE malwares can affect OS integrity. They gain this 
capability after successfully infecting executable files (Solomon, 1993). Through PE 
format infection, a PE malware can exploit OS vulnerabilities and then insert codes into 
some parts of the OS. Then, they can abuse system resources to infect more files (Essam 
Al Daoud, 2008). 
The infection of executable formats allows PE malwares to take over OS resources 
easily and then use these resources as normal applications (Bo-yun Zhang, 2006). One 
of the most important resources a PE malware uses is the API function. A PE malware 
needs to call such system functions to execute its functionalities smoothly and normally 
inside the Windows OS (S. Choi et al., 2007). As illustrated in Figure 2-4, a malware 
can easily find the address of a system call that needs through execution (M. Alazab et 
al., 2010).  
A malware can call an API function in the same way that a normal application does. 
However, it has a different purpose for such a call. A malware differs from a normal 
application in calling an API function in that the malware abuses these functions to 
perform payloads and to propagate (Bai et al., 2009). Therefore, during malware system 
calling, malware analysts see some behaviours that are not frequently seen during the 
system calls of normal applications (M Alazab et al., 2010). .  
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Table  2-1 gives some examples of API functions that malwares and normal applications 
often call. The table explains how the purpose of calling an API function differs 
between a malware and a normal application. Through this table, we show a few 
examples of API functions that are abused by many malwares (Microsoft, 2011).  
 
Table ‎2-1Abusing behaviours of API functions by Malware 
# 
Name of API 
Function 
Normal Applications 
Malwares 
1.  LoadLibirary  ( ) To point the required 
.dll file  
Used as pointer to find more 
.dll files 
2.  GetProcAddress ( )  To find an API function 
address in a specific .dll 
To find an API function 
address in .dll file that 
malware need it. 
3.  InternetOpen ( ) 
InternetOpenURL ( ) 
InternetReadFile ( ) 
They used for Internet 
connections and 
download files. 
Used to download and install 
payload to victim PC 
4.  Group of Reg ( ) They used to predefine 
which program is 
necessary to execute 
when Windows started-
up. 
Abused by malwares to 
execute their codes each time 
Windows run or a program 
run to ensure the propagation 
5.  CopyFile ( ) It uses to copy the 
existing file into a new 
file. 
Abuses by malware during 
changing the attributes of an 
existing file to copy it 
somewhere in memory.  
 
The trend of abusing of such API functions by PE malwares is an implicit activity 
because of the similarities of the purposes of API calling for different applications. 
Through the next section, this work explains how similar behaviours of malicious API 
calls are classified, and how penetrating normal behaviour by malicious API calls are 
misclassified.  
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2.7 Classification of API calls Behaviours 
 
In API behaviour classification, finding calls with similar behaviour is always the main 
target of some predefined malwares. Behaviours of a malware always could be 
identified through tracing the API calling sequence. This is because; tracing and 
analysing the API calls of an application explains how it executes and interacts with 
computer systems, and how it tries to call the services and functions of that system 
during execution (Symantec, 2010).  
API-behaviour-based classifier models depend on the degree of similarity between the 
predefined and unseen sequence of API calls. Figure 2-5 shows the sequence of calling 
API functions by two malware (M1 and M2). The figure shows the similarity between 
the sequences of function calling. The only difference is in the fifth step, which is 
related to the type of activities that both malwares need to achieve; where M1 performs 
network misuse and M2 manipulates the registry contents. API behaviour classifier 
models considered such two sequences as similar and classify both in malware class. 
 
 
Figure ‎2-5 Similarity between API calls in two malwares 
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Like the API functions of Figure 2-5, malwares can misuse many other API functions. 
For instant, the API function CreateWindowExA misused by malwares to build a 
message and present it to user ones it has executed (Dunham, 2011). Other functions 
misused for other activities. For example, below functions may use by malwares to 
control HTTP communication: “HttpSendRequestExA, HttpQueryInfoA , 
HttpSendRequestExW , InternetQueryDataAvailable , InternetReadFileExA , 
HttpSendRequestW, GetUrlCachEntryInfoW”(Szor, 2000). Such calls supposedly show 
abnormalities as malwares misuse them for different malicious behaviours. However, 
some parts of this sequence remain similar to normal behaviours.  
As shown in Figure 2-5, the first four calls that are used by both malwares are often 
found in the API sequence of normal applications. Malwares and normal applications 
often use these four API functions to acquire information about functions that form the 
OS. As a second example, a system call sequence can have the following form: 
“OpenRegistry, ManipulateRegistry, OpenSocket, WriteSocket, ...”; this form can 
characterize malicious calls that manipulate the Windows registry database and then 
transmit information through network socket operations (Xiao & Stibor, 2011). Some 
other malwares misuse API function by inserting their malicious calls in the path of 
normal calls. For instant, if the GetDate function is in the sub-sequence of the 
CreateFile, then the name of the file depends on the data and varies from data set to 
another (Bayer, Comparetti, et al., 2009). Although, malware analysts consider such 
behaviour as a malicious call because normal applications do not need to do these 
procedures, malicious classifier models cannot distinguish them accurately. 
 
 
 36 
 
There are many calls that made by malwares; however, a normal program may do the 
same calling sequences too. Many functions are used properly by a normal application 
for a privileged activity while they misused by a malware for non-privileged issues 
(Table 2-1). Furthermore, the way that both types of application call systems and the 
ways the system responds bring both normal and malware system-calling behaviours 
close to each other. 
This level of similarity makes distinguishing the normal calls from the malicious calls 
difficult for classifier models. Therefore, many classifier models either misclassify 
unseen calls or doubtfully classify them into a class. Both situations negatively affect 
the accuracy of the classifier model. 
Next section presents many methods that proposed by researchers as malicious API call 
classifier models to distinguish malicious calls in PE malwares. 
 
2.8 Review on Malicious API calls Classifier Models 
 
Although the concept of API tracing goes back to 1996, researchers proposed active 
efforts on this topic only after 2005 (Omer, 2009). Moreover, the idea of infecting 
executable files goes back to December 1986. At the time, Ralf Burger, who is the 
creator of the Virdem,  presented a model of programs that could replicate themselves 
by adding their codes to executable DOS files in .COM format (Solomon, 1993). The 
codes that presented by Burger were considered the first MS-DOS executable infectors. 
However, the first Win32 (Windows 95 and Windows NT) infector goes back to 1996, 
when a few viruses penetrated Windows 95 through the PE format. For instance, a 
Win32 virus called “Win95.Punch” that could infect the .EXE format and stay in the 
memory as a VxD driver was discovered. Similarly, the virus BOZA, created by some 
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Australian Virus Laboratory and Distribution (VLAD) group, appeared the same year 
Windows 95 was introduced (Fu et al., 2008; Szor, 1998). 
After that, the PE infectors or Win32 viruses developed gradually. However, until 2000, 
the field of PE or Win32 viruses was still in its early stage, as mentioned in (Szor, 
1998). The most important problem found at that time was the compatibility of 
Windows 95 that kept most DOS-based viruses compatible with the new Widows 95, 
such as the Yankee-Doodle (Szor, 2000). Based on our best knowledge the first article 
that covers PE infectors, the techniques used to penetrate Windows OS and some 
detection strategies were conducted in 1998 (Szor, 1998). The author published a new 
version of his article in (Szor, 2000). The author succeeded to describe the format of the 
PE files and the locations that the viruses most possibly changed or modified. 
Moreover, he explained how computer viruses abused the Win32 API in Windows 95. 
He mentioned the necessity of working with some behaviour-based techniques to detect 
PE infectors.  
At present, different detection models depend on disparate methods and techniques to 
detect PE malwares (Xiang, Hao, Zhang, & Liu, 2008). However, detection models 
operate as knowledge-based, statistical-based, or machine-learning-based systems (Szor, 
2006). The independent parameters of any detection models are changed, depending on 
their types. For instance, the knowledge-based detection system, also known as the 
signature-based detection system, depends on some predefined strings inside a 
suspected file. Meanwhile, statistical- and machine-learning-based systems frequently 
use other parameters, such as API call tracing or instructions and redundant code 
monitoring (Essam Al Daoud, 2008). Moreover, all detection models are either static-
based or dynamic-based systems. Static detection models check suspected files and 
applications without executing them. However, dynamic execution models scan the 
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execution behaviours of a suspected application (Bergeron et al., 2001).  To reveal the 
malicious API, models use statistical or machine learning systems.  
Another type of classifier models have been proposed based on some bio-oriented 
solutions (Fuyong & Deyu, 2011). Their conceptual originated on the functionalities 
that occur inside HIS. In this topic, many algorithms proposed to mimic the activities of 
cells and detectors inside HIS. Always, the ability of HIS on adapting to classify harm 
non-self-cells with self-cells was the main objective for bio-oriented studies. Their 
objectives were to find more accurate classifier models that can distinguish the 
behaviours of malicious API calls. Many behaviour-based techniques and methods  that 
depend on biological or non-biological concepts are explained in the survey papers of 
(Idika & Mathur, 2007; Jacob, Debar, & Filiol, 2008; Vinod, Jaipur, Laxmi, & Gaur, 
2009). However, for both cases, many researchers depend on Equation 2-1 to compute 
the accuracy of their classifier and detection models (Yoshiro Fukushima et al., 2010). 
 
Equation  2-1 
         
     
           
 
where TP is the true positive, TN is the true negative, FP is false positive, and FN
 is false negative. 
Next two sections show the review on both types of malicious API calls classifier 
models that used to distinguish malicious calls in PE malwares.   
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2.8.1 Non-Biological API Detection Models 
 
Detection systems that depend on statistical and machine learning algorithms or 
methods may be considered as non-biological models. They use techniques, such as 
data mining, conditional probability, the Naive Bayes theory, neural network, fuzzy 
logic, and other machine learning techniques. Researchers use disparate non-biological 
models in recent years to propose detection systems. In 2001, a non-biological model 
was proposed in (Schultz, Eskin, Zadok, & Stolfo, 2001) to reveal malicious executable 
files. These models depend on the frequency calculation of API functions that are called 
by benign and malware applications. They use the frequency figures to find features for 
their mining systems. They train their system on the known features of malware. Data 
mining techniques are used to detect unseen malwares, whereas the Naive Bayes 
method is used to classify the suspected executable file.  
Another non-biological model, the heuristic technique, was used by (Szor, 2002) by 
executing a suspected application in a virtual machine. To develop this heuristic model, 
the author referred to his article (Szor, 2000), explaining most sections and fields in a 
PE file whose contents the malware might modify. The study monitored the API calls 
used by normal applications or abused by three types of malware during memory 
access. The author evaluated the monitored API to reveal malicious executable.  
A static model was proposed by (Bergeron et al., 2001) to reveal executable codes. 
Authors in this work represent an API call or a block of API calls as an intermediate 
form. The authors showed the direction of the flow between these intermediate blocks. 
Finally, the work extracted a control flow compared with many security policies to 
reveal malicious executable codes.  
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When malwares penetrate systems, they inject malicious codes, dynamically generate 
malicious codes, or perform obfuscated malicious codes (Xiang et al., 2008). These 
behaviours could be revealed by tracing and monitoring the API calls of a suspected PE 
file, as was conducted in a study proposed by (Rabek, Khazan, Lewandowski, & 
Cunningham, 2003). Another powerful method used by different malwares is the 
polymorphic technique. This technique gives malware the ability to change signatures 
and to rearrange codes (Szor, 2006). Therefore, signature-based detection systems 
cannot overcome such malwares. More time and effort are required to analyse 
polymorphic malwares as they become more complex. By controlling API functions 
and system calls, such techniques could be revealed, as proposed by (J-Y. Xu, 2004). In 
the aforementioned work, the similarity was measured between the original virus and 
the variants that were generated through polymorphic techniques. A threshold value was 
defined to evaluate the degree of similarity between two API call sequences. Thus, the 
degree of similarity between two API sequences could be obtained, and accordingly, the 
two most similar sequences could be identified. 
Different behaviours of malware, including mass mailing and registry overwriting, were 
used by (Mori, 2004) to define malicious codes. They defined these behaviours on the 
level of Win32 API calls. Static code analysis and dynamic code simulation were 
combined to identify these behaviours. The authors argued that different types of mail 
malware could be detected by tracing Win32 API calls through their respective 
proposed approach.  
To analyse malware behaviours, malware analysts rely on manual steps. An approach 
was proposed by (Bayer et al., 2006) to analyse malware dynamically by increasing the 
number of malwares. Their proposed work found similar dynamic behaviours for 
malware based on certain predefined policies. During their implementation, they 
depended on tracing the Win32 API calls, as in the previous studies. 
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One of the most important behaviours of malware is propagation among files within the 
same host or propagation over networks (C. W. J. P. R. Zhao & Liu, 2009). A model 
was proposed by (Y. Ye, Wang, Li, & Ye, 2007) to implement malware detection based 
on propagation behaviour. In this work, the authors relied on data mining to develop a 
model by using an objective-oriented association mining-based classification. Through 
this approach, vectors of Win32 API calls could be monitored to detect malwares.  
Malwares can locate each address of required API functions via different means. For 
instance, the Boza virus uses hard-coded addresses, whereas Win32.Bozano uses 
homonymy functions. However, most malwares, such as Win32.Aztec, use a string 
array to store the name and address of API calls. Consequently, researchers (Fu et al., 
2008) proposed an approach for extracting API calls in suspected files. Some indirect 
API calls made by many malwares could not be revealed easily. This issue was solved 
by comparing the original API call sequences and the indirect API call policies used by 
the malwares.   
Considering that the number of malicious codes approximately equals the number of 
normal codes (Shabtai, Moskovitch, Elovici, & Glezer, 2009), additional studies were 
conducted from 2008 through 2012 to detect malicious API calls. Table 2-2 mentions 
most of these studies.  
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Table ‎2-2 Summary of Related Works for Non-Biological Malware Detection Models 
# Title Methods Contribution Note 
1.  Data mining methods for detection of new malicious 
executable 
Data mining , Naive Bayes The author used DM method to predict unseen malwares (Schultz 
et al., 
2001) 
2.  Heuristic detection of malicious computer code by page 
tracking 
Emulating and Virtual machine  Tracing memory accessing behaviour (Szor, 
2002) 
3.  Static detection of malicious code in executable 
programs 
Evolutionary methods.  Behaviour of API calls could be used to reveal malwares (Bergeron 
et al., 
2001) 
4.  Detection of injected, dynamically generated, and 
obfuscated malicious code 
Evolutionary method. API calls could be used to reveal three different behaviours; 
Inject MC, Dynamically generated MC, and Obfuscated MC 
(Rabek et 
al., 2003) 
5.  Polymorphic Malicious Executable Scanner by API 
Sequence Analysis 
Cosine Similarity method. 
Extended Jaccard measure. 
Pearson’s correlation measure 
They can find similarity between original viruses and 
variants generated by polymorphic technique.  
(J-Y. Xu, 
2004) 
6.  Behavior-based malicious executable detection by multi-
class SVM 
Support Vector Machine Using SVM to find out more than one classes of malwares (Zou et 
al., 2009) 
7.  Detecting Unknown Computer Viruses – A New 
Approach 
Evaluation Similarity Defined policies that can detect malwares’ behaviours at 
Win32 API calls level. 
(Mori, 
2004) 
8.  TTAnalyze: A tool for analyzing malware Evaluation Similarity Extract malware behaviour at Win32 API call level.  (Bayer et 
al., 2006) 
9.  Static Detection of API-calling Behavior from Malicious 
Binary Executable 
Evaluation Similarity Defined API call policies by malwares (Fu et al., 
2008) 
10.  Learning and classification of malware behavior 
 
Classification using Support Vector 
Machine 
New form of malware policies defined. (Rieck et 
al., 2008) 
11.  A SOM based malware visualization system using 
resource access filter of virtual machine 
Self-Organizing Map 
Unsupervised NN 
Visualizing malware activates and behaviours (Ando et 
al., 2009) 
12.  Detecting Malicious Behaviour Using Critical API-
Calling Graph Matching 
Matching on Critical API calls that 
doing Transfer and Jumping 
Defining Critical API calls policies. (Bai et 
al., 2009) 
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functionality 
13.  Scalable, behavior-based malware clustering Locality Sensitive Hashing. It is a 
probabilistic  algorithm.   
Reducing dimensionality to put similar pattern in the same 
bucket (container).  
(Bayer, 
Comparet
ti, et al., 
2009) 
14.  A view on current malware behaviors Used an analysis tool to study the 
behaviours of one million malwares 
Obtained the most activities of malware, through observing 
one million malwares 
(Bayer, 
Habibi, et 
al., 2009) 
15.  Using API Sequence and Byase Algorithm to Detect 
Suspicious Behavior 
Bayes Algorithm. Extract features 
(behaviours) based on frequency 
calculation. 
Shows API functions that used to achieve each behaviours 
of malwares 
(Wang et 
al., 2009) 
16.  Malware Detection Based on Structural and Behavioural 
Features of API Calls 
1- n-gram to find executable 
distribution. 
2- Extract behaviour features 
of API. 
3- SVM for training and 
classification. 
Checking malwares in three stages: 
1- API hooking. 
2- File modification. 
3- DLL modification tracing. 
(M. 
Alazab et 
al., 2010) 
17.  Towards Understanding Malware Behaviour by the 
Extraction of API Calls 
Evaluation  similarity Categorized malware behaviours by referencing the API 
calls for each behaviour 
(M 
Alazab et 
al., 2010) 
18.  Reining In Windows API Abuses with In-lined 
Reference Monitors 
Evaluation similarity  File base classification to detect malwares (Hamlen 
et al., 
2010) 
19.  Malware detection using statistical analysis of byte-level 
file content 
Statistical evaluation File base classification to detect malwares (Tabish et 
al., 2009) 
20.  Using Aggregation Technology to Improve System Call 
Based Malware Behavior Detection 
Statistical Evaluation Collecting behaviours of processes and their relation to 
system calls 
(Peng, 
2011) 
21.  APICapture-A tool for monitoring the behavior of 
malware 
Monitoring events Monitoring API calls in three level: User, Kernel, and Call-
back functions.  
(Miao et 
al., 2010) 
22.  Malware detection based on mining API calls Data mining Monitoring API calls and mining them to reveal malicious 
API 
(Sami et 
al., 2010) 
23.  Differentiating malware from cleanware using 
behavioural analysis 
Classification with k-fold process. New features for malware have been defined (Tian et 
al., 2010) 
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24.  Fuzzy Neural Network for Malware Detect Fuzzy and Neural Network Using new method to detect malwares (Y. 
Zhang, 
Pang, 
Yue, & 
Cui, 
2010) 
25.  Malicious Executable Classification Based on 
Behavioral Factor Analysis 
SVM Extracting malware behaviour report and consider them as a 
features. 
(H. Zhao, 
Xu, 
Zheng, 
Yao, & 
Ho, 2010) 
26.  Malware Family Classification Method using API 
Sequential Characteristic 
Similarity measurement Extracting malware behaviour report and consider them as a 
features. 
(K.-S. 
Han et al., 
2011) 
27.  A study of malware detection and classification by 
comparing extracted strings 
Strings similarity Comparing strings similarity between two files (Lee et 
al., 2011) 
28.  Malware detection using assembly and API call 
sequences 
Similarity analysis based on some 
quantitative measures 
They propose two malware detection approach: analyser and 
dissembler 
(M. K. 
Shankara
pani et 
al., 2011) 
29.  Scattered Feature Space for Malware Analysis Classifying malwares Analyse the content of PE header and body. (Vinod et 
al., 2011) 
30.  Detecting Malware Variants by Byte Frequency Distance and similarity measures. Frequency of byte calculation to detect malware.  (S. Yu et 
al., 2011) 
31.  Malware detection using pattern classification Pattern match algorithm, 
Statistically 
Uses four types of futures, beside the DLL functions, to 
revel malwares 
(Wan, 
2012) 
32.  Computational Intelligent Techniques and Similarity 
Measures for Malware Classification 
SVM with measuring the similarity 
of API call sequences 
Combined SVM and Similarity measures  
Achieved (85%) of accuracy from similarity. 
(Shankarp
ani, 
Kancherla
, Movva, 
& 
Mukkama
la, 2012) 
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33.  Malware Detection using Windows API Sequence and 
Machine Learning 
Used Abscission Mining 
Classification  
Compute an accuracy better than SVM, Naïve Bayes, and 
Decision Tree techniques 
(Ravi & 
Manohara
n, 2012) 
34.  Malware detection based on evolving clustering method 
for classification 
Rule based clustering The work defined some rules for each family of malwares (Ramadas
s, 2012) 
35.  Detecting unknown anomalous program behavior using 
API system calls 
Frequency – time based API calls 
classifier 
The accuracy of this model crossed (88%) (Islam et 
al., 2012) 
36.  Malware Classification Methods Using API Sequence 
Characteristics 
API call sequence Analysis  The work can measure the damages in infection rate. (K. S. 
Han et al., 
2012b) 
37.  Detection Methods for Malware Variant Using API Call 
Related Graphs 
Analyse API call sequence Detecting malware variances  (K. S. 
Han et al., 
2012a) 
38.  Euclidean distance based method for unclassifiable 
region of support vector machine 
SVM and Euclidean Method To solve unclassified cases in unclassified region for multi-
classes classifier models. 
(R. B. Li, 
Li, Cai, 
Li, & 
Wang, 
2010) 
39.  Intelligent file scoring system for malware detection 
from the gray list 
SVM and associative classifier Used SVM to define good boundary, and associative 
classifier to define relation between input and outputs 
(Y. Ye, 
Li, Jiang, 
Han, & 
Wan, 
2009) 
40.  PE-Miner: Mining Structural Information to Detect 
Malicious Executables in Realtime 
SVM and Decision try classifier Used Decision try to extract features and SVM to classify 
them 
(Shafiq
, Tabish, 
Mirza, & 
Farooq, 
2009) 
41.  An intelligent PE-malware detection system based on 
association mining 
Used Objective-Oriented 
Association data mining 
Depended on mining the sequence of API calls (Y Ye, 
Wang, Li, 
Ye, & 
Jiang, 
2008) 
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The summary of this review includes non-biological detection system models that 
depend on API call behaviours: 
1- API call behaviour-based detection systems are reliable and efficient. 
2- These behaviour based detection systems could be achieved statically or 
dynamically, or via a combination of both. 
3- Behaviours, such as code injection, dynamical code generation, and code 
obfuscation, could be revealed by tracing and monitoring API calls. 
4- Techniques and tools that are used to generate variants from one malware could be 
overcome. 
5- Behaviours such as mass mail and file registry modification with other behaviours 
could be controlled and monitored by tracing API calls. 
6- Propagation behaviours that are somehow implemented without the user’s 
knowledge could be displayed through API call evaluation. 
7- Most studies depend on measuring the similarity between known and unknown 
API call vectors. 
8- The trend of most AV research is toward revealing malware behaviours 
dynamically.  
9- The major algorithms used to classify API call vectors include 
a. Supervised neural network, 
b.  Self-organizing map (unsupervised neural network), 
c.  Support vector machine, 
d.  Statistical methods. 
10- API call monitoring and tracing could also be used by malware analysts to 
dynamically trace and check new malware. 
11- API call analysis is also used in many fields and for different purposes such as the 
preservation of copyright and birthmark of programs. (S. Choi et al., 2007) 
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12- Recent studies [35-40]  provided the following information: 
a. The behaviour of API call sequences are used actively by researchers. 
b. The approach that combines statistical tools or intelligent techniques 
with similarity measures has been presented. 
c. Many studies have proposed to compare and check the accuracy of 
different malicious API call classifier models. 
2.8.2 Biological API detection systems 
 
Biological models show the marked similarity between the behaviours of biological 
viruses and computer malware (Boase & Wellman, 2001). Moreover, the huge demand 
for a security defence system that can work as efficiently and accurately as the HIS is 
one of the objectives behind all these biological models (Elgert, 2009; Julie Greensmith, 
2010; Paul K. Harmer, 2002). The second objective involves the investigation on the 
ability of the HIS to detect unseen foreign bodies (Elgert, 2009). The reason is that 
detecting unseen malware is one of the serious problems that challenge valid malware 
detection models as they scan zero-day malwares (M. Alazab et al., 2011; AV-
Comparative, 2010).  
The principles and fundamentals of HIS were discussed for the first time by (Forrest, 
Perelson, Allen, & Cherukuri, 2002), who proposed the bio-oriented model, “Self and 
non-self-discrimination in a computer.” Conducted since 1994, the self and non-self-
discrimination approach remained one of the foundations of every biological detection 
model. The drawbacks that emerged later motivated researchers to implement 
improvements.  
The algorithm for the self and non-self-discrimination approach is called the negative 
selection algorithm (NSA) (Kim & Bentley, 2001). It classifies detectors into two 
classes: self-class, which represents normal application behaviours or strings, and non-
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self, which represents malware behaviours. The implementation of the NSA algorithm 
proceeds as follows: an unknown string or behaviour that does not match any detector 
inside the self-class could be considered as a detector inside the non-self-class (Kim & 
Bentley, 2001).  
A number of researchers (Fuyong & Deyu, 2011; Ji & Dasgupta, 2009; Shen, Wen-Jian, 
& Xu-Fa, 2007; Tao, Shiguang, & Dejiao, 2010; Yang, Deng, Chen, & Wang, 2011) 
proved that not every unknown string or behaviour could be considered as non-self. 
This issue was noted as a main drawback for the NSA; it encouraged researchers to 
work on this aspect to improve the algorithm (Fuyong & Deyu, 2011; Kim & Bentley, 
2001; P. T. Zhang, Wang, & Tan, 2010). 
The clonal selection algorithm (CSA) was one of the alternative algorithms to NSA that 
was proposed to build detection or classification models (Khaled et al., 2010; 
Xiangrong Zhang 2004; Y. Yu & Hou, 2004; Zuben, 2001). In using the CSA, classes 
are divided into two main classes: self-detectors and non-self-detectors. Unlike the case 
in NSA, maturation in CSA is performed among non-self-detectors to generate unseen 
non-self-detectors. The new non-self-detectors are then compared with the known self-
detectors. If a match is found during the comparison, the newly generated non-self-
detector is cancelled. Otherwise, the non-self-detector is considered a member of the 
non-self-detector class (Zuben, 2001). The CSA can effectively detect variants of old 
viruses and malwares because the CSA process generates new variants of detectors from 
old detectors. One of the drawbacks of the CSA is its weak diversity that is due to the 
maturation inside the same domain of non-self-detectors, which also causes global 
optimization problems (Yidan Luo & Jiang, 2008).  
Another alternative to NSA is the danger theory (U Aickelin & Cayzer, 2002). Similar 
to the self and non-self-approaches, the danger theory supports the classification 
process. In this theory, the HIS responds only to danger cases among numerous foreign 
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cases found. A non-self-behaviour does not have to be classified as malware. Detection 
models should be able to distinguish between a dangerous, hostile, or unfriendly non-
self-behaviour(U. Aickelin, Bentley, Cayzer, Kim, & McLeod, 2003; Kim, Greensmith, 
Twycross, & Aickelin, 2005). The danger theory increases the efficiency of detection 
models because it minimizes the dimensions of the domain. However, measuring the 
degree of danger for any non-self-application is not easy.  
The identification of a threshold to discriminate between dangerous and friendly non-
self-cases is difficult. In such a situation, classification models put many cases in a 
doubtful position (Manzoor, Shafiq, Tabish, & Farooq, 2009).  
To identify more alternatives to NSA and CSA, researchers investigated the 
functionalities of all parts of HIS and then examined the phenomenon that occurs within 
HIS. As a result, an AIS algorithm was proposed (D Dasgupta, 2007; D. Dasgupta, Yu, 
& Nino, 2010; De Castro & Timmis, 2002; He, Yiwen, Tao, & Ting, 2010; S. Hofmeyr 
& Forrest, 1999; Khaled et al., 2010; Paul K. Harmer, 2002)]. HIS contains different 
activities and functionalities. Parts of HIS may achieve one or more functions as the 
entire system defends the human body. Some functionalities may be implemented as a 
form of a distributed system, whereas others are achieved in the form of a centralized 
system (D Dasgupta, 2007; Jieqiong Zheng 2010; Paul K. Harmer, 2002). The ability to 
adapt the valid detectors to match unseen harmful foreign bodies without any false 
alarm is the key to the success of HIS (Health, 2003) and is the goal of most biological 
models.  
Several functionalities of HIS mentioned in (Paul K. Harmer, 2002) could be proposed 
for computer security applications. Table 2-3 summarizes the functionalities and 
activities proposed in various detection models:  
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Table ‎2-3 List of Biological Models that Inspired HIS Algorithms and Models 
 
# Title AIS methods Contribution Reff. 
1.  A model of collaborative artificial immune system Collaborative AIM Solved the sociability and Collaborative problems (He et al., 
2010) 
2.  A Sense of `Danger' for Windows Processes Dendritic Cell Algorithms Evolutionary explanation of Danger method.  (Manzoor 
et al., 
2009) 
3.  Danger theory: The link between AIS and IDS Danger Theory Evaluating the concept of AIS to build 3 generation IDS (U. 
Aickelin 
et al., 
2003) 
4.  Malicious code execution detection and response 
immune system inspired by the danger theory 
Dendritic Cell Algorithms Drawing a similarity between API calls and cells that used by 
AIM 
(Kim et 
al., 2005) 
5.  The danger theory and its application to artificial 
immune systems 
Danger Theory It identifies which data should AIS models represent (U 
Aickelin 
& Cayzer, 
2002) 
6.  An Improved Clonal Selection Algorithm and its 
Application in Function Optimization Problems 
Clonal Selection Combined clonal algorithm with an evaluation algorithm to 
solve global search ability and provide a diversity of the 
population.,   
(Yidan 
Luo & 
Jiang, 
2008) 
7.  A clonal selection algorithm by using learning operator Clonal Selection The work has built an AIS to build a virus computer immune 
system. 
(Y. Yu & 
Hou, 
2004) 
8.  A negative selection algorithm with the variable length 
detector 
Negative Selection  Propose to test normal detectors besides the negative testing. (Shen et 
al., 2007) 
9.  An evaluation of negative selection in an artificial 
immune system for network intrusion detection 
Negative Selection Shows that NSA could be used just as a filter in IDS, not to 
generate new detectors. 
(Kim & 
Bentley, 
2001) 
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10.  An Artificial Immune System Architecture for 
Computer Security Applications 
HIS System Depended on layer defences as the layers in HIS to prevent 
intruders. 
(Paul K. 
Harmer, 
2002) 
11.  Run-time malware detection based on positive 
selection 
Positive Selection It depends on PSA, which recognizes normal cells, to detect 
normal network packets. 
(Fuyong 
& Deyu, 
2011) 
12.  A Novel Immune Based Approach for Detection of 
Windows PE Virus 
HIS’s adaption strategies to detect 
virus changes  
The work Checks the difference between the relocation of PE 
virus and normal application. 
(Y. Zhang 
et al., 
2008) 
13.  Artificial Immune Clonal Selection Classification 
Algorithms for Classifying Malware and Benign 
Processes Using API Call Sequences 
Clonal Selection Algorithm This works proposed all status that found inside HIS for CSA, 
to represent detectors for malicious API call. 
(Khaled et 
al., 2010) 
14.  A malware detection model based on a negative 
selection algorithm with penalty factor 
Negative Selection Algorithm Used NSA with providing a factor to converge more to detect 
harmful cases and diverge to and harmless cases. 
(P. T. 
Zhang et 
al., 2010) 
15.  Tunable Immune Detectors for Behaviour-Based 
Network Intrusion Detection 
Negative Selection Algorithm Tunable Activation Threshold theory.  (Antunes 
& 
Correia, 
2011) 
16.  Malicious Codes Detection Inspired by MHC. features of MHC (Major 
Histocompatibility Complex) 
Unknown malware detection  (Y. 
Zhang, 
Song, & 
Yang, 
2011) 
17.  Using IRP for Malware Detection Combination of Negative and 
Positive Selection 
n-gram block of API that represent I/O Request Packet (F. Y. 
Zhang, 
Qi, & Hu, 
2011b) 
18.  Run-time malware detection based on IRP Negative selection.  
Positive selection. 
API calls the responsible I/O Request Packet monitoring (F. Y. 
Zhang et 
al., 
2011a) 
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19.  Immunity-Based Model for Malicious Code Detection CSA and process of gene 
maturation. 
Tracing the I/O packet requests from Kernel.  (Y Zhang, 
Wu, Xia, 
& Liu, 
2010) 
20.  A self-adaptive negative selection algorithm used for 
anomaly detection. 
Negative Selection Proposed to include non-self detectors in the population. (Zeng et 
al., 2009) 
21.  Intelligent agent based artificial immune system for 
computer security—a review 
Distributed characteristics of HIS Try to make distributed agents systems to work as the 
distributed cells in HIS perform 
(Srinivasa
n, 2009) 
22.  An Immune System Algorithm Based on Variable 
Detection Radius of the Negative Selection 
Mechanism 
Negative Selection and affinity Changing the radius of the detectors will works as affinity 
tolerance 
(Jiang, 
Mo, & 
Qin, 
2009) 
23.  The Feature Detection Rule and its Application within 
the Negative Selection Algorithm 
Negative Selection Suggested a new system of affinity threshold. (Poggiolin
i, 2008) 
24.  Malicious Code Detection Architecture Inspired by 
Human Immune System 
HIS principle for detection, in 
general, considered. 
To types of detectors used for identifying malwares (Marhusin
, 
Cornforth, 
& Larkin, 
2008) 
25.  Is negative selection appropriate for anomaly detection Negative Selection Suggested negative and positive samples for detectors. (Stibor, 
Mohr, 
Timmis, 
& Eckert, 
2005) 
26.  An immunological approach to change detection: 
Theoretical results 
Negative Selection Algorithm Explains the fault that caused in NSA due to the shape 
matching. 
(D'haesele
er, 2002) 
27.  Architecture for an artificial immune system Principles and fundamentals of 
HIS 
The work built an AIS to model an IDS. (S. A. 
Hofmeyr 
& Forrest, 
2000) 
28.  Using the danger model of immune systems for 
distributed defense in modern data networks 
Danger Method Building behaviour based Intrusion Prevision System. (Swimmer
, 2007) 
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29.  A Survey of artificial immune applications Review many applications for 
AIS 
Suggest some comments to make AIS more applicable to real 
problems. 
(Jieqiong 
Zheng 
2010) 
30.  Immunity by design: An artificial immune system It used the Distributed, robust, 
dynamic, adaptive characteristics. 
The work inspired these characteristics to build new IDS model (S. 
Hofmeyr 
& Forrest, 
1999) 
31.  Artificial immune systems: a novel approach to pattern 
recognition 
Used the concept of HIS pattern 
recognition. 
The work used a mathematical representation to build AIS 
concepts for pattern recognition.  
(De 
Castro & 
Timmis, 
2002) 
32.  Advances in artificial immune systems The concept of HIS inspiration as 
computational models. 
Gives suggestion and guides about building AIS in different 
fields.  
(D 
Dasgupta, 
2007) 
33.  Recent Advances in Artificial Immune Systems: 
Models and Applications 
It done a survey on HIS’s 
methods that inspired to build 
models in different fields, 
It mentioned that the start of art of AIS until October 30, 2010, 
is only involved four methods: Negative Selection Algorithm, 
Artificial Immune Network, Clonal Selection Algorithm, and 
Danger theory or dendritic cell Algorithm. 
(D. 
Dasgupta 
et al., 
2010) 
34.  Malware Detection Techniques Using Artificial 
Immune System 
Activities of HIS are followed to 
classify malwares 
Two features are extracted and analysed; system calls and 
network activities. 
(Ali & 
Maarof, 
2012) 
35.  A Malware Detection System Inspired on the Human 
Immune System 
self–non-self-theory, danger 
theory 
They explained only some malware’s policies in the view point 
of two AIS algorithms 
(de 
Oliveira, 
Grégio, & 
Cansian, 
2012) 
36.  Using Two Levels dangar model of the Immune 
System for Malware Detection 
They apply two level 
classification  
More improvement showed by their works. (Alanezi 
& 
Aldabagh, 
2012) 
37.  Immunity-Based Model for Malicious Code Detection Clonal Selection Algorithm Studied the sequence of packet behaviours to define normal and 
malicious application 
(Y Zhang 
et al., 
2010) 
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The summary of Table 2-3 could be as follows: 
1- The AIS algorithm is used to build many applications in different fields. 
2- Many proposed studies in the computer security field employed the AIS. Most 
algorithms involved in AIS improve the ability and accuracy of security in 
computer systems. The same scenario of HIS has been proposed to integrate 
computer immunology or to define defence systems for computers. 
3- Regarding malware detection models and approaches, the major AIS 
algorithms that are frequently employed include (D. Dasgupta et al., 2010) 
a. NSA, 
b. AIS network,  
c. CSA; and 
d. The danger theory and dendritic cell algorithm. 
4- Numerous functionalities and phenomena that occur inside HIS are not 
included in building malware detection models, including the co-stimulation 
phenomenon. 
5- The parameters and features that are considered in building bio-oriented 
malware detection models differ from case to case. 
6- To our knowledge, few studies have employed API calls as features and 
parameters to proposed biological detection models.  
Biological studies that attempt to classify API call vectors into self- and non-self-groups 
have inspired most AIS algorithms, but none of these have involved the co-stimulation 
phenomenon to perform such classification despite its importance as a HIS 
discrimination method. Response strategies against foreign bodies are adopted based on 
the classification achieved by co-stimulation. 
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2.8.3 Why Biological Models?  
 
The main target of any classification model is distinguishing unseen objects to their 
correct classes with a high degree of certainty. This target has a direct relation with the 
accuracy degree of classifier models. Therefore, the accuracy is the main concern in 
classifier models. There are two main features usually related to measure the accuracy 
of classifier models, which are FP and FN rates. These two features give indications 
about objects that misclassified. Accuracy, as mentioned in Equation 2-1, increases if 
FP and FN parameters decrease, and vice versa.  
This work focused more on biological models because such models depend on some 
processes and strategies of HIS that used to defend body against foreign cells. 
Biologically, the strategy that achieved by HIS has no self-cell attacking which means 
no FP. Moreover, cases like passing non-self-cell as self-cell, which means FN, is very 
rare. Therefore, the accuracy of HIS in classifying self and non-self cells is very high.  
The role of having a high accuracy in HIS when classifying foreign cases is going back 
to different parts. However for controlling errors, HIS has a phenomenon which 
responsible to eliminate errors, and can keep the HIS’s safety with reference to mistakes 
made when attacking a self-cell. Although some cells have foreign genes, HIS will not 
attack them as non-self-cell as far as they are not harmful cells. It means cells are not 
listed as self-cell however have characteristics of self-cells. Distinguishing such 
different cells that have similar characteristics by HIS brings attention to this work. 
Such type of distinguishing process is very necessary in classify many malicious API 
calls that penetrating normal behaviours. 
To know more about biological processes inside HIS, and how HIS can keep the 
accuracy, latter sections explains the work strategy of HIS and identifies how this 
strategy is carried out by HIS.  
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2.9 Work Strategy of HIS: 
 
HIS consists of a network of cells, tissues, and organs that work together to defend the 
body against attacks by “foreign” invaders. It is a complex system that can recognize 
and remember millions of different anomies. The HIS can produce secretions and cells 
to match up with and wipe out each one of them. The key to a healthy immune system is 
the remarkable ability to distinguish between the body’s own cell (self) and foreign cells 
(non-self) (Michael A. Horan, 1997).  
In general, the architecture of the HIS consists of two main parts: the innate immune 
system and the adaptive immune system. The innate immune system has a fixed 
response to pathogens and is not entitled to learning. It exists in the human body from 
birth through death. The adaptive immune system conveys changes in the pathogens and 
has the ability to memorize these changes(Spafford, 1990). The entire immune system 
has four layers of defence, as illustrated in Figure 2-6. Each layer depends on the special 
techniques and strategies of defence. The layers are distributed to different locations 
inside the body. Chemical interactions occur between the layers to perform their 
functions. They are distributed but some of their own centralized rules and regulations 
remain to distinguish between the self and the non-self as well as to confirm these 
distinctions (Michael A. Horan, 1997; Yegnanarayana1, 1994)   . 
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Figure ‎2-6  Layers of the immune system (Michael A. Horan, 1997) 
Each layer of the immune system has several functional components known as cells. A 
network of interacting cells and molecules, which recognizes foreign substances 
(antigens), constitutes the immune system (Michael A. Horan, 1997). The molecules of 
the immune system that recognize antigens are called antibodies. An antibody does not 
recognize an antigen as an entire object; instead, an antibody recognizes small regions 
called epitopes. An antibody recognizes an antigen when it binds to one of its epitopes. 
The binding region of an antibody is called the paratope. The strength and specificity of 
the interaction between the antibody and the antigen are measured as the affinity of 
interaction. The strength of affinity depends on the degree of complementarity in shape 
between the interacting regions of the antibody and the antigen. A given antibody can 
typically recognize a range of different epitopes, whereas a given epitope can be 
recognized by different types of antibodies. An antibody will not only recognize a 
specific antigen, but will also recognize other antigens that have the correct epitope. An 
epitope characteristic for a given antibody type is called an idiotope (Elgert, 2009).  
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Antibodies produced by cells are called B-lymphocytes. B-lymphocytes differ in terms 
of the antibodies they produce. Each type of antibody is produced by a corresponding 
lymphocyte, which produces only one type of antibody. When an antibody on the 
surface of a lymphocyte binds with another molecule (antigen or other antibody), the 
lymphocyte is stimulated to clone and then to secrete free antibodies. In contrast, 
lymphocytes that are not stimulated die in a matter of days. Thus, a selection process 
occurs whereby antibodies stimulated by antigens increase the antibodies, whereas the 
non-stimulated antibodies die (Michael A. Horan, 1997; Spafford, 1990). 
Until this stage, the antibodies of the B-cells in the immune system identify non-self-
bodies. However, co-stimulation in the system will confirm whether the decision made 
by the B-cell is correct. A positive confirmation will activate B-cells to generate more 
of such antibodies and to memorize them; otherwise, a the B-cell decision will be 
cancelled and such types of B-cell antibodies will be killed(Yegnanarayana1, 1994). 
Such process ensures that no self-cells will be attacked by the immune system, which 
results in an autoimmune disease (Michael A. Horan, 1997). To explain more activities 
of HIS, next section focused on important functions that occur inside HIS and the task 
of each function.  
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2.9.1 Important Activities of HIS 
 
Below are the important activities achieved by the immune cells as well as properties of 
the HIS (U Aickelin, Greensmith, & Twycross, 2004): 
1- Parallel and Distributed: The structure of the immune system is totally 
distributed and has a verity of components.  Those components that distributed 
throughout the body can communicated through the chemical signals. 
2- Multi-layered: No part of the immune system can provide defence 
individually. The parts operated independently, yet as a package, to provide 
defence to the body. 
3- Autonomous: There are many entities at each layer or parts of the immune 
system. Each entity has operated independently. This keeps the system 
reliability. 
4- Imperfect Detection: For detection purposes, not necessary the matching be 
exactly, it required exceeding an affinity threshold. It builds detectors so that 
they can detect a large subset of non-self-space. 
5- Safety: for minimizing the detection errors, there are many checking processes 
in the system, such as Co-stimulation (sometimes called second confirmation 
signals) and activation thresholds.  
6- Diversity: A single pathogen cannot succumb the immune system of entire 
population. In addition, a large population of cells with a diverse set of 
receptors types enables the body to cover a large portion of the non-self-space. 
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7- Search Space optimizing: The maintenance of the receptors to cover a large 
space and changes of search over the time is not an easy job, even though as a 
combinatorial. However, the immune system has a great program, through 
death and cell division, to maintain a random sampling of the search space. 
Therefore, through this program, the immune system always can optimize its 
arsenal of receptors.  
8- Self / Non-self-Detection: The non-self-receptors death and generation gave the 
immune system an ability to detect and respond to pathogens, even those that 
have not been countered before. 
9- Selective Response: After detection, chemical signals and identification 
method effectively classify the antigen. This will determine the exact response 
to an infection. 
10- Memory: Memory B cells enable the immune system to “remember” past 
infections and prime the system for an improve response upon later infection 
by the same or similar antigen.  
11- Adaptive: The system evolves through clonal selection and hyper-mutation to 
improve the antigen recognition capabilities and therefore improve the overall 
system performance.  
All above functions can be found implicitly in the Figure 2-7 that also shows the 
distributed and parallel actions that achieved upon detecting a pathogen (Kim & 
Bentley, 2001).  
For this work, the safety function that achieved by HIS is more concerned as it controls 
FP and FN errors. As mentioned in point number (5), the function that used by HIS to 
provide safety and control errors is called co-stimulation. Therefore, the next section 
explains in detail how co-stimulation is occurred, biologically, inside HIS. 
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Figure‎2-7Parallel actions, signal communications, feedbacks, and confirmation 
processes 
2.9.2 Co-stimulation Function in HIS 
 
For HIS, Co-stimulation is a general requirement for antigen-dependent activation of 
IS’s detectors. In HIS, stimulation through the antigen receptor, or ‘signal 1’, is usually 
insufficient for full activation, and additional co-stimulatory signals, or ‘signal 2’, 
through a separate receptor must be received (Iwasaki & Medzhitov, 2010).  
Any IS’s cell activation, or sometimes called stimulation, through antigen receptor in 
the absence of Co-stimulation , usually leads to the cell becoming unresponsive to 
subsequent exposure to antigen (Elgert, 2009). Such states inside IS called anergy, and 
an anergical detector is unable to proliferate, and some circumstances may undergo cell 
death by apoptosis (Davies, 1997).  Such extra level of stringency for IS’s detectors 
activation may have evolved as a way of controlling the detectors that recognize self-
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cells antigens, which means causing autoimmune diseases (or false alarm in computer 
security viewpoint) (D Dasgupta, 2007). The phenomenon, can also considered as a 
distinguishing process that achieved to disparate self-cells with non-self-cells (S. A. 
Hofmeyr & Forrest, 2000). Through Co-stimulation, IS controls the activities of the 
immune’s detectors and receptors. The phenomenon directs the defence process 
correctly and, in perfect situations, they instruct the immune cells in performing their 
functions, when a specific antibody has generated and memorized for an antigen (Naik, 
2003).  
The phenomenon starts with B-cells, when they engulf a suspected body and analyse it. 
Pieces of engulfed body arose as activate Major Histocompatibility Complex (MHC) in 
peptides on the surface of B-cell. The MHC rising in the B-cell signals to two types of 
T-helper cells (that is, Th- CD+4 and Th-CD+8) to be stimulated the MHC (Michael A. 
Horan, 1997; Naik, 2003). 
When receptors of Th- CD+4 are activated with MHC, the first signal (Signal 1) 
detecting an abnormal case is satisfied. The degree of activation differs as not all 
receptors have the same shape as MHC. The degree of such activation represents the 
affinity. The Th-cell will bind with the MHC protein in another form using (CD+8) to 
confirm (Signal 1). The incorrect activation of (CD+8) Th-cell will not generate the 
confirmation signal (Signal 2). This means that Signal 1 is generated incorrectly and the 
engulfed B-cell will be marked as anergic cells (Health, 2003). However, correct 
activation will result in the co-stimulation signal. In this situation, the immune system 
will decide to build an arsenal of a certain type of antibody and killer cell through the 
proliferation of B and T cell to kill the antigens, thereby cleaning the body, and to 
memorize the built antibodies (Michael A. Horan, 1997). Figure 2-8 illustrates the co-
stimulation and its effects (Zakaria, 2009). Co-stimulation signals, sometimes called 
two-signal messages, come from simultaneous activation of two different Th- cell types 
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with an antigen (Naik, 2003). This is a basic and essential condition for considering an 
antigen as a non-self cell. Without this message, the popular stage, which is the 
proliferation of antibodies, will not be activated. Even if activated, theoretically, this 
will generate improper antibodies that may possibly attack self-cells. The process of 
self-attack means activating a self-cell as an antigen (Julie Greensmith, 2010). Such a 
case is similar to the process of generating a false alarm when a normal file is identified 
as a malware by a computer classifier system (Nachenberg, 2001). 
To inspire the functionalities of Co-stimulation in API calls classifier models, next 
section explains the parts that needed to build an Artificial Co-stimulation Classifier. 
 
Figure ‎2-8 HIS co-stimulation Process (Rang, Dale, Ritter, & Moore, 2003) 
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2.10 Artificial Co-stimulation Classifier (ACC): 
 
The ACC is a system that depends on the concept of the HIS co-stimulation, structure 
and functionalities, to classify malicious API calls in PE malwares. The ACC model 
mimics the  co-stimulation phenomenon; HIS strongly relies on co-stimulation to 
classify self and non-self-cells and to avoid any self-attack (Elgert, 2009). This work 
proposes an ACC model to improve the classification of cases that have a strong 
similarity index among them, such as the classification of malicious API calls with 
normal API calls.  Figure 2-9 illustrates the framework of the ACC model that can 
distinguish between malicious and normal API calls.  
 
 
 
Figure ‎2-9 ACC model to classify malicious API calls 
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As illustrated in Figure 2-9, the ACC model forwards any input case to two different 
paths. Through the first path, the model checks the execution sequence of a case, 
whereas the second path scans the case to check the availability of four major abnormal 
activities done by most malwares. For the first path, the ACC model involves all API 
functions that traced and monitored. In the second path, the model narrows down the 
monitoring process that divided it into four iterations. For each round, the model checks 
the availability of one abnormality behaviour (section 1.7), and it only involves the API 
functions mostly used by malwares to achieve an abnormal activity. As explained 
below, important issues include the need for both paths and why one path is inadequate 
for detecting malicious API calls. 
1- First, this work needs narrowing because tracing and monitoring the original 
sequences of API calls usually lead to uncertain and misclassified results. In 
later chapters, more details on this question are provided.  
2- Second, this work needs to keep the results of the first path to identify the certain 
and uncertain areas.  
3- This work needs narrowing because the API sequence that is applied to the first 
path represents the original execution sequence for the suspected application. 
The sequence contains a wide range of mixed behaviours, such as junk code 
insertion, that usually use jumping among codes. These junk code leads to hide 
most malicious behaviours.  
4- Narrowing practically means decreasing the number of API functions involved 
in an API call monitoring procedure. Most vendors of API call monitoring 
software recommend narrowing to obtain results that are more precise. The 
reason is that such software might display different results of the sequence of the 
API functions called by a suspected application when the number of API 
functions involved in monitoring increases or decreases. This problem has been 
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clearly written in the manual of both software used in (APIMonitoring.Com, 
2010; HeavenTools, 2010). This present work explains this problem 
experimentally in later chapters. 
 
This work depends on artificial neural network (ANN) to construct both checking 
blocks (general and narrowing), as illustrated in Figure 2-9. ANN in this work depends 
on feed-forward back propagation algorithm during the learning process. The co-
stimulation block uses the Euclidean theory to measure the similarity and the distance 
between vectors. 
Next two sections explain the theory of tools, ANN and Euclidean methods, that 
involved in the process of building the ACC classifier model.    
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2.10.1 ANN Classifier Technique: 
 
ANN is a mathematical or computational model that is inspired by biological neural 
networks. This network consists of many interconnected neurons that can process and 
compute information through the connectionist approach. Neurons in an ANN are 
distributed on three types of layers:  input layer, hidden layer/s, and output layer. Each 
neuron receives a vector of scalars () that are multiplied by a vector of weights (). 
The result of adding a bias value b to the product of vectors () will be applied to 
activate the function f, which is called the transfer function. Figure 2-10 represents a 
typical diagram of a neuron (Sivanandam, 2006).  
 
 
Figure‎2-10 Input and output of an ANN neuron 
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As shown in Figure 2-11, many shapes for the transfer function in an ANN can be 
employed (Sivanandam, 2006). Each function may fit a specific application. The current 
work uses the logsig() function in the neurons of all layers. This function is selected 
because it is a robust differentiable function over an infinite range. Moreover, the output 
of this function is between zero and one, which fits the result expected by ACC 
classifier models. 
 
 
Figure‎2-11 Three main types of transfer function in ANN  
 
Connecting neurons inside a layer and between layers can be performed in various 
ways. The simplest way is to connect neurons from the layer directly above a current 
layer to those in the layer below, as in the case of Feed forward Back propagation 
Neural Network (FFBP-NN). However, a neuron can receive its input from the neurons 
below and can send its output to neurons above in a strictly forward manner.  
The structure is called feed forward because no backward connections exist between 
neurons from different layers. Figure 2-12 illustrates a typical structure of an FFBP-NN. 
Equation 2-2  shows the expression of the output of any units in such type of ANN 
(Ivancevic, 2010) 
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Figure‎2-12 Typical structure of FFBP-NN with n hidden layer and i nodes at 
output layer 
 
Equation  2-2 
  (   )    (  ( ))    (∑    ( )  
 
 
( )    ( )) 
 
yk(t+1) is the output of k
th 
unit, yj(t) is the output of the j
th
 unit forwarded to the k
th
 
neuron, b(t) is the bias value for the j
th
 node, and      is the weight value that 
determines the effect unit j on unit k. Each node receives an input for the neighbouring 
neurons or external resources. Then, it computes the output by using the activation 
function, and finally, it forwards the result to the next neighbouring nodes. The 
activities of ANN neurons include training on processing an input set and obtaining 
the desired output. Therefore, the term “back propagation” describes the way that an 
ANN acquires training. The training process adjusts the weights of any ANN so that it 
can perform a specific application (Heaton, 2008).  
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Various methods are used to achieve ANN weight configuration. One way is to set 
and initialize the weight value depending on prior knowledge. Another way is to train 
the ANN by feeding it teaching patterns and forcing it to change its weights according 
to the learned rules. The methods for training and learning can be classified into two 
distinct categories: supervised and unsupervised learning.  Both learning paradigms 
result in the adjustment of weight values between units (Ivancevic, 2010; J. J. Zhang, 
2005).    
One of the most important learning methods is back propagation, which depends 
mostly on the trianlm function (Sivanandam, 2006). Back propagation involves 
supervised learning, and it depends on the delta rule to adjust the weight value 
between two units. Through the delta rule, the adjustment of a weight can be defined 
by computing the difference between the actual    and the desired    output, as 
shown in Equation 2-3. The delta rule can determine the error between the actual and 
the desired output at each node.  Moreover, error adjustments for the units of the 
hidden layer are determined by back propagating the errors of the output layer units. 
 
Equation  2-3 
 
         (     )  
 
Therefore, the back propagation algorithm has two phases. In the first phase, the input 
data are clamped to the ANN, propagate toward the output, and then generate an error 
signal between the desired and the actual outputs. The second phase involves a 
backward pass through the network during which the error signal passes to each unit in 
the network and then appropriate weight changes are calculated (Yegnanarayana1, 
1994). 
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The rate of error between the actual and the desired outputs will be minimized by 
adjusting the value of the neuron’s weight. The overall error that occurred due to 
differences between actual and desired for an ANN classifier model is computed 
according to the Equation 2-4 (Heaton, 2008). 
.  
Equation  2-4 
 
      √
 
 
∑(      ) 
 
   
 
 
Where: 
ti is the desired output and yi is the actual output. 
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2.10.2 The Similarity Measuring Technique: 
 
To detect malware or variants of old malware, most researchers have depended on 
measuring the similarity between predefined function calls (Pf) and suspected functions 
calls (Sf), where both Pf and Sf are vectors (Apel, Bockermann, & Meier, 2009; 
Johanyák & Kovács, 2005; M. Shankarapani et al., 2010). Many theories and 
algorithms, such as the Euclidean distance, Hamming distance, and Jaccard index 
methods, have been used. The Hamming distance and the Jaccard index are used to 
recognize malware patterns and to classify and cluster the malware’s family. These are 
also used by researchers to compute for the similarity of behaviours. Considerable effort 
is done to determine the method that is more suitable to their methodology as well as 
the method that yields a higher accuracy rate than others. This step is considered by 
researchers to be of fundamental importance to problems in malware classification, 
clustering, and detection (Cha, 2007). 
The theories that are more often used for measuring and computing for the similarity 
between two vectors are the Euclidean method, which is used to compute for the 
distance (D) between the two vectors, and the cosine method, which is used to compute 
for the similarity (S) between both vectors. Equation 2-5 and  2-6 explain how the D and 
S for the vectors Pf and Sf can be obtained (Cha, 2007): 
Equation  2-5 
 (     )  √∑ (   
 
       )
       
Equation  2-6 
 (     )   
∑ (   
     
)    
√∑ (   
)        √∑ (   
)     
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Where n is the number of elements in both vectors, and  i is the i
th 
element within 
each vector.  
To decide on a similarity status between any two vectors or to obtain the degree of 
similarity between them, most studies have considered both values of D and S (Tabish 
et al., 2009; S. Yu et al., 2011). However, some studies are satisfied only with one 
method to check the affinity status between two compared vectors (Apel et al., 2009; M. 
Shankarapani et al., 2010). Although the Euclidean distance method is strongly 
recommended by many researchers, the present work states some flaws of this method 
(Rozinov, 2005): 
 
1. The Euclidean method depends on the size of the two compared vectors, where 
both vectors may be identical, but missing a small part, thereby generating a 
high difference in the similarity index. 
2. The improper alignment of the two vectors being compared will result in low 
Euclidean distance measurement.  
 
However, in our work, the Euclidean method is still applicable given that the size of the 
vectors will remain the same. The alignment of vectors is necessary for sequences of 
API calls to influence the work. 
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2.11 Chapter Summary 
 
Chapter two could be summarised as below; 
 
1- PE malwares affect the integrity of Windows OS through misusing resources, 
such as API call functions. 
2- Malware authors can easily find much vulnerability inside PE structure, such as 
unused fields and areas that misused by malwares to insert malicious codes. 
3- PE malwares can penetrate normal behaviour to avoid classifying their 
malicious API call behaviour. 
4- Researchers are either depended on biological or non-biological concepts to 
devise their malicious API calls classifier models. 
5- Penetrating normal calling behaviours by PE malwares brings down the 
accuracy of malicious API call classifier models.  
6- This work preferred biological concepts of co-stimulation as it can provide 
solutions for minimising FP and FN. 
7- This work proposed ACC model for classifying malicious API calls in PE 
malwares. 
8- ACC combines two methods to achieve the concept of co-stimulation; ANN 
classifier and Euclidean Similarity theory.  
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Chapter 3 
 
3. Research Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
As mentioned in section (2.11), this work proposes ACC model for improving the 
accuracy of distinguishing malicious API calls in PE applications. The current chapter 
explains the methodology of the ACC model. Throughout this chapter, the main three 
parts of the ACC model are explained.  
Each parts of the ACC model contains many activities. Although these activities 
executed individually and having different aims, they achieved within each part 
sequentially. The output of each sub-part is received as an input by subsequent subpart. 
Even this sequentially approach is followed between the main parts.  
Finally, the input of ACC model is a suspected PE application and the out is its API 
calls that classified either normally or maliciously. 
Next section starts to explain the works that occurred inside the first part of the ACC 
model. 
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3.2 Methodology Flow 
 
As mentioned in section (3.1), the ACC model consists of three main parts. Each part of 
the ACC model, as illustrated in Figure 3-1, has different but sequential steps.  
 
 
Figure‎3-1 The main parts of the ACC model 
 
In the first part, the required samples of normal and malware PE applications are 
collected, verified, and executed. At this stage, the sequence of the API functions that 
required by each sample is extracted. Two different patterns from the extracted API 
calls are prepared in the form of vectors. Finally, these vectors are passed to the part two 
of the ACC model. 
In part two, the two different patterns that prepared in part one from the same PE 
application are clamped to an ANN classifier technique. The purpose of this part is to 
generate Signal-1 and Signal-2. Each signal contains the classification results based on 
their certainty degree.  
· The malware samples will be collected and analysed. 
· The API calls for each malware will be extracted and 
indexed.
· Vectors for API calls will be prepared.
· Clamping prepared API vectors to ANN.
· Collecting results.
· Generating Signal-1 and Signal-2.
· Measuring the similarity index between vectors that 
obtained through Signal-1 and Signal-2 generation.
Part One
Part Two
Part Three
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Finally, the last part of the ACC model calculates the similarity that may found among 
the results that computed in the form of Signal-1 and Signal-2. The purpose of this step 
in ACC model is to obtain a new degree of certainty for each misclassified and doubtful 
results. 
 
3.3 Part ONE: PE Samples and API Call Vectors 
 
The first part of ACC model, as shown in Figure 3-2, pertains to PE sample collection 
and API vectors preparation. This part contains the following steps and activities: 
1- For the PE sample collection and preparation, this work achieves that following 
steps:   
a. Identifying the properties and characteristics of the PE samples that 
should be collected as well as the sources where probably could be 
found. 
b. Verifying all collected PE samples in order to confirm each collected 
sample is either malware or normal. 
 
2- For API call vectors preparation, this work achieves the following steps: 
a. Extracting the general execution pattern for API calls from the PE 
samples that confirmed in the step 1.b. 
b. Extracting another four different patterns of API calls from the PE 
samples that confirmed in the step 1.b  
c.  Indexing all API calls that extracted through steps 2.a and 2.b. 
d. Preparing API call vectors. 
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Figure ‎3-2The activities and steps of part one of the ACC model 
 
 
After achieving all these processes and activities in part one, the expected output vectors 
(X1 and X2) as illustrated in Figure 3-2, are passed to the subsequent part. Next section 
starts more explanation about data preparation step of part one, and more specifically, 
the characteristics of PE samples that should be collected.   
 79 
 
3.3.1 The Properties of PE Malware Samples 
 
This section will focus on three areas as mentioned previously (section 1.7). We have 
considered the more frequently infected structure of applications as well as the more 
easily penetrated operating systems. Among different types of malware family, this 
work covers three families. Therefore, all our samples should share these three 
characteristics, as explained and justified below. 
1. Regarding the structure and the format of the infected files and application, all 
our samples should follow the PE structure because of the following reasons: 
a. Many AV vendors reported that 70% to 80% of total malwares are PE 
infectors (Ahmadi et al., 2011; Symantec, 2010). Moreover, the 
behaviours of one million malwares have been monitored and collected 
randomly from networks and the Internet. Research shows that around 
80% of malwares have PE infector behaviour (Bayer, Habibi, et al., 
2009).  
b. The PE format represents the biggest fraction of today’s malicious 
codes. Moreover, a sufficient number of non-malicious samples also 
use this format. Therefore, the acquisition of appropriate training and 
testing sets is realistic (Merkel et al., 2010). 
c. The number of PE infectors throughout past years has been increasing 
because the slack and free areas inside these file formats are widely 
available, and malware authors can easily misuse them (Essam Al 
Daoud, 2008; Schreiber, 2001). 
d. It is the valid format that supported by all Windows OS versions 
(Microsoft, 2008, 2011). 
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2. All our PE samples are either normal or malware. If the samples are malware, 
they should be classified under one of the malware families mentioned in 
section 1.7, which includes PE virus, PE Trojan horse, and PE worm. Our 
samples have narrowed down the families for the following reasons: 
a. These three families are considered as the major types of PE malwares 
(AV-Comparative, 2010; McAfee, 2010; McGraw & Morrisett, 2002; 
Symantec, 2010; Xu, Sung, Mukkamala, & Liu, 2007). 
b. AV vendors have reported that these three groups represent 75% to 
85% of the entire population of PE malwares (AV-Comparative, 2010; 
Coorp, 2008; McAfee, 2010; Symantec, 2010).  
c. Another reason for selecting these categories of malware is because of 
the behaviours and activities that could be found in these three types. 
Most researchers believe that by evaluating the three behaviours, such 
as self or non-self-propagation, dependent or independent execution, 
and host or network propagation, the models can reveal most malwares 
(K.-S. Han et al., 2011; Niemela & Palomaki, 2011; Trinius et al., 
2011).   
d. These three families are the mean families of malwares, and the other 
families of malwares could be considered as their sub-families 
(Wagener et al., 2008). 
3. Our work focuses on Windows OS. Therefore, all our samples should be 
Windows-based applications. The reasons for choosing this platform are 
explained below:  
a. Since the development of the Windows NT version, the PE structure 
has become a standardized format for all later versions (Dabak et al., 
1999; Oney, 2002; Schreiber, 2001). Therefore, PE malwares can 
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easily transition into new versions of the OS and survive (Essam Al 
Daoud, 2008; Szor, 2000).  
b. Windows OS allows other parties to insert new DLL files to valid  sets  
(Dabak et al., 1999; Father, 2004). This feature allows PE malwares to 
build a suitable environment for them to thrive inside Windows-based 
systems. 
c. Although UNIX supports a similar format of PE, our work is more 
focused on Windows OS because it is more vulnerable than UNIX 
(Szor, 2000). For example, an open port in Windows OS can be easily 
penetrated by malwares compared with other platform systems. 
Moreover, UNIX is safer; it prevents a program from accessing 
memory or storage spaces that are allocated for other applications 
(Salomon, 2010). Figure 3-3 explains the scope of our work more 
clearly. 
 
Portable Executable Applications 
Under Windows OS
Normal 
samples
Malware samples
Viruses
Trojan 
Horses
Worms
 
Figure ‎3-3 The‎applications’‎categories‎the‎focused‎by‎this‎work‎as‎samples  
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3.3.2 The Sources of PE Samples 
 
In any study, searching for the samples is an important step. However, the type of the 
sources where samples could be collected is more important. Researchers have used 
different methods to collect normal and malware applications. However, for both types 
of application, verification is also an important process. 
In collecting PE malwares, one of the resources most researchers use is downloading 
the samples from websites. Many online resources provide a substantial number of 
normal and malware PE application samples (OffensiveComputing, 2010; VirusSign, 
2010; VXHeavens, 2010). However, such samples should be verified. Verification may 
be performed by scanning the samples through valid AV software (K.-S. Han et al., 
2011). 
This work collected 10,000 samples of PE malware applications from the following 
online sources after consulting with the University of Malaya Information Technology 
Centre (UMITC).  
1- http://vx.netlux.org/vl.php.  
2- http://www.offensivecomputing.net/ 
3- http://www.virussign.com/?gclid=CPv2__m5la0CFUoa6wodWxU0mg 
We also collected 2,000 normal PE samples from fresh Windows 7 operating systems. 
All samples, comprising normal and malware applications, were collected between May 
2010 and September 2010. 
Next step of this work shows how and why the collected samples are verified.  
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3.3.3 PE Samples Verification Process 
 
Most researchers need to verify their malware samples, especially if the malwares were 
collected from websites. The research needs verification to determine if the samples are 
malwares or not (Szor, 2006). Researchers usually depend on valid AV software to 
check the normality or abnormality of suspected samples. To obtain accurate 
verification, researchers depend on decisions made by a collection of AV software (H. 
Zhao et al., 2010).  
To verify our samples, we used five AV software applications, namely, Norton, 
KasperSky, McAfee, Avira, and PC-Cillen Internet Security. The first verification 
process was implemented using the 2010 version of all AV software. A year later, the 
same samples were verified again using the 2011 version of all AV software.  The 
process of verifying the collected PE samples are clearly illustrated in the Figure3-4. 
Table 3-1 provides more details about the number of samples that underwent the 
verification process, and the number of malwares that were verified using the five kinds 
of AV software. Based on the information listed in the table, some malwares could not 
be marked positively by all AV software. The undetected samples are either not 
malware or unknown malwares. Therefore, this work only considered those samples 
that have been verified as malware by all five AV software to avoid doubts and 
uncertainties about the samples.  
Hereafter, only 2,000 PE samples; 1,500 PE malwares and 500 normal applications 
were considered for further works in this study. Verified samples of PE malwares are 
divided into 500 PE viruses, 500 PE Trojan horses, and 500 PE worms. The numbers of 
collected samples, which are 2,000, are confirmed by(Parmjit Singh, Chan Yuen Fook, 
& Sidhu, 2009)as a sufficient number for building ACC model. Only samples that 
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passed verification process are executed by monitoring software to extract their API 
calls, as explained in later section.  
 
 
Figure ‎3-4 PE samples verification process 
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Table  3-1; Number of Malwares Samples that Analysed and Verified 
 
Types of Samples Number of 
Samples 
Norton AV KasperSky AV McAfee AV Avira AV PC-Celling Internet Security 
PE Virus 3500 3284 3198 3143 3176 3103 
PE Trojan Horse 3500 3298 3312 3274 3245 3281 
PE Worm 3000 3198 3231 3226 3271 3265 
PE Normal 2000 0 0 0 0 0 
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3.3.4 Extracting API Functions (Execution of PE Samples) 
 
A kind of monitoring software is required to extract the API functions of a suspected 
application. The suspected application should be executed and monitored using this 
software. Through this monitoring software, many API calling behaviours for the 
suspected application could be observed. This work collects API behaviours for the 
suspected application in the two phases below: 
1- For each PE samples (within the 2000 samples that verified in step 3.3.3) a 
general execution sequence of API calls are extracted. This sequence includes all 
available API functions. 
2- At this phase, each PE sample executed four rounds within the monitoring 
software. At each round, a sequence of API calls are extracted. Each extracted 
sequence related to one of the malware behaviours that mentioned in section 1.7. 
Figure 3-5 illustrates the phases of PE sample execution and API calls extracting.  
The behaviours that referenced in point (2) are focused more by this work because 
malwares could be revealed efficiently through tracing these behaviours. This fact 
evidenced by (Bayer, Habibi, et al., 2009) when they traced the behaviour of one 
million malwares. They found these activities at the top of all malware’s behaviours. 
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Figure ‎3-5 Phases and rounds of PE sample Execution and API calls extraction 
 
This work used two types of observation software to extract API functions, namely, PE-
Explorer and APIMonitoring(APIMonitoring.Com, 2010; HeavenTools, 2010).  As 
shown in Figure 3-6, APIMonitoring software is used to execute a suspected PE 
application and to report the name of all API functions that are called by the monitoring 
application. The scanned application in the figure is “Notepad.” The APIMonitoring 
software has an ability to export all calling behaviour collected information to an Excel 
sheet format. Figure 3-6 is also illustrated the list of API functions that obtained from a 
Notepad application in the form of an Excel sheet.  
Although information has been exported to the Excel sheet, this work only considered 
the name of the API functions as well as their behaviour groups (details in section 
3.3.6). The sequence of API calling is also concerned by this work. This work considers 
each row in the Excel sheet as a single activity or a single behaviour for the scanned 
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application. Until the execution is completed, an application may call many API 
functions, thereby performing much behaviour. 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎3-6Collecting API functions that are called by a PE application using 
APIMonitoring Software 
 
 
For clarification, this work assumes that M is a suspected application executed under the 
observation of APIMonitoring software. Furthermore, we assume that A is a set of all 
behaviours or activities that an application, like M, may achieve during its execution. 
Therefore, we can obtain the vector A for any M when executed under our monitoring 
software (Ando et al., 2009; Willems, Holz, & Freiling, 2007). A vector A for any M 
has n number of elements, where each element represents an activity or behaviour of the 
M during the execution: 
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Equation  3-1  
A = (a1, a2, ....... an),   ˅  a ϵ A 
  
Equation 3-1 denotes each behaviour as a, and A represents a vector that contains all 
behaviours for an application M. The size of A for each M is (1 x n).  
For each PE sample, five patterns of API call sequence are expected at output stage of 
this section. Patterns here are represented by the name of the API function. Next section 
explains how each name of API function indexed by a real number. 
 
3.3.5 API Function Referencing File 
 
As shown in the section 3.3.4, the name of API functions has been extracted only from 
the verified PE samples. However, these names should be indexed with a real number 
(section 3.3.6 explains the process as well as the reasons about indexing). To achieve 
this indexing, a pre-processing step is required to build a referencing list that contains 
each API function name and its equivalent real index. This work stores the name-index 
list for all called API functions in a file named as ReferenceOfFunctions (this file used 
in the Matlab code Appendix-2 Code1 which achieve API function converting 
process).Figure 3-7 shows a part for ReferenceOfFunctionfile. Each time code-1 in 
appendix-2 is used to convert an API name to real index; this referencing file is 
involved to provide the correct index for an API function. 
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.  
Figure ‎3-7 The API function reference file 
 
As shown in the Figure 3-7, there is a real number index for each API function. Each 
real index represents two facts. For instance, AllocateAndInitializeSid is an API function 
that is stored in the C:\WINDOWS\system32\ADVAPI32.dll model, represented with a 
positive real number, 1.006. The integer part, first fact, explains that this API function 
belongs to access behaviour activity, whereas the second fact is 006 that comes after the 
dot represents the function itself.   
Until this stage, only an index for each API function is assigned. The sequence of API 
functions that extracted from each verified PE sample still not converted. In the next 
section, this work explains how a long sequence of API names is indexed, and what 
reasons are behind the API indexing. 
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3.3.6 Indexing the observed API Functions 
As mentioned in section 3.3.5, this work needs to convert each element in A (section 
3.3.4) that represents the name of an API function to a real number index. The reason 
that behind indexing the name of API function calls is because dealing with a real 
number is easier than dealing with strings, especially, if such information clamps any 
artificial intelligent (AI) technique. Most researchers that employed an AI technique as 
a classifier model have converted the name of all API functions from strings to integers 
or any real number (Zolkipli & Jantan, 2011). 
When a Matlab code, such as mentioned in Appendix-2 / code1, is used to convert the 
name of an API function, it reads first the name of the API function that needs to be 
converted. Then, the code makes a search inside the ReferenceOfFunction to find out its 
equivalent index value. Finally, the code sends out the correct index.  
To explain indexing API functions mathematically, suppose I(x) denotes the indexing 
function that converts strings (API function) to their equivalent indices, which are real 
numbers, then, 
 
Equation  3-2 
I (A) = ( I(a1), I(a2)…I(an) )    
and each string a is converted to r real number, 
I(ai)  ri  ˅  r ϵ R    Or     I(A)  ̅ 
where ri is the equivalent index of the ai API function and it is the i
th
 element in the  ̅ 
vector. The output of the indexing process is a vector that has the same (1 x n) 
dimensions. This result indicates that vectors A and  ̅ have the same dimensions. 
However, for each pattern that obtained in section 3.3.4, the value of n is difference. 
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Next stage shows converting the long sequence of API indexes to matrixes through 
scanning-sliding process.  
 
3.3.7 Scanning –Sliding the Indexing API calls 
 
At this stage, we need to convert the vector  ̅, which has (1x n) dimension to a matrix 
with dimension of (m x 6) because we need to build two data sets in the form of 
matrices, X1, to generate Signal-1, and X2, to generate Signal-2 (Figure 3-2). Both input 
sets are derived from vector  ̅. 
The size of vectors in the new matrix should be established to convert a long sequence 
of indexed API functions into a matrix. The size of the vector denotes the number of 
elements inside each vector. The number of elements inside each vector identifies the 
adequate number of indexed API calls to reveal malware behaviour. Most researchers 
set this number to six elements (Alanezi & Aldabagh, 2012). Six elements from the long 
sequence of an indexed API calls vector are scanned each time. After scanning, the 
scanning window slides by one unit. This process will continue until scanning of the last 
six elements of a long indexed API call is completed. 
The scanning–sliding process described above is followed to form both X1 and X2 
datasets, however, with a little difference. In forming X1, Figure3-8 illustrates the 
process of scanning–sliding on the indexed API calls of an application. The scanning 
window is shown at three positions. At each position, the process scans only six indexed 
API calls. Then, the process copies the content of this window to make a new vector in 
input set X1.  
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Vector  ̅ has a (1xn) dimension, and the results for the indexing function are as follows: 
Equation  3-3 
 ̅ = (r1, r2, …. rn)    
 
Figure ‎3-8 Scanning process and Window Sliding to Build Input Vector 
 
We assume that S is the function of the scanning and sliding process. The function S can 
read six elements from any long sequence of indexed API calls ( ̅), such shown in 
equation 3-3, and can then save them inside the matrix X1 as a new row. 
Equation  3-4 
S( ̅)  Xn-5 6 (xij) ˅  xij = ri+j-1  
The Matlab code mentioned in Appendix-2 / Code2 is used to achieve the S function. 
The code can read the real number elements of any vector  ̅, which has (1xn) 
dimension. Then, the code can convert all elements of vector   ̅to construct the matrix X 
as explained in Equation 3-4. The X matrix is used to generate Signal-1,denoted as (X1). 
In constructing the matrix X2 to generate Signal-2, the API functions need to be 
classified into four main groups, where each group is related to a behaviour mostly 
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completed by malwares. A sample of this API grouping based of malware behaviour is 
explained clearly in figure 3-9. 
 
 
Figure ‎3-9 Grouping API calls based on Behaviours or Activities of Malwares 
 
We assume that the function g(x) represents the element’s grouping process that the 
function receives each time an element is inside the indexed vector of  ̅. Then, the 
function places this element in one of the following four groups, with consideration for 
their sequences:   
 
· gP represents the API functions that related to Application execution 
activities; 
· gA represents the API functions that related to Accessing activities; 
· gR represents the API functions that related to Registry file activities; and 
· gFS represents the API functions that related to I/O and system file activities. 
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The element’s properties and the structure of vectors inside each of the group are the 
same as those of the elements found inside the indexed vector of  ̅. However, they have 
different sequences. Therefore, the scanning–sliding process is applied to the vector 
inside each group. The final output of this process is shown in Figure 3-9. The figure 
shows that all four groups have been obtained. Finally, the input matrix X2could be 
constructed as a union of all mentioned groups, as shown in Equation  3-5.  
Equation  3-5 
X2 = ( gPU gAU gRU gFS )   
Figure 3-10 illustrates in details how the work of converting X to the input dataset X2 is 
achieved, and the Matlab code that illustrated in the Appendix-2/Code-3 is used to read 
all elements inside an indexed vector of    ̅̅ ̅ and then converts them to X2 input dataset.  
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Figure ‎3-10 Attaching indexing and scanning-sliding steps to extracting API calling step 
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The output of this part is generating both X1 and X2 data sets. Next section is about the 
methodology of the part two that used both prepared data sets to generate Signal-1 and 
Signal-2. 
 
3.3.8 Labelling vectors in X1 and X2: 
 
Each vector in X1 and X2 represented the behaviour of the six calls made by a PE 
application. Therefore, the class to which a vector belonged, namely, normal or 
malware, must be identified. Each vector needed to be labelled by identifying their 
classes. Each vector class is labelled either as (0) or as (1). The label (0) is considered 
for normal calls, whereas label (1) is considered for malicious calls.  
Different levels of binary for labelling were used to identify the family of each malware 
vector. However, the family identification of malware applications was beyond the 
scope of this research. This labelling process helped our model during the training and 
testing phases. The model used these labelling processes as a target for each vector, 
which is usually what a supervised ANN needs during implementation (Sivanandam, 
2006).  
The implementation of Part One of the ACC model is thus completed. Prepared 
matrixes of X1 and X2 will be forwarded to the next part. At later parts, the list of below 
will be expected: 
 
1- The ACC model uses both datasets in the processes of training or test-setting 
phases; 
2- A part of a prepared dataset will be used to test the accuracy and error problems 
of some classifier models;  
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3.4 Part Two: Signal-1 and Signal-2 generation 
 
Both datasets of X1 and X2, prepared throughout the part one of ACC model, are 
presented in this section. The vectors in X1 are used to generate Signal-1, however X2 
vectors are used to generate Signal-2. The process of interpreting vectors to signals has 
been achieved using supervised ANN (Figure 3-11). ANN is preferred for this work 
because it is a strong predictor and classifier model. Although ANN has two types of 
learning, supervised and unsupervised, this work employed supervised learning. For 
classifying applications, supervised ANN has stronger ability than unsupervised (Guerra 
et al., 2011). (Evidenced in chapter 5) 
 
 
Figure ‎3-11 Aactivities and sub-blocks of part two of ACC model 
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3.4.1 Signal-1 generation 
 
Each vector inside X1 should be classified either as normal or as malware. At this step, 
the signal also identifies the degree of membership of a vector in X1 to its class. The 
single line threshold value system is incorporated with the Signal-1 classifier as a 
distinguishing process. Based on the current threshold value system, results of classifier 
models are classified rather normally or maliciously. This work presents a new 
threshold value equation that can support the classifier models to identify errors better 
than the single line (results shown in Table 4-5). Figure 3-12 shows the steps of  
Signal-1 classifier.  
 
 
Figure ‎3-12 Process of generating Signal-1 
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If fs1 is the function that maps each vector in X1 to a certain value at that output stage, 
then the value of each mapping is located between zero and one. If y is the value of 
Single-1 at the output stage for each vector, then the value of y could be expressed as 
Equation 3-6. 
 
Equation 3-6 
   (   (   )) 
 
If C can perform the function of the single line threshold value system, then C can 
distinguish each vector in X1 either as normal or as malware based on its corresponding 
y value at the output stage. The comparison of y value with the threshold value can be 
done based on Equation 3-7. The variable a in the equation has a value from 0.5 to 0.6, 
and the value varies from one research to another. 
 
Equation 3-7 
 
 ( )  {
                      
                    
 
 
However, in a later chapter, this work shows that such distinguishing system cannot 
support classifier models to minimize errors. Therefore, this work proposes a new 
threshold value distinguisher.  
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Based on the new threshold system that shown in Equation 3-8, outputs of Signal-1 can 
be divided into three area, namely, d11, d12, and d13: 
Equation  3-8 
 ( )  {
                              
                              
                      
 
Signal-1 carries three different classes (d11, d12, and d13) as outputs. This work focuses 
more on the elements that lay in d13 area because all elements of this group are 
considered either as doubtful or as misclassified objects.  
Finally, the input vectors of X1 are classified into three groups of (G1), namely, normal 
vectors (G1n), malware vectors (G1m), and suspected vectors (G1s). The work groups of 
each input vector based on their corresponding output  ( ). 
 If G is the function of the groups in the input vectors, as in equation 3-9, then the final 
stage Signal-1 maintains for any vector in X1 includes the input vector itself X1i, the 
actual output y1i, and the group of the input vector G1i, Equation 3-10. 
 
Equation 3-9 
 (  )  {
                              
                              
                       
 
 
Equation  3-10 
        (   )  (
   
   
   
) 
More details on the execution of Signal-1 will be discussed in chapter four. Next section 
explains the process of preparing Signla-2 results.   
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3.4.2 Signal-2 generation 
 
The same ANN used to generate Signal-1 is also employed to generate Signal-2 because 
the structure of the input dataset X2 is exactly similar to that of X1. Each vector in X2 has 
six real value elements, as in X1. The process of training and testing the ANN is also the 
same. However, each vector in X2 represents a different aspect from the vectors of X1. 
Although the meaning of vectors is not the same, the target of each vector in X2 is 
represented by 0 or 1, implying the same range of output. Therefore, the activation 
function used by each node for training X1 has not changed during the training of X2. 
Due to the difference in the meaning of vectors in both datasets, the output of the ANN 
gives different explanation. The execution of the ANN with X2 determines the degree of 
relationship between each vector with certain malware behaviours. However, the 
execution of the same ANN with X1, can only show the degree of normality of a general 
execution vector. More importantly, ANN with X2 can classify malwares, implicitly, 
based on the four major behaviours of malwares. However, this goal is beyond of our 
work. ANN with X2 checks vectors for a specific behaviour; hence, precise results could 
be obtained. 
The results of Signal-2 are distinguished also based on Equation 3-8. Moreover, 
Equation 3-9 is used for grouping the vectors of X2 into three groups in (G2), such as 
normal vectors (G2n), malware vectors (G2m), and suspected vectors (G2s).  
Equation 3-10 is used to generating Signal-2 for each vector in X2. The format of 
Signal-2 can be shown as (X2i, Y2i, G2i). However, sub-classification exists inside each 
group. Vectors in each group will belong to one of monitored behaviours of the 
malware. Based on the monitored behaviour of an application, we can determine if the 
application is a malware or not.  
Next section explains how results of Signal-1 and Signal-2 proceeds by the part three of 
ACC model. 
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3.5 Part Three: Co-stimulation 
 
In this part, ACC model performs a comparison process between elements of Signal-1 
and Signal-2. For Signal-1, only cases in d13 are considered. However, for Signal-2, 
cases in both d21 and d22 are considered. The model takes each case in d13 (suppose Ci), 
and achieves the following procedures: 
1- Compute the similarity index between Ci and each case in d21. Then; 
a. Considerer only vectors that their similarity indexes are greater than 0.7. 
b. Compute the total number of vectors that obtained in 1.a. 
c. Compare the number that obtained in 1.b with the factor K (value of K 
explained later page 178, 3). 
2- Compute the similarity index between Ci and each element in d22, and then 
repeat all steps of 1.a, 1.b, and1.c to obtain 2.a, 2.b, and 2.c. 
3- ACC makes decision based on the following rules: 
 
Table ‎3-2 Rules that considered during signals confirmation. 
 
 
Status of  Ci Rules 
Ci is Normal 
If the value that obtained in 1.b >K (Signal-1 confirmation) and 
value that obtained in 2.b <K (Signal-2 confirmation).  
Ci is Malware 
If the value that obtained in 1.b <K (Signal-1 confirmation) and 
value that obtained in 2.b >K (Signal-2 confirmation). 
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The first rule of confirmation checked the distance and similarity among doubtful cases 
and behaviour of malwares (dist1). Values were obtained using Equation 2-5 and 
Equation 2-6.  
If any case confirmed both indicators, then the work would proceed to the second step, 
which involved measuring the distance and similarities among vectors and classes with 
equivalent normal behaviour (dist2). Increasing the certainty for any case would be 
confirmed if and only if Equation 3-11 is satisfied.  
Equation 3-11 
                             
 
The new certainty value for the doubtful cases that passed confirmation processes must 
be computed. If Ci is the classification value for the doubtful case i, the new value for Ci 
should be computed based on Equation 3-12.  
Equation 3-6 
       (            ) 
 
Accordingly, the new value of Ci will increase the certainty of case i either to the normal 
direction or to the malware direction. In both cases, the new value of Ci improves the 
value of RMSE, which in turn indicates improvement of accuracy.  
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3.6 Model‎and‎Problem’s‎Validation 
 
 
A part of the present methodology is to validate ACC model against the important 
theories and techniques that frequently employed as malicious API call classifier 
models. This validation process that depends on some tests should confirm to facts: 
 
1- Errors exist in the current classifier models due to characteristics similarity 
of vectors that belongs to different classes. 
2- Result of ACC model should show better accuracy results than other models. 
 
In general, most studies depended on three types of techniques to achieve API call 
classification. These techniques were either supervised or unsupervised AI algorithms, 
or they followed some statistical theories. Therefore, this work tests the collected API 
calls using the following AI techniques and statistical theories.  
 
1- Supervised learning algorithm 
a. Neural Network 
b. Support Vector Machine 
2- Unsupervised learning algorithm 
a. SOM 
b. K-mean clustering 
3- Statistical theories: These theories depend mostly on computing the frequency or 
probability of suspected API functions that mostly called by normal and rarely 
called by malware application. 
Results of these tests are shown in Table 5-4 
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3.7 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter explains the methodology steps of the ACC model as below: 
 
1- ACC model is proposed by this work as a malicious API calls classifier models. 
2- ACC model has three main parts. Each part has different sub-parts or steps. 
3- Parts of the ACC model, mainly, related to: 
a. Sample collection and API call vectors preparation. This part started by 
collecting PE samples from different sources and ended by generating 
two different patterns of API call vectors.  
b. Designing an ANN as a classifier model, and using the two different data 
sets of (1.a) as inputs for training and testing the ANN classifier model. 
This part also results Signal-1 and Signal-2 at output.  
c. Making a compression between results in Signal-1 and Signal-2. 
Through this step, ACC model should be able to increase the certainty of 
doubtful and misclassified results. 
4- Clamping the same input data set (1.a) to some important classifier models, and 
compare their results with the results that obtained by ACC model. 
5- Some new ideas presented though this chapter, such as proposing new function 
as a threshold value system. The new threshold value should support classifier 
models better than the valid one.  
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Chapter 4 
 
4- ACC Implementation 
 
4.1 Introduction: 
 
This chapter explains the implementation part of the ACC model. Through this chapter, 
the three main parts of ACC model are executed individually. Moreover, details about 
steps inside each main part are also explained. The first section of this chapter describes 
the type and the version of softwares that employed by this work as well as the details 
about OS environment where implementations are taken place. 
As there are many techniques and theories involved in ACC model, this chapter also 
covered information about parameters and features of the involved theories with regard 
to the API call classifier models. More figures and tables are presented in this chapter to 
explain the implementation process or to support the ACC methodology.  
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4.2 System environment and Employed Software 
 
This work has executed all codes and PE samples using the Windows 7 OS. An HP 
desktop computer with the following details was used: 
· Model: HP Compaq dc7900 Convertible Minitower. 
· Processor: Intel(R) Core(TM)2 Duo CPU E8400 @3.00GHz 3.00 GHz 
· Memory (RAM): 4.00 GB 
· System Type: Windows 7, 32 bit Operating System. 
 
 
Three types of softwares are used in this work for coding and evaluation as follows: 
· Matlab 2010b. Matlab software version 2010b was used throughout the work, 
from coding most parts of the ACC model to code and test most classifier 
models. To present and display the results, our work mostly depended on the 
graphical tools of Matlab.  
· SPSS Version 18. SPSS Version 18, statistical software that can perform most 
statistical theories, was used in obtaining the frequency and probability of each 
API function that might be called by any PE sample. The software even used 
during model’s evaluation. 
· The monitoring softwares have been used for extracting API functions that 
called by PE samples. Two types of these softwares are employed. The first 
software is called APIMonitoring (Version 2007) and the second is PE-Explorer 
that is usable for Windows 7 (2008). Both softwares work only with Win 32-bit 
PE files. 
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4.3 ACC Implementation: Part One 
 
The following steps are needed to be achieved throughout the implementation of part 
one of the ACC model. This part was introduced in chapter (3) as a sample collection 
and API call vectors preparation. This part is started by specifying the characteristics of 
PE samples that focused by this work and ended with generating to different patterns of 
input dataset. Implementation details of each step in this part are explained in later 
sections, wherever is necessary. 
4.3.1 Properties of PE Samples 
 
The wok introduced the properties of the required samples in section 3.3.1. The section 
has focused only on the characteristics and properties of the malware and normal 
applications that should be collected. The section also identified the type of malware 
and normal applications that should be focused by this work. Furthermore, the section 
also presented the justifications about each focused property.  
The only aim of this section was to know the type of malwares and normal samples that 
should be collected. Through sections 1.7, 2.6, and 3.3.1 all information regarding 
samples and other relevant issues has been clearly identified. It has been decided 
through these sections that the type of application which should be focused by this work 
is PE structures.  
As the aim for the section 3.3.1 was only to explain the properties of samples, therefore, 
there is no coding works for this section. The only step that could be done here is to 
move to the next section to find out the process that used by this work to identify 
sources where samples could be found. 
.  
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4.3.2 The sources of PE Samples 
 
All sample properties that identified through section 3.3.1 have been passed to section 
3.3.2 to guide the research how to find the required samples. Therefore, the aim of 
section 3.3.2 was to find out where these samples could be obtained.  
Through reviewing many researches, the work has found the possible ways that could 
be followed to get malware and normal samples. Regarding normal samples, it was not 
difficult to find them as most researches depended on applications from a fresh installed 
Windows (H. D. Huang, Lee, Kao, Tsai, & Chang, 2011). However, obtained malware 
samples were difficult. The ways that used by most researches are either downloading 
them from online sources or capturing them through using Honeypot systems. Getting 
malwares from other researchers was more difficult. 
Here, this work wants to refer the Appendix-1 that contains valuable suggestions and 
recommendations from a great malware analyst and a security architect from Symantec 
Security Response, Mr. Peter Szor, regarding collecting malware samples. This work 
decided to download PE malware samples from three different websites that mentioned 
in section 3.3.1, based on these suggestions.  
To decide how many samples are adequate for this research, the work has found in 
(Parmjit Singh et al., 2009) that 500 samples are efficient for each type of applications 
included in this work. As the work focused on four types of application (section 1.7), 
therefore 2,000 samples are sufficient. However, because the section after 3.3.2 has 
used to verify malware and normal samples, and there is a possibility that some samples 
will not pass this verification process, therefore, this work decided to collect 10,000 
malwares. As indicated in table 3-1, this work collected 3,500 PE Viruses, 3,500 PE 
Trojan horses, and 3,000 PE Worms. 
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Henceforward, the term “PE samples” related to these 2,000 PE samples that passed the 
verification process and considered in this work for further processes.   
4.3.3 PE Samples verification process 
 
The process of samples’ verification has clearly indicated in section 3.3.3. In that 
section, Figure 3-4 explained how the process of verification has handled, and Table4-1 
displayed the results of that process. The section also mentioned the name of the five 
brands of AV softwares that used in the process of verification.  
The employed AV softwares have been installed individually on a Windows7 OS. Each 
time an AV installed, available samples have been scanned by the AV and only the 
detected samples are considered for the subsequent scanning. Although, no AV can 
detect all available samples, AVs could detect adequate number for this research.  
Table 4-1 shows the number of samples / type application that passed the verification 
process. The table also illustrates that the passed number is more than the required for 
this research. This work randomly selected 500 samples for each verified PE 
applications type. 
Table ‎4-1 Number of PE that passed verification 
 
Type of PE application Total number of samples 
passed verification 
Number of samples the 
selected randomly 
Virus 2,689 500 
Trojan Horse 2,864 500 
Worms 2,783 500 
Normal 500 500 
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4.3.4 Extracting API Functions (Execution of PE samples): 
 
PE samples under monitoring systems must be executed to extract the needed 
information. Samples that passed verification processes in sections 3.3.3 and 4.3.3 were 
executed under the APIMonitoring software. From this execution, the monitored 
software can observe much information, including the name of each API function called 
by the executed sample and the name of the DLL related to each API function.  
The monitoring software reports the name of the API functions in the form of a name 
sequence. The first name represents the first function called by the executed sample, 
whereas the last name is the last necessary API function needed by the sample. The 
monitoring software can track the system calling for any executed application. Each call 
is represented as execution behaviour for the monitored sample. Therefore, this work 
monitored the sequence of the execution behaviour by monitoring the execution of 
samples using the APIMonitoring software.  
In addition to obtaining the sequence of API functions’ name or the names of the 
execution behaviour, this work obtained more information from monitoring the 
execution process, as summarised below:  
 
1- The DLL files that most frequently called by the executed sample. This work has 
found that most DLL files used by PE samples during calling of API functions 
are: 
a. Kernel.dll; 820 API functions were monitored; 
b. User32.dll; 621 API functions were monitored; and 
c. Advapi32.dll; 430 API functions were monitored. 
2- The total number of calls made by all PE samples was 326,942. In this 
monitoring scenario 1,871 API functions are monitored, however, only 342 
functions were called by PE samples. 
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3- Another grouping for the monitored API functions could be arranged. Functions 
may be classified based on the four behaviours of malwares (section 1.7). Table 
4-2 shows more details on the summary of the result of this arrangement. 
 
Table ‎4-2A compression result between the number of monitored API functions 
and actually called API function 
 
 The four malware behaviours 
that focused by this research 
(section 1.7) 
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654 117 206 611 283 1,871 
Called 
API 
Function 
127 23 48 107 37 342 
 
It is clear from the result which shown in Table 4-2 that not all monitored API 
function which tracked by APIMonitoring software are called by PE samples. 
Therefore, narrowing down the number of monitoring API functions in the 
monitoring process preserves the consumption of time and memory requirements.  
As clarified in section 3.3.4, the output at this stage is a sequence of API name that 
called by a PE sample. Next section explains the implementation of converting the 
sequence of API names to a sequence of API indexes to prepare dataset X that 
mentioned in section 3.3.6 
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4.3.5 Preparing dataset X: 
 
The sequence of functions obtained through the monitoring software (sections 3.3.4 and 
4.3.4) is form of a list of names. As the names of API functions in the obtained list are 
in a string or character format that is difficult for any AI technique to deal with directly, 
therefore, they must be changed to another forms of representation, such as real 
numbers or digital numbers, which may be accomplished by building a reference file 
(mentioned in section 3.3.5) whereby an API function is referenced or indexed by a 
number. Any list of functions would be transferred to their equivalent indexes by 
referencing this indexing file.  
The process of building the reference file is summarised below: 
 
1- Collect all API functions’ name that called by PE samples. 
2- Group the collected API functions in (1) based on the four malware behaviours 
that mentioned in section 1.7. 
3- Inside each group, remove duplicated names. 
4- Use real number format to index each API function as below: 
a. Use the integer part of the real number to represent the group that 
mentioned in (2). 
b. Use the decimal part, which comes after the dot, to represent the index of 
each function that obtained in (3). 
 
The output of this process generates a list, if stored in an excel sheet, could be seen as 
shown in the Figure 3-7. This list is used in the process of converting a sequence of API 
names to equivalent sequence of API indexes. The code that can perform this 
conversion is written in the Appendix-2 Code-1. Figure 4-1 is considered as an example 
of this conversion. 
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Figure ‎4-1 List of API names converted to equivalent API indexes 
 
The output of indexing process, as shown in the Figure 4-1, is considered as an X 
dataset. Each PE sample had an X dataset, which contained a long sequence of API 
function indices. The dimensions of the X vector  is (1 × n), which indicated that during 
the execution of any individual PE sample, an n number of the API function is expected 
to be called. Next section should convert this X dataset to X1 dataset. 
 
4.3.6 Preparing the Matrix X1: 
 
The X vector that prepared in Section 4.3.5 represents the sequence of calling procedure 
for any PE application. The (    ) API calling vector must be converted into a matrix 
with an (    ) dimension. The concept of this conversion is explained in section 
3.3.7. The Matlab code that receives the vector X and converts it into X1 is shown  
in Appendix-2 code 2. Figure 4-2 shows a sample of this conversion. 
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Figure ‎4-2 Sample of X to X1 conversion 
 
After converting the sequence of each application that comes within the PE samples, 
this work puts X1 vectors for all application in one set together. Assembling all X1 
vectors in one set created a big X1 matrix with (25,319) vectors. However, (793) 
duplicated vectors have been recorded, which means (793) duplicated behaviours in the 
matrix. 
In later section, this work uses X1 to train an ANN classifier model to distinguish 
normal with malicious vectors. Existing duplicated vectors inside the training dataset 
harms the training process of the ANN classifier model. Therefore, this work should 
remove duplicated vectors in X1 dataset. After cleaning the X1 dataset from duplication, 
only (24,526) unique vectors have been remained and considered for further process in 
later sections.  
In the next section, this work explains how the vector X is used to prepare the matrix X2. 
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4.3.7 Preparing the Matrix X2: 
 
There are two possible ways to build X2. The first way is through executing each 
application in PE samples under the monitoring softwares individually for four rounds, 
as mentioned is Figure3-5. The second way is by deriving X2 from X using scanning-
sliding process that mentioned in section 3.3.7. In both ways, vectors inside X2 are 
almost the same. However, this work uses the second approach as it needs less time than 
executing each application in PE samples for four rounds. Therefore as in the process of 
preparing X1, this work also depends on the matrix X to generate X2 matrix.  
The difference between X1 and X2 matrixes is that X2 grouped the API functions based 
on the four behaviours that mentioned in section 1.7, and then performed scanning and 
windowing. However, X1 generation had no grouping. Code-3 in Appendix-2 shows the 
Matlab code that can achieve this conversion, whereas Figure 4-3 shows an example of 
the X to the X2 conversion process.  
 
 
Figure ‎4-3 Example of (X) to (X2) conversion 
 
As in section 4.3.6, vectors of all application in PE samples are put together to create a 
big set of X2. Counting duplicated vectors, the size of vectors inside X2 matrix are 
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(6,074). However, this number has reduced to (5,451) vectors after removing duplicated 
vectors.  Finally and before passing X1 and X2 to the part two of ACC model, vectors 
inside these two dataset should be labelled as normal or malwares. The process of 
labelling is clearly explained in section 3.3.8 
4.4 Part TWO of ACC Model: 
 
The main target of this part of the ACC model is to classify vectors that have a 
dimension of (1 x 6) elements. This part receives such vectors from both X1 and X2 
matrixes that prepared in sections 4.3.6 and 4.3.7.  
As mentioned in sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, this part employed an ANN to classify each 
clamped vectors to either normal or malware. In section 2.11.1, this work mentioned 
that ANN classifier model has depended on Feed-forward Back Propagation as a 
training algorithm.  
Both X1 and X2 data set has been assigned to train and test the ANN classifier models in 
two different phases. ANN with X1 has learned to distinguish a sequence of API indexes 
that behaved normally with the one that behaved maliciously. However, X2 can train 
ANN to distinguish four major behaviours (section 1.7) of PE malwares. ANN can learn 
differently from X1 and X2, as the patterns of API calling sequences in these two dataset 
are different. API sequences that kept inside X1 represent the general execution of a 
suspected application, while sequences in X2 represent four major behaviours that 
malwares more frequently follow (Section 3.3.1). 
In this part, a new idea presents by this work to control misclassified and low certainty 
classified cases. The new approach proposes a threshold value system that can map 
results of ANN classifier models in to three areas; normal, malware, and doubtful areas.  
Next section shows the process of training and testing the ANN classifier model using 
X1 dataset.  
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4.4.1 Training and Testing ANN (FFBP-NN): Dataset X1 
 
The X1 dataset was the general execution sequence for PE samples. The X1 matrix had 
24,526 vectors, distributed between normal and malicious classes (section 4.3.6). This 
work clamped the X1 dataset to a feed-forward back propagation neural network (FFBP-
NN) (supervised classifier model), as illustrated in Figure 4-4. The figure also shows the 
number of nodes at each layer (input, hidden, and output). 
Figure 4-5 shows other details about this classifier model, such as the transfer function 
used inside each node and the number of nodes at input, hidden, and output layers. The 
transfer function used inside each node of both hidden layers was termed as “logsig.” 
Six nodes were involved as input because each clamped vector had six elements. 
However, the output layer only had one node that could map the status of a vector either 
to (0) or to (1). Moreover, the number of nodes of both hidden layers one and two was 
five and three nodes, respectively. More details about the physical structure of layers are 
also illustrated in Figure 4-5. 
 
 
 
Figure ‎4-4 The structure of the ANN used as tested classifier model 
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Figure ‎4-5 Details about the structure of the ANN used as tested classifier model 
 
Vectors in X1 were divided into two groups. The first group contained 10,000 normal 
vectors, whereas the second group had 14,526 malicious vectors. Moreover, vectors 
were sub-divided into the group of vectors used for the training phase and the group of 
vectors used for the testing phase. For the training phase, the work clamped 7,000 
normal and 11,526 malware vectors. However, the work used the remaining 6,000 
vectors (X1test) during the testing phase, where 3,000 are normal vectors and 3,000 were 
malware vectors. The parameters of the training phase for the above FFBP-NN are 
shown in Figure 4-6. 
The code mentioned in the Appendix-2 Code4 was used in the training and testing 
phases. Figure 4-7 illustrates the status of training, testing and validation of the ANN at 
each epoch. Figure 4-8 illustrates the result of the test on 6,000 non-seen vectors.  
Figure 4-8 also shows the distribution of testing results along the range of 0 to 1 and 
shows that results have been mixed over a range between 0.3 and 0.7. Such results 
would cause ambiguity and affect the accuracy of any classifier model.  
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Figure‎4-6Training parameters for the FFBP-NN using dataset X1 
 
Such result that illustrated in Figure 4-8 has many doubtful cases (cases that correctly 
classified but have low certainty degrees). Although objects have been labelled for two 
different classes, they have the approximate distances to both classes’ centres. There is 
no doubt that such results will increase the probability of occurring errors, especially if 
a classifier model will depend on a single cut-off (threshold) value. The threshold value 
that used in the mentioned figure has been set on (0.5), and the accuracy obtained was 
(82.9%) (Figure 5-1). 
Another important type of errors that notably found in Figure 4-8 is misclassified errors. 
It is clear in the figure that most misclassified vectors are located in area surrounded 
both sides of the threshold line. Moreover, it is also clear that the valid threshold value 
cannot support classifier model to identify an area that more properly doubtful and 
misclassified results could be found there. Therefore, this work should find out an active 
threshold value that at least can identify clean areas and isolate the doubtful area. 
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Section 4.4.3 explains how this work can identify the clean and doubtful areas, and how 
the work sets the values for new proposed threshold lines system. 
 
Figure  4-7; Training, testing, and validation status for X1 dataset 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎4-8The result of predicting (6000) non-seen vectors after training FFBP-NN 
with dataset X1tests 
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The coming section explains the process of training and testing ANN with X2 dataset as 
well as its physical and logical information. The action also indicated more 
characteristics about X2. 
4.4.2 Training and Testing ANN (FFBP-NN): Dataset X2 
 
To train and test our ANN classifier model with second dataset X2, this work uses the 
same physical structure that shown in Figure 4-4 and Figure 4-5. This is because, 
vectors in X2 has the same structure as vectors in X1. However, the number of vectors in 
X2 has been reduced to (5,451) vector (section 4.3.7). The work grouped the dataset into 
(2,000) normal cases with (3,451) malwares. For training our FFBP-NN, the work has 
clamped (3,451) vectors; (1,500) normal and (1,951) malware vectors. Remain (2000) 
vectors, which represented as (X2test), has used for testing.  
Although the physical information and training parameters for the FFBP-NN to train 
and test the second dataset is like the one that used for first dataset, there are some 
differences in training process between them. Figure 4-9 shows the training and 
validation information for FFBP-NN when its input receives the X2 dataset.  The Matlab 
code in Appendix 2 Code4 has used by this work to achieve the training and testing 
phases for this dataset too. 
Figure 4-10 shows how the results for testing the (X2test) dataset have been distributed 
over the range of 0-1. Moreover, Figure 4-11 shows the confusion matrix for the same 
testing results, where, FP and FN rates are shown. Based on the Equation 2-1, the 
confusion matrix can obtains the accuracy of this model, which is 77.1% as mentioned 
in the figure. 
As illustrated in the Figure 4-8 and Figure 4-10, misclassified results with low certainty 
results are located surrounding the single threshold line. Such results reducing the 
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accuracy of ANN based classifier models. The effect on accuracy is can be obtained 
clearly from the figure 4-11, which is known as Confusion Matrix.  The figure 
illustrated the rate of true positive and negative with false positive and negative. These 
rates are enough for using Equation 2-1 to obtain the rate of accuracy. As a result, the 
obtained accuracy has been found on 77.1%, as shown in the figure. The function 
“plotconfusion()” can easily generate Confusion Matrix figure.  
 
 
 
Figure‎4-9 Training, testing, and validation status for X2 dataset 
 
Therefore, this work proposed a new function (Equation 4-1) for setting the threshold 
value, as explained in the next section, to control errors, first, and then to improve the 
accuracy. 
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Figure‎4-10 The result of predicting (2,000) non-seen vectors after training FFBP-
NN with dataset X2tests 
 
 
 
Figure‎4-11 Confusion matrix for FFBP-NN training and testing with X2tests  
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4.4.3 Active Threshold boundaries: 
 
Figure 4-8 and Figure 4-10 show the inability of a single threshold value to control 
errors. A single threshold value served as a logic gate and could not support more 
functionality to classifier models. The classifier models still depended on cut-off values 
in discriminating objects. In contrast to the previous studies, the present research 
assigned a new functionality for the threshold value, such as an error controller, which 
is one of the important duties of co-stimulation inside HIS. The new boundaries of the 
new threshold value are described as in the Equation 4-1. In later parts of this section 
more details about obtaining the values of these boundaries are given. 
 
Equation  4-1 
      {
                                              
                                               
                                              
 
 
According to Equation 4-1, the model of this proposed work could map the results of 
classification into three predefined areas: 
 
1- Pure normal; means all vectors in this area classified as normal with high 
certainty degree, 
2- Pure malware; means all vectors in this area classified as malicious with high 
certainty degree, and 
3- Doubtful areas; vectors either classified correctly but with low certainty degree 
or misclassified. 
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Therefore, boundaries of the new threshold value for each area needed to be identified, 
which was accomplished by using the results found by the ANN classifier, as discussed 
in the previous section. Figure 4-8 shows that the traditional threshold value uses a 
single line to discriminate objects into two classes: malware and normal. However, 
many misclassified points and doubtful records were found at both sides of the 
threshold line. The RMSE for the model was 0.465, with the RMSE for the normal side 
(threshold range from 0 to 0.5) at (0.3451) and that for the malware side (threshold 
range from 0.51 to 1) at 0.3121.   
According to Equation 4-1, this work needs to define three areas instead of two (as it is 
the status in using the single line threshold). This work created these three areas using 
two lines threshold value (upper-line and lower-line). Based on the boundaries that 
define for each line in Equation 4-1, results of classifier models can be mapped into 
three areas instead of two (single line). 
The values of these two lines are obtained by this work based on the coming process. At 
the beginning, both lines were fixed on the position of 0.5. Then, the upper-lines are 
shifted by 0.05 units toward the right side, whereas the lower-line is fixed. For the 
second move, the lower-line shifted toward the left side by 0.05 units, whereas the 
upper-line was fixed. Figure 4-12 illustrates the shifting process of the upper and lower 
line of the threshold value. 
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Figure ‎4-12 Shifting the threshold line process, and the THREE areas of results. 
 
Within each shift, the work computes the RMSE for each defined area. The aim of these 
tests is to find out the value of both threshold lines on which RMSE for each pure 
normal and malware areas sets on a smallest value. Table 4-3 and Figure 4-13 show the 
results that have been obtained during each shift. It is clear that value of RMSE in both 
pure normal and pure malware areas are decreased within each shifting of threshold 
value lines, while this value for the doubtful area is notably increased. With this 
process, the work can create two cleaner areas and control the existing errors inside the 
third one. The process of shifting lines will be continue until the value of RMSE in both 
clean areas will not be decreasing notably. According to the Table 4-3 and Figure 4-13, 
the work found that at test number nine and forward (where the value of upper line = 
0.7 and the lower line = 0.3), the value of the RMSE, in all three areas, somehow 
become fixed and the process of shifting lines no more affected them. 
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Table ‎4-3 The effect of upper and lower line shifting on the RMSE measure in the defined three area 
Tests Threshold line Number of vectors in  RMSE 
Upper Lower Normal area Malware area Doubtful area Pure-Normal Pure-Malware Doubtful area 
1 0.5 0.5 2650 3350 0 0.3451 0.3121 0 
2 0.45 0.5 2094 3350 556 0.2982 0.3121 0.0469 
3 0.45 0.55 2094 2652 1254 0.2982 0.2631 0.0959 
4 0.4 0.55 1987 2652 1361 0.248 0.2631 0.1461 
5 0.4 0.6 1987 2033 1980 0.248 0.2011 0.2081 
6 0.35 0.6 1740 2033 2227 0.225 0.2011 0.2311 
7 0.35 0.65 1740 1457 2803 0.225 0.1724 0.2598 
8 0.3 0.65 1340 1457 3203 0.1909 0.1724 0.2939 
9 0.3 0.7 1340 1103 3557 0.1909 0.1661 0.3002 
10 0.25 0.7 982 1103 3915 0.1903 0.1661 0.3008 
11 0.25 0.75 982 835 4183 0.1903 0.1656 0.3013 
12 0.2 0.75 512 835 4653 0.1898 0.1656 0.3018 
13 0.2 0.8 512 389 5099 0.1898 0.1652 0.3020 
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Figure‎4-13 The impact of Shifting threshold lines on the RMSE measure of each 
defined area 
 
Before making a final decision on the obtaining boundaries, this work has to do another 
test as a confirmation. Our work uses the same ANN and same testing vector numbers 
(6000). The work assumes that the obtained boundaries for the new threshold system 
are true. The work checks the impact of increasing the number of the input vectors on 
the RMSE of each area as shown in the Table 4-4 and in the Figure 4-14.The figure and 
the table illustrate that the value of RMSE in the doubtful area increases with (80%), 
while this amount in two other areas is less by more than half. This means, by setting an 
area like doubtful area errors could be controlled and minimised by (40% – 80%).  
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Table ‎4-4 Impact of increasing the input number on RMSE 
# Number of 
input 
Vectors 
Number of 
Confused  
vectors 
RMSE for the area 
Normal Malware Doubtful 
1 500 213 0.0812 0.06234 0.0924 
2 1000 539 0.0884 0.06715 0.1234 
3 1500 784 0.0911 0.07233 0.1256 
4 2000 1023 0.0979 0.07719 0.1841 
5 2500 1358 0.0967 0.07937 0.2204 
6 3000 1803 0.1023 0.08154 0.2467 
7 3500 2203 0.1247 0.1025 0.2566 
8 4000 2557 0.1305 0.1472 0.2738 
9 4500 2915 0.1643 0.1662 0.2841 
10 5000 3183 0.1783 0.16893 0.2917 
11 5550 3314 0.186 0.16946 0.2982 
12 6000 3557 0.1909 0.1661 0.3002 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎4-14 RMSE for doubtful area increased more than other areas 
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All above tests show that most results located in above 0.3 and lower than 0.7 brought 
uncertainties to the classifier model. Therefore, the only part that needed more work for 
increasing certainty is the doubtful area.  
All the tests above were achieved through a Matlab code shown in Appendix-2 Code5. 
The next section shows how results that obtained from ANN classifier model (sections 
4.4.1 and 4.4.2) can be mapped to three areas that proposed by this section. 
 
4.4.4 Grouping the Results: 
 
Before activating the new threshold value, the FFBP-NN classifier model classified the 
input API call vectors into two classes: normal and malware. These results, as illustrated 
in Appendix-2 Code4, were kept in the matrix Doutn and Doutm. The code used Doutn 
to keep the normal results and Doutm to keep the malware results.  
However, the results needed to be grouped into three areas based on the threshold 
values defined in Equation 4-1. Accordingly, each element kept in the matrix Doutn and 
Doutm was classified into one of these three groups: Pure normal, Pure malware, or 
doubtful classes.   
Each element kept in the matrix Doutn and Doutm had an equivalent vector either in the 
X1tests or in X2testsdataset. However, this grouping process reclassified those vectors into 
one of the three predefined classes. The process identified a class for each vector in 
X1tests or in X2tests based on the equivalent grouping result. Accordingly, the process of 
grouping the results and vectors generated six subsets as shown below: 
 
1- d11, is a subset of vectors that derived from the X1test and classified as normal. 
2- d12, is the subset of vectors that derived from X1test and classified as malwares. 
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3- d13, is a subset of vectors that derived from X1test and classified as doubtful 
vectors. 
4- d21, is a subset of vectors that derived from the X2test and classified as normal. 
5- d22, is the subset of vectors that derived from X2test and classified as malwares. 
6- d23, is a subset of vectors that derived from X2test and classified as doubtful 
vectors. 
Table 4-5 shows the situation of the errors and the RMSE rate for both normal and 
malware areas with single threshold line and double threshold lines.  The table show the 
results of testing two different datasets. For instance, the FP rate (5.2%) and FN rate 
(11.1%) that found in normal and malware areas with single threshold line became 
(0.85%) for the same two areas with double threshold line. Even, the RMSE rate for 
normal area (0.3451) and malware area (0.3121) has been reduced to (0.1909) and 
(0.1724) respectively. Moreover, the number of vectors that brings problem to accuracy 
in normal and malware areas have been shifted to doubtful area, and only vectors that 
classified at high level of certainty are remained.  
 
Table ‎4-5 FP and FN isolating and minimizing RMSE 
Number  
of clamped 
vectors 
Single line threshold Defined threshold in 
Equation 4-1 
The areas Vector 
No. 
FP & 
FN % 
RMSE Vector 
No. 
FP & 
FN% 
RMSE 
6000 
Normal 2650 5.2% 0.3451 1340 0.85% 0.1909 
Malware 3350 11.1% 0.3121 1457 0.85% 0.1724 
Confused  NA NA NA 3203 14.6% 0.2939 
 
2000 
Normal 1062 10.4% 0.2094 496 0.91% 0.0979 
Malware 938 7.2% 0.1498 481 0.83% 0.0772 
Confused  NA NA NA 1023 15.8% 0.1841 
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Through this process, the work groups the doubtful and misclassified results into d13 
and d23 groups. It means errors in both normal and malware classes can be isolated. This 
work focused on the area that needed more improvement in the entire classification 
accuracy.  Therefore, in the next section this work uses a functionality of co-stimulation 
to improve the accuracy of ANN classifier model by increase the certainty of low 
certainty cases and reclassify the misclassified results.  
 
4.5 Part THREE of ACC Model: Co-stimulation 
 
The main target of this part is to increase the certainty degree of doubtfully classified 
cases and reclassifies the misclassified cases. This improvement can be achieved 
through a process named co-stimulation.  
The process considered vectors inside d13 that contains high misclassified and 
doubtfully classified vectors. The process also involved vectors in d21 and d22 that 
contain high classified vectors with a few misclassified cases.  
The process of co-stimulation can measure some similarity figures between a low 
certainty vector in d13 with vectors in both d21 and d22together. Later, the process 
considers the degree of similarity with the old certainty degree of the vector to compute 
new and better certainty degree for the doubtful vector. Latter sections give more details 
about co-stimulation process. However, the next section starts to find out indicators that 
accordingly two vectors are considered as similar or non-similar through co-stimulation 
process.   
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4.5.1 Calculating the Similarity Measurement 
 
To define two vectors similar or non-similar, co-stimulation process needs define two 
measures to evaluate the similarity degree between both vectors or between a vector and 
a class. Both measures were extracted from the vectors classified as high certainty 
vectors, that is, vectors kept in matrixes d11with d12fornormaland d21with d22formalware. 
The work evaluated those vectors to determine two important indicators, which would 
function as threshold values. The first indicator used to decide the similarity between 
two vectors, whereas the second indicator can check the distance between vectors and 
classes. Below steps show calculating process for the value of both indicators:  
A- Identifying the value of the first indicator (When two vectors are similar): 
1- Within a certain behaviour class, the similarity degree between each vector and 
the remaining vectors would be computed. Afterward, the vector’s average 
similarity (VAS) was obtained for each vector. If class A has n vectors, each 
vector in class A has (n) similarity, and each vector should have one VAS. 
However, class A should have (n) VAS.   
2- For each class, the overall average similarity (OAS) would be computed 
depending on the VAS of each vector (class A has only one OAS). The value of 
OAS represents the value of the indicator used for evaluating the similarity 
among vectors within a certain class. 
3- Each behaviour class has different vectors and different number of vectors. 
Hence, behaviour classes would have different values for their similarity 
indicator.  
4- Vectors are considered to be similar to any vector inside a certain behaviour 
class if and only if their Cosine Similarity is equal to or greater than the OAS 
value of that class.  
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B- Identifying the value of the second indicator (vector to class similarity): 
1- Within a certain behaviour class and for each vector, the VAS of each vector 
would be compared with the OAS values of that class. The number of vectors 
(assume  ̅) that has a VAS equal to or greater than the OAS of the class is 
identified.  
2- This work considered the value of  ̅ as the second indicator value. 
 
Accordingly, closer behaviour classes for doubtful vectors were identified if and only if 
their VAS values were equal to or greater than the OAS value for a number of vectors 
that can pass the  ̅ number (test one or T1 or Signal-1). If a doubtful vector from a 
malware behaviour class is identified, another confirmation test must be conducted, 
namely, test two or T2 or Signal-2. The Signal-2 would test the same doubtful vector 
with the normal behaviour class equivalent to the malware behaviour class, which was 
identified through Signal-1. The conditions that should be satisfied through Signal-2 
would be an inverse of the conditions applied through Signal-1. 
Table 4-5 presents the figures used to compute both values of the indicators. The total 
number of vectors in all matrixes normal and malwares was 3, 774 vectors: 1, 836 and 
1, 938 normal and malware vectors, respectively. However, the 977 vectors that 
belonged to the X2test dataset were sub classified based on four malware behaviours. 
Figure 4-15 shows the numbers of high-certainty vectors in the main and sub classes of 
the malware and normal datasets.  
The code mentioned in the Appendix 2 – Code6 was used in archiving, collecting 
information, and identifying both values of the indicators. Table 4-6 and Table 4-7 
illustrate the obtained values for OAS and  ̅ for all normal and malware behavior 
classes.  
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Figure ‎4-15 Number of high certainty vectors in classes and sub classes 
 
 
 
Table ‎4-6 The OAS values for each behaviour class 
Application 
classes 
General 
Execution 
Behaviour 
Application 
Behaviour 
Access 
Behaviour 
Registry 
Modification 
Behaviour 
I/O and 
System File 
Behaviour 
Normal 0.761% 0.812% 0.835% 0.817% 0.827% 
Malware 0.863% 0.893% 0.914% 0.876% 0.883% 
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Table ‎4-7 Value of  ̅and its percentage for each behaviour class. 
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Next section shows how these two indicators can be used in the process of co-
stimulation. 
 
4.5.2 Costimulation process: 
 
At this point, the situation of our classifications still contained doubtful and 
misclassified cases. Therefore, the two indicators that found in section 4.5.1 are 
involved in co-stimulation process to increase the certainty of suspicious cases. In each 
step of the two-step confirmation process (Equation 3-9), both values of indicators 
obtained in the previous sections were used. The first step of confirmation checked the 
distance and similarity among doubtful cases and behaviour of malwares (dist1). Values 
were obtained using Equations 2-5 and 2-6. If any case confirmed both indicators, then 
the work proceeds to the second step, which involved measuring the distance and 
similarities among vectors and classes with equivalent normal behaviour (dist2). 
Increasing the certainty for any case can be confirmed if and only if Equation 4-2 is 
satisfied.  
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Equation 4-2 
                             
 
The new certainty value for the doubtful cases that passed confirmation processes must 
be computed. If Ci is the classification value for the doubtful case i, the new value for Ci 
should be computed based on Equation 4-3. Accordingly, the new value of Ci will 
increase the certainty of case i either to the normal direction or to the malware direction. 
In both cases, the new value of Ci improves the value of RMSE, which in turn indicates 
improvement in accuracy.  
Equation 4-3 
       (            ) 
Table 4-8 illustrates the number of doubtful vectors that have been improved after 
applying the co-stimulation process. The table also shows the RMSE rate for the ANN 
classifier model before and after applying the Costimulation process. 
 
Table ‎4-8 Number of doubtful vectors with RMSE rate improvements after 
applying co-stimulation process 
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The number of doubtful vectors relocated from doubtful areas to a more certain area 
after applying the co-stimulation process are shown in Table 4-9. The table shows the 
status of the three areas, namely, normal, malware, and doubtful, before and after 
applying co-stimulation. The table shows that (51.8%) of low certainty classified 
vectors are relocated to higher certainty areas. 
 
Table ‎4-9 Number of vectors in the three predefined areas before and after 
applying co-stimulation 
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Another result that needs illustration is the rate of FP and FN. The improvement made 
by this work also covered errors that occurred due to misclassified objects.  
The implementation of this part was achieved using Matlab code. Instructions of this 
code are shown in Appendinx-2 code7. This work executed the same code (10) rounds. 
At each round the input set, which is 6000 has been chosen randomly. 
The ACC model showed its ability to change the classes of many misclassified objects. 
In next chapter, a compression between ACC and some classifier models are illustrated 
and improvement of FP and FN that made by ACC could be notably found.  
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4.6 Chapter Summary 
 
The implementation processes that described throughout the chapter four is summarized 
as below: 
1- This work has utilized the process of malware samples verification to avoid 
possibility of finding any noises in malware’s samples.  
2- It is not necessary for a PE application to call all API functions available inside 
computer system. PE applications only need to call the API functions that 
necessary for their execution. 
3- The long sequence of API functions that called by an application could be 
broken down to smaller parts of sequences, which each of them represent a 
behaviour of the application during its execution. 
4- For each type of application’s execution behaviour there is a concerned group of 
API function. To monitor a specific behaviour of an application, tracing the 
behaviour’s concerned group of API function is enough.  
5- ANN is a good classifier model. However, it has many misclassified or doubtful 
classified cases. Current threshold value that used with all classified models has 
no ability to identify which area causes more errors that affect the accuracy. 
6- The result of any classifier model could be divided into three areas; normal, 
malware, and doubtful area. 
7- This work needs to depend on some indicators in order to decide whether two 
vectors are similar or not. 
8- Process of co-stimulation is a confirmation of a case in two directions. 
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Chapter 5 
 
5. Evaluating ACC with other Classifier models 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Although the tools and the techniques that employed by researchers for devising 
classifier models were different, the concept and the algorithms that activated by them 
were followed either supervised or unsupervised methods (Ando et al., 2009; Merkel et 
al., 2010; Miao Wang, 2009; B. Zhang et al., 2006; Y. Zhang et al., 2010; H. Zhao et 
al., 2009; Zou et al., 2009). Moreover, Statistical theories was another concept that 
intended by researchers to build classifier models. Different statistical methods used by 
researchers to measure the membership probability degree for an unknown case inside a 
class.  Measuring the frequency for a malware’s behaviour was another statistical 
method (Cha, 2007).  
Regarding the input dataset, researchers were clamped only one dataset as an input to 
their systems. Therefore, this work tests some supervised and unsupervised detection 
models depending only on the X1 dataset, which has (24,526) vectors. The work also 
tested two concepts of statistical theories. Below are more details of the tested models: 
1- Supervised learning methods. 
a. Neural Network; Feed forward Back-Propagation algorithm 
b. Support Vector Machine. 
2- Unsupervised learning methods;  
a. Neural Network: Self-Organizing Map. 
b. K-means algorithm 
3- Statistical Theory (Obtaining the frequently of function calling). 
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5.2 Supervised Learning Classifier Models 
5.2.1 Feed-Forward Back Propagation Neural Network (FFBP-NN): 
 
In the section 4.4.1 of the previous chapter, a (FFBP-NN) has been trained and tested as 
a supervised classifier model. The training and testing process has been repeated for 
(10) rounds. At each round, the rates of FP and FN have been obtained. Details of each 
rounding test are mentioned in the Appendix A1.  
This process came as a part in the ACC model implementation. However, the results of 
FFBB-NN classifier model could be summarized in the confusion matrix below;  
Figure 5-1. Based on the FP and FN median rates that mentioned in the figure, the 
accuracy of this model equals to (82.9%). However, the median of accuracy for all (10) 
rounds set on (84.23%) 
 
 
Figure ‎5-1 Confusion matrix for FFBP-NN training and testing with X1tests  
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5.2.2 Support Vector Machine (SVM): 
 
Support Vector Machine (SVM) is another supervised classifier model that could be 
used when a classifier needs distinguishing objects only into two classes.  This work 
clamps (18,526) vectors to train SVM classifier model. The testing phase has checked 
(6,000) cases that divided into (3,000) normal and (3,000) malwares.  
The Matlab code that can perform the SVM training process has illustrated in the 
Appendix-2 Code8. 
 
 
 
Figure ‎5-2 The Confusion matrix output for SVM classifier model 
 
The FP and FN rate that mentioned in Figure 5-2 set the accuracy for a round of testing 
SVM on (83.8 %). However, the median for all ten rounds is (83.74%), as shown in the 
Appendix-3.  
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5.3 Unsupervised classifier model 
 
5.3.1 Self-Organizing Map (SOM): 
 
To test an unsupervised classifier model, this work employs Self Organizing Map 
(SOM) neural network.  For this test, the work used (24,526) vectors; normal vectors 
are (10,000) and malicious vectors are (14,526). This work tested the SOM neural 
network in two directions. The first direction was for using SOM to group the input 
vectors. The second direction was to use SOM to cluster input set and then to compute 
the FP and FN rates.  
To achieve the first part, all (24, 526) vectors has been clamped as input to SOM neural 
network. Originally, our dataset consists from two groups. The aim of this part of test is 
to find out either SOM can initiate input vectors to their original class or not. The 
structure of SOM that used by this work is shown in the Figure 5-3. The output 
dimension of SOM has been set on (1 x 2) as the input dataset originally consists from 
two classes. As each input vectors has six elements, therefore, the number of nodes at 
input layer has been set on six.  
 
 
Figure‎5-3The physical structure for SOM NN at part one test 
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SOM mapping result for vectors into each cluster has been shown in the Figure 5-4. It is 
clear from the figure that there are errors in the clustering process as input vectors have 
not been clusters like their original group; (10000 in cluster one and 14526 in cluster 
two).   
 
 
Figure ‎5-4 Number of vectors inside each cluster (SOM part one test) 
 
SOM forms a semantic map where similar samples are mapped close together and 
dissimilar apart. Based on that and comparing the results, it is clear that some vectors 
that originally belonged to a cluster, however, SOM have clustered them to another 
class that they have similarity more. It means there are many API calls that originally 
made by malwares; however, they are similar to normal behaviour calls.  
The code that illustrates in Appendix 2 code can achieve the first part of SOM classifier 
model testing. 
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The second part of the test is to compute the rate of FP and FN to find out the accuracy 
rate. The physical structure of the SOM NN for the second part is same as shown in the 
Figure 5-3. However, the dataset has been changed.  
The work has divided dataset into two parts; (18,526) vectors used for training and 
(6,000) vectors for testing. The testing vectors included (3,000) normal vectors and 
(3,000) malicious vectors. 
However, Figure 5-5 gives more details about the accuracy of SOM, as FP and FN rates 
have been found. The accuracy rate that could be obtained from the information given 
by the mentioned figure is (78.6%). However, the median accuracy of SOM during the 
(10) rounds of testing was (78.83%). 
 
 
Figure ‎5-5  The Confusion matrix for SOM classifier model 
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5.3.2 (K-means): 
 
K-means clustering is an unsupervised method tools that tests by this work as a 
classifier model.  Our clustering model classifies (24,526) API call vectors into normal 
and malware classes. The method that use by k-means is distance measure. The method 
measures the distance between the centres of each class with each vector. A vector will 
set in a class if the distance between this vector and the centre of that class is less than 
distances with other classes’ centres. 
 
 
Figure ‎5-6 Clustering 2000 vectors with K-means algorithm 
 
 
Figure 5-6 shows the result of k-means algorithm clustering. The figure illustrates the 
distribution of API call vectors around the centre of normal and malware classes. The 
figure shows an important situation very clearly, which is the occurrence of some 
misclassified cases.  
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There are many points that belonged to the normal centre but located close to the 
malware class centre. The areas that highlighted in figure show some points, which are 
representing normal and malware API calls, have mixed in an area located between the 
centres of both classes.  
The Appendix-2 Code10 shows the instruction that can achieve k-means algorithm 
implementation. The output of this code classifies the input vectors into two classes; 
class number one and class number two. The work can obtain two more results. The 
first result is the number of the class that computed for each input vector. The code 
keeps the class’s number of each vector in matrix called idx. The second important 
result is shows the distance between each input vector with the centres of both classes. 
The distance results have been kept by the code in the matrix sumd. Inside this matrix, 
there are (24526) vectors, each have two elements. 
This work used the actual class number and k mean output class number for all vectors 
to obtain the confusion matrix that shown in the Figure 5-7. This method is called 
External Evaluation for clustering methods. The accuracy that shown in the figure 
obtained based on the median FP and FN rate. Accordingly, the accuracy for this 
classifier model will be (80.1%).   However, the median of the accuracy for ten rounds 
of testing equals to (77.69%). 
The second type of result shows the distance of each vector within a cluster and 
between other clusters.  Ideally, good clustering method should score for each vector a 
high similarity degree within a cluster and low similarity degree between clusters. To 
measure this evaluation, this work has depended on the (24526 X 2) vectors that 
obtained and kept in the sumd matrix in the Appendix-2 Code7. The vectors show the 
distance between each vector and both centres classes. To achieve that, this work first 
shows the variances of distances for each vector through the Figure 5-8. 
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Figure ‎5-7 Confusion Matrix for K-mean classifier model 
 
 
Figure ‎5-8 the variance of distances between vectors and centres 
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For both classes, it is clear that distances have been separated between 2 and 12, and the 
mean of the distance for both classes is around 6. Now going back to distances that have 
been kept in sumd, this work can obtain some measures as illustrated in Table5-1. 
 
Table ‎5-1  Number of vectors inside and outside the mean distance for each class 
Class’s Number Number of Distances > 6 Number of Distance < 6 Total number of vectors 
Class 1 10,668 13,858 24,526 
Class 2 9,216 15,310 24,526 
 
 
It is clear from the table that many vectors are located outside the mean distance for 
each class. The clustering certainty of such vectors is very low, which increases the rate 
of RMSE. 
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5.4 Statistical classifier models 
 
To distinguish malicious API calls, many researchers have depended on obtaining 
statistical figures of such callings. Thoroughly, they compute the frequency of each API 
function that probably called by malware or normal applications. Then, they identified 
the API functions that more frequently called by malwares, and rarely called by normal 
applications. Based on that, researchers have marked the API functions that mostly 
called by malware and rarely called by normal as suspicious API calls.  
Researchers used the frequency number of API calls in different directions to classify 
normal with malware applications. A group of researchers used these frequency figures 
to build vectors for each application. Each vector indicates the API functions that have 
the highest frequency calls and the ones that have the lowest frequency. As a result, 
researchers can get many normal and malicious vectors. The second group used the API 
calls frequency to compute the probability of a function inside normal and malware 
applications.  Functions that have high probability call’s rate by malware applications 
are considered as suspicious functions over this rate. 
However, in both cases researchers depended on one type of computation to decide 
either a call that made by an application is malicious of not. They measured the distance 
between the computed vector or probability for a suspected application with some 
predefined malicious vectors and probability figures. If the distance passed a predefined 
threshold value, the call considered as malicious, otherwise it considered as normal call.  
To test the concept of statistical classifier models, this work has started to collect the 
frequency of each API functions that called by (2,000) samples of PE application. 
Samples have been grouped into (500) normal and (1,500) malware applications. This 
work has employed the SPSS program version - 18 to find out the API calls’ frequency. 
Figure 5-9 shows a sample of SPSS report about the API function frequency collecting. 
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Then the work has to interpret these frequency figures either to vectors or probability 
measurements.  
 
Figure ‎5-9 A sample of the SPSS program report about API call frequencies 
collection 
 
The work has imported the collected API call frequencies to an excel sheet. There, a 
vector for each application has been built. Each vector contains 12 elements; the first six 
elements represent the API functions that have the highest frequencies, while the last six 
represent the functions with lowest frequency calling. Figure 5-10 is a sample of an 
excel sheet that shows some applications and their frequency ranking of API calls. The 
highlighted application is a normal application called “accwiz” with its API calls 
ranking. The highlighted API calls represents only the Access behaviour for that 
application. 
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Figure ‎5-10 Samples of vectors that shown the frequency rate of API calls 
 
Another sheet has been prepared by this work included the probability of calling of each 
API function by malware applications. To achieve that the work follows below steps: 
1- Computing the probability of each function inside each PE malware samples. (fp) 
2- Computing the average probability of each function among all samples. (Afp) 
3- For each malware sample, compute how many API functions their malicious 
probability passed the average indicator (Afp).  It means computing (k).  
4- Then find the average of (k) among 1500 malware samples. (Ak) 
Through these steps, this work has obtained for each API function the average 
malicious calling that made by 1500 malware applications. Furthermore, the work has 
obtained the value of indicator Ak, which is equal (3). Calls inside a suspected 
application could be considered as malicious if their probability passed their Afp values.  
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And, if the number of malicious calls inside the suspected PE application passed the 
indicator Ak, the application will be considered as malware.  Figure 5-11 shows a part of 
API functions with their average malicious probabilities.  
 
Figure ‎5-11 Obtaining the average probability measure for API functions 
 
The work has tested both statistical concepts individually. To test the highest and lowest 
frequency similarity, this wok has tested (200) vectors that selected randomly from the 
(2000) vectors; (100) vectors are normal and the rest are malware. The work has 
checked the similarity rate between each vector in the (200) group with remain (1800) 
vectors in the population. The work considered two vectors as similar if their cosine 
similarity is above of (0.7). This factor has been computed in section 4.5.1 (Table 4-6). 
A tested vector will be considered as malicious vector if the number of similar vector 
inside malware group is more than the similar vector that found in normal. 
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This test has been repeated (10) times, and at each time the work selected new (200) 
vectors randomly. Table 5-2 shows median of the FP and FN rates of the statistical 
classifier model that depend on highest and lowest rate of frequency calling. 
The Appendix-2 Code11shows the Matlab instructions that can achieve this statistical 
similarity process. The code execution can give (1,800) similarity indexes for each 
vector. Accordingly, the code can obtain the number of similarity of a vector with 
vectors in the normal and malware groups. The code, then, can classify the results into 
normal or malware.  
 
Table ‎5-2 FP and FN rates for Statistical Classifier models  
(Highest and Lowest call rate similarity) 
 
  Target 
   Malware Normal 
O
u
tp
u
t Malware 73 27 
Normal 23 77 
 
 
The second phase of testing is related to measuring the probability indicator for each 
API function calling by a suspected sample. The code that can achieve that is mentioned 
in the Appeindx-2 code12.  
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First, the probability degree for each API functions that called by a suspected 
application should be computed. The code reads the probability of each API function 
that called by the suspected application. Then, the code compares each probability with 
the indicators that mentioned in Figure 5-11. The code considered calls that their 
probabilities passed their equivalent indicator of Afp as malicious call. If number of 
malicious calls inside the suspected application passed three, the application will be 
considered as malware. This test has been repeated (10) rounds. At each time (200) 
samples of PE applications are considered randomly; (100) normal and (100) malwares. 
Table 5-3 illustrates the median of the FP and FN rates of the malicious probability rate 
based classifier models. 
 
Table ‎5-3 FP and FN rates for Statistical Classifier models  
(Probability of malicious calling rate similarity) 
 
  Target 
   Malware Normal 
O
u
tp
u
t Malware 77 23 
Normal 23 77 
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5.5 Accuracy Evaluation for classifier models 
 
Most researchers measured the accuracy of the classifier models based on computing 
the FP and FN rates. They used the Equation 2-2 to find out the accuracy degree of their 
models. This work has employed the same equation to compute the accuracy. More 
details about accuracy of each model have been shown in Appendix A-1. 
Table 5-4 and Figure 5-12 illustrate the comparison between accuracy and FP with FN 
for the models that have been tested throughout this work, including the ACC classifier 
model. The value that shown in each cell of Table 5-4 represents the median value for 
TP, TN, FP, FN, and the accuracy for each tested models.  
 
Table ‎5-4 The median accuracy comparison between ACC and some classifier 
models 
 
Classifier Models TP TN FP FN Accuracy 
Supervised: NN- FFBP 2488 2486 513 514 84.23% 
Supervise: SVM 2502 2527 499 474 83.74% 
Unsupervised: SOM 2301 2415 700 586 78.73% 
Unsupervised: K-mean 11971 7678 2555 2322 77.69% 
Statistical: Frequency 74 78 27 23 75.50% 
Statistical: Probability 78 78 23 23 77.50% 
ACC  2724 2656 277 345 90.23% 
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Figure ‎5-12 Median accuracy comparison between the tested classifier models 
 
To show the significant of the ACC model among the other classifier models, this work 
uses another way of testing which called One-Way ANOVA test. This time, the test 
compares the mean of accuracy for two models each time. Figure 5-13 shows how the 
accuracy of the ACC classifier models outperformed the rest of tested models. 
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Figure ‎5-13 The mean accuracy of models that computed using ANOVA testing 
method 
 
 
The main aim of the results that are shown in table 5-5 is to check either the 
outperformance of the ACC model is significant or not. As mentioned before, this work 
has used the ANOVA test to evaluate the results that obtained from all classifier models 
including the ACC model. Table 5-5 evidenced the significant of the accuracy results 
that have been obtained by ACC compared with other classifier models. The notes that 
have been written under the table give some keys about how to compare the values 
inside the table. 
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Table ‎5-5 Comparison between the mean of tested and ACC classifier models 
 ANN SVM SOM K-mean Statistical: Frequency Statistical: Probability ACC 
ANN --- 0.368 4.618** 5.053** 7.442** 5.743** -14.414** 
SVM --- --- 4.250** 4.685** 7.074** 5.375** -14.032** 
SOM --- --- --- 0.435 2.824* 1.125 -19.032** 
K-mean --- --- --- --- 2.389 0.690 -19.467** 
Statistical: Frequency --- --- --- --- --- 1.699 -21.856** 
Statistical: Probability --- --- --- --- --- --- -20.157** 
ACC --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 
Notes:  
1) Numbers without * means that the two models are not significant. 
2) Numbers with * means that the two models are significant, but less than 2.00 
3) Numbers with ** means that the two models are strongly significant. 
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5.6 Chapter Summary   
 
The accuracy of the ACC has been verified with some conversional classifier models. 
Through chapter five, this work had shown the process of models verification. Below are 
the summery of chapter five:  
1- Classifier models could be devised based on different techniques and tools. 
2- To test the majority of classifier models with reference to accuracy, this work has 
tested the classifier models that more frequently employed by researchers during 
the past decade.  
3- All used classified models have high rates of False Alarm and Root Mean Square 
Errors. 
4- The ANOVA test that has been done by this work evidenced that ACC model has 
significant outperformance accuracy. 
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Chapter 6 
 
6. Conclusion and Contributions 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter is organized in the following manner. The first part presents the conclusions 
of the work, with emphasis on the importance of improving the accuracy of classifying 
malicious API calls. In addition, this section explains how the direction set by this current 
work can support behaviour-based API call detection systems to reveal PE malwares. 
The second part of this chapter presents the objectives, all of which were defined and 
validated by the work, and describes how each objective was carried out and achieved. 
Later, the chapter emphasis the most important contributions of the current work and how 
each contribution can positively affect the accuracy of API calling behaviour classifier 
systems. The chapter ends by underlining some suggestions for future works. 
6.2 Conclusion 
 
Throughout the review stage of this work, we found that most researchers attempted to 
classify PE malwares by monitoring the API calls behaviour of malwares. However, 
malwares always try to call API functions as normal applications. This behaviour affected 
the accuracy of malicious API classifier models, which is problematic. Therefore, this 
work addressed the gap of malicious API calls classifier models.  
First, the work conducted tests and measured the gaps in the behaviour-based API calls 
classifier models. Hence, the work found that the accuracy of API call classifier models 
can be improved by controlling errors and by conducting further analysis. The work 
searched to find some error controller and confirmation mechanisms. This work found that 
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the functions of a biological phenomenon, called co-stimulation, can be used as a bio-
oriented solution to the problem of gaps in API call classifier models.  
Co-stimulation always directs the human immune system to avoid errors. Another function 
of co-stimulation is in improving the ability of detectors to use safe and balanced processes 
(sections 2.10.1 and 2.10.2). Based on these two processes, this work concluded that 
simulating the functionality of co-stimulation as a bio-oriented solution the accuracy of 
API calling behaviour classifier models can be improved. 
This work has found that the concept of co-stimulation can be attached to most API call 
classifier models to increase the certainty of doubtful cases and to improve the 
misclassified cases by performing two steps. In the first step, the classifier model can 
define the boundaries of these cases that are located in doubtful areas. Second, the model 
can clamp them for further investigations and analyses. Through these two steps, the 
classifier models, such as ANN, can minimize the FP and FN with RMSE rates  
(Table 4-5). 
Another interesting discovery is the viewpoint considered by previous researchers in 
defining malwares. We found that most researchers defined malwares from the viewpoint 
of computer systems or computer users. However, we noted that the viewpoint of detection 
and classification systems in defining malwares has not been considered yet. Therefore, 
this work concluded a new paradigm for defining malwares based on their behaviours 
(6.3.4).  
6.3 Achievement of Research Objectives 
 
The objectives are mentioned in Section 1.5. Each objective in this current work is focused 
on the process of improving the accuracy of the API call classifier models. Below is the 
explanation of each objective in relation to their effect on minimizing errors while 
classifying malicious API calls. 
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· Studying different works on malicious API call classifier models 
 
Different perspective and proposals have been made by previous works on malicious 
API calling classifier models. Those works had analysed API calling behaviours to 
reveal PE malwares through classifying malicious API calls. Reviewing those 
projects was the first objective that conducted by this work to collect much 
information about this area. 
The work initiated this objective to find out the type of models that proposed by 
researchers and the tools with methods that utilised by them. The aim of this 
objective was also to identify the relation between the behaviours of malwares and 
proposed classifier models as well as with the functionalities of the biological viruses 
and biological defence systems. 
Through achieving this objective the following points become clear: 
 
1- Most works have depended on measuring the similarity between calling 
behaviours of unseen malwares with some predefined calling behaviours (Table 
2-2 and Table 2-3). 
2- Penetrating a normal behaviour for calling API functions by malwares has an 
important effect on the accuracy of classifier models as it leads to increase 
errors.  
3- There is a strong matching between HIS and malware classifier models. This 
work obtained through this objective that biological error controller can be 
employed to control errors in malicious API classifier models, and then to 
improve the accuracy rate. 
4- Through this objective, it became clear for this work which type of malwares 
should be focused in this research.  
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· For Investigating the functionality and the ability of a biological phenomenon 
that can minimize or avoid errors 
 
This work initiated this objective to understand how immune system can control 
error when it classify huge amount of biological viruses. Through section (2.10) the 
overall work strategy of human immune system has been explained. The section 
showed how immune system works and which part of this system can control errors. 
The sub-section 2.10.1 has explained the biological error controller that used by the 
immune system in more details. Moreover, in sub-section 2.10.2 the concept of 
biological error controller, which called co-stimulation, inside the artificial immune 
system has been clarified.  
In the methodology chapter, especially section 3.5, the designing steps of building a 
classifier model including the co-stimulation error controller is clearly explained. 
The implementation of the concept of artificial co-stimulation is showed in chapter 
four.  
Through chapter five and six, the accuracy of Artificial Co-stimulation classifier 
model has been discussed and compared with other classifier models (Table 5-4 and 
Table 5-6 with Figure 5-12 and Figure 5-13). 
 
 
· Identifying features that have efficient impact on accuracy of the malicious API 
call-classifier models 
 
To validate the accuracy, most classifier models depended on many features. The 
most important were the FA and RMSE rates. The FA comes in the four forms, 
which are FP, FN, TP, and TN. The value of these four features were substituted in 
Equation 2-1 and its result used by most researchers to find the accuracy of their 
classifier models. Another form used by researchers to gage the accuracy of classifier 
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models is RMSE, which mentioned in Equation 2-4. Moreover, researchers have 
identified different values for the threshold distinguisher that attached to all classifier 
models. The main target of this objective was studying the characteristics of these 
features.  
Targeting this objective helped this work in two ways: 
 
1- As most researches used the FA and RMSE rates for validate the accuracy of 
their works with other works, this work should use the same concept to validate 
the proposed model, which is ACC, against most important classifier models 
that conducted by researchers in Table 2-2 and Table 2-3. Table 5-4 was 
resulting from the concept of this objective. 
2- Through this objective, the weaknesses of the current threshold value systems 
have been revealed. The objective helped this work to find out solutions that 
makes threshold value to do other functionalities, such as error controller 
(section 4.3.3).  
 
· Building an accurate discrimination model (ACC) and performing validation 
 
Under this section, both objectives that concerned the design and implementation 
with validating the ACC model are targeted. The objective has achieved with regard 
to FP and FN with RMSE features. The main target of this objective was to design an 
accurate malicious API call classifier models, such as ACC, then, to implement and 
validate it. These three steps are achieved as indicated below: 
 
1- The parts that mentioned in chapter 3 indicated how to build an accurate model 
like ACC. 
2- Chapter 4 related to the implementation of ACC. 
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3- Chapter 5 tested the more frequently used classifier model. The result of these 
tests was used to validate the ACC accuracy. 
6.4 Contribution 
 
The main contribution of our work can be summarised in the following points: 
 
1- Defining a new concept to categorize classifier models. 
2- Devising a new bio-oriented malicious API calls classifier model. 
3- Identifying new functionality for threshold line distinguisher that attached to 
classifier models. 
4- New paradigm to define malwares. 
 
Latter parts of this section explain the above-mentioned contributions in detail.  
 
· A new concept to categorise malicious API call-classifier models  
 
Throughout the process of literature review, this current work has found malicious API 
classifier models could be categorised into two types of model; biological models and 
non-biological models (section 2.9). Although the aim of both types of classier models is 
same, their concept and implementation are different. 
The concept of biological models depends on some algorithms that occurred inside HIS, 
while their implementation depends on a code program that can compute the matching 
degree between the shape of detectors and the shape of unknown objects.  
On the other side, non-biological models depend on some mathematical and statistical 
computation of malwares’ behaviours, where some statistical methods, such as 
measuring probability and frequency of API calls, are employed.  
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Categorising classifier models into biological and non-biological may bring attention of 
many researchers to do some comparison works between them to propose many types of 
accuracy improvement. For instant, researchers can propose some works that can identify 
weak points for each type of these models or suggesting ideas of building a hybrid 
system between them for better accuracy. 
 
· A new bio-oriented solution for minimizing FP and FN with RMSE errors in 
malicious API call-classifier models. 
 
The AIS includes many techniques and algorithms that are employed in different fields 
of study. However, most of them are utilized for detection and classification purposes 
only (Jieqiong Zheng 2010). Although biologically, the immune system has amazing 
interconnected and interrelated procedures and phenomena, only a few bio-oriented 
algorithms have been coined independently and employed artificially in AIS (Elgert, 
2009; Naik, 2003; Smith, 2006). More research and complementary studies should be 
done to improve the ability of these AIS algorithms (U Aickelin et al., 2004; Julie 
Greensmith, 2010; Marhusin, Cornforth, et al., 2008; P. T. Zhang et al., 2010; Y Zhang et 
al., 2010).  
In the field of malware classification, most studies depend on the fundamental algorithm 
that was proposed by Forrest et al. (1994; 1997). Based on this algorithm, if a case is not 
normal, it can be considered as a malware (Forrest et al., 2002). However, such concept 
leads to an increase in the rate of errors, such as false alarms, as every unknown normal 
is not always a malware (P. T. Zhang et al., 2010). To avoid such errors, this work found 
that IS includes the co-stimulation phenomenon, which undertakes double confirmation 
in distinguishing or identifying an unknown cell (Elgert, 2009; Health, 2003). Therefore, 
classifier models and detection systems that depend on the algorithm of AIS should also 
include this phenomenon in their processes to minimize errors. However, to the best of 
 169 
 
our knowledge and according to the latest survey on AIS applications (Jieqiong Zheng 
2010), the concept of confirmation performed by co-stimulation has not been included in 
any research on classification and detection models of malwares . 
 
· New functionalities for the threshold value: 
 
Most of the classifier models and detection systems that proposed previously have 
threshold values through which objects can be distinguished. The function (   ) can 
represent most, if not all, threshold lines. This function means that all the threshold 
values are in a single line, and the only change that occurs from one model to another is 
the value of (a).  
Models with a single-line threshold value can separate objects into only two classes. 
Models that use such discriminator function can position objects in one of its two sides. 
On each side of the threshold line, researchers can find a mixture of classified objects 
that are high-certainty objects, misclassified objects, and doubtful or low-certainty 
objects.  
To make the threshold value systems more active in detecting and classifying models, 
this study provides a new function for threshold value so that the system can perform 
more roles. The new roles that our new threshold value can provide include bonding 
most cases that are doubtfully classified and sub-classifying objects into three areas, 
namely, pure class one, pure class two, and a class of low-certainty objects. Through 
these new functions, the threshold value can support classifier models to identify those 
objects that negatively affect the rate of RMSE. This new threshold value can also 
identify objects that need more analyses and work to increase their degree of certainty. 
Such increase in degree of certainty can reposition some misclassified cases, which in 
turn can decrease the FP and FN rates.  
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The support vector machine theory is the only theory that performs its threshold value in 
a similar manner to our proposed function. It can collect objects in two classes and then 
create a gap between them. However, it cannot activate and utilize this gap to support 
more classification models.  
 
· A new paradigm of malwares’‎definition: 
 
Throughout the history of computer viruses and malwares, many definitions of malwares 
have been formulated and coined (Bradfield, 2010; Idika & Mathur, 2007). Most of these 
definitions describe the activities or the behaviour that malwares perform inside any 
infected system. The behaviour described in earlier definitions is analysed and explained 
through the lenses of computer systems or computer users. From those definitions, 
researchers show ways by which malwares interact with computer systems and reveal the 
risks that malwares may bring to users (Szor, 2006).  
Some researchers attempted to use another style of defining malwares. They extracted 
information from the methodologies of their work and then they used them to define 
malwares (M. Alazab et al., 2010; Bayer, Habibi, et al., 2009; Trinius et al., 2011; S. Yu 
et al., 2011). However, most of their definitions were still coined within the boundaries 
of computer systems and the concepts of computer users.  
Our current work initiates a new version of malware definition. We extracted information 
from the methodology of the work, but we considered the detection viewpoint of 
malwares and classification models. The new version of malware definition states the 
following: “Malwares are blocks of codes that are mixed up with normal codes to 
perform their payloads smoothly and to defeat detection systems smartly"  
The first part of our definition explains the way that malwares can be used to predict 
normal applications. This success accurately satisfies the objectives and the methodology 
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of our work. Other definitions always start by describing malwares as unwanted 
applications or unprivileged codes that they want to detect. 
The second part of our definition shows the behaviour that malwares may perform. The 
definition concentrates on two activities: payload execution and defeating techniques. 
Although the work payload covers many of the activities of malwares, these are not often 
used by researchers to define malwares. However, to date, the concept of the defeating 
behaviour of malwares has never been used in any process of defining malwares.    
 
· Supporting other biological models. 
 
Initially, AIS was grounded on simple models of the human immune system. As noted by 
Stibor (Xiao & Stibor, 2011), the “first-generation algorithms,” including NSA and CSA, 
do not produce the same high quality performance as the human immune system. In 
particular, algorithms that conduct negative selections are prone to scaling problems and 
generating excessive FA when used to solve problems, such as malware detection 
systems. The second-generation algorithm, called Dendretic Cell Algorithm (DCA), was 
developed to overcome the problems seen in the NSA. When appropriate threshold 
values are used, DCA can generate robust and accurate results in classifying models 
(Xiao & Stibor, 2011; Yidan Luo & Jiang, 2008).  
Through the proposed model, solutions to the problem of the rate of FA that accompany 
NSA and CSA, as well as the problem of identifying an appropriate threshold value 
necessary for DCA, are already provided.  
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6.5 Suggested future works 
 
For future works, this work suggests some directions that may make the classification of 
malicious API calls more efficient. To achieve that, this work recommended some more 
expansion in the parts of the ACC model.  Parts that need expansion summarized below: 
 
· Identifying optimum threshold value 
 
Identifying doubtful area for any classifier model may change based on the methods that 
used and the dataset that clamped. Through the section 4.4.3, this work could define the 
perfect boundaries of active threshold value. It takes many tests to find out these active 
values. To make it more efficient, this work suggested an automated step that can give 
optimum boundaries for any dataset that may clamped to any classifier model.  By this 
step, less time required for defining an active threshold value.  
This step can support classifier models in another direction. When the boundaries of the 
threshold value have been defined, it means defining objects that lie within these 
boundaries and need more investigations. Accordingly, the definition of active threshold 
can highlight the area where objects doubtfully classified or misclassified.  
 
· More malware policies and behaviours 
 
Since they coded for the first time, malwares have got many modifications and they 
behaved differently and more difficultly. They changed from their simplest to more 
complicated form. Every span of time, malware analysts recorded new behaviours and 
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activities of malwares. Therefore, to detect malwares based on their behaviours systems 
should be up-to-date.  
Classifier models usually depend on some training dataset to find out any new cases. 
These training sets should cover the valid malware activities and behaviours. Therefore, 
this work recommended a process that can identify optimum behaviours from a 
malware’s population. Through this identification, classifier models can narrow down to 
the necessary behaviours that should be monitored. By this step also, malicious API calls 
classifier models can highlight the number and the type of the API functions that should 
be covered during training step, and they remained up-to-date with respect to the recent 
available malware samples.  
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6.6 Chapter Summary 
 
Contribution and conclusion of this work have been described through the chapter six, and 
below are the chapter summary: 
1- As far as PE malwares can abuse the API calling behaviour of normal applications, 
PE malwares can challenge the malicious API calling classifier models. 
2- From the objectives of the researchers; 
a. Classifier models are divided into two groups, biological and non-biological 
classifier models. 
b. Biological co-stimulation is used by human immune system to support 
minimizing errors in biological viruses’ classification. 
3- It is not necessary for a PE application to call all API functions available inside 
computer system. PE applications only need to call the API functions that 
necessary for their execution. 
4- The long sequence of API functions that called by an application could be broken 
down to smaller parts of sequences, which each of them represent a behaviour of 
the application during its execution. 
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Appendix-1 
 
The letter from Peter Szor 
 
Virus Analysis 2 messages  
From:  WHA080028 student <saman1969@siswa.um.edu.my> 
<saman1969@perdana.um.edu.my> Fri, Mar 19, 2010 at 4:42 PM  
To:  pszor@acm.org 
 
Dear Sir   
 
I am a PhD student in Network Department - Faculty of Computer Science -University of Malaya. My Name 
is “Saman Mirza Abdulla” from Iraq. My research is somehow related to develop a biological model to detect 
computer malwares, and now I am in my third semester.  
My model has scoped to windows PE file and the function calls that malwares used them during infection 
and after.  The model currently needed to be analysed with some real malwares to know if the analysed 
malwares somehow following the print-foot that drawn by our model or not. For that, we need to trace some 
malwares to know how they insert their code inside the PE file and where.  
Otherwise, I should trace those malwares, which in that case, needs to download them.  
Please, can you advise me how I can get real malware codes or articles that specified virus analysis? In fact, I 
found one article in your token about virus analysis in (VB) magazine. In addition to that, your book "Virus 
Research and Defence" and some articles published by Symantec became my research backbone.  
Your cooperation is highly appreciated.  
Thanks in advance for any comments and guides.  
 
Thanks.  
 
Saman Mirza Abdulla --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
UNIVERSITY OF MALAYA  -  " The Leader in Research & Innovation "  
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Peter Szor peter.szor@gmail.com 
To: saman1969@perdana.um.edu.my  Fri, Mar 19, 2010 at 10:56 PM  
 
Hi Saman,  
Thanks for your question. You see, malware samples are never shared outside of the relatively small security 
circles, which is really hard to get into. Often, I see this problem at universities, that they would need real 
malware. The problem is that by not knowing you, nobody would risk to give samples to you, due to the 
impossible justification of its use, and safe handling, without risking the general public. This is true for 
trojan, malware, as well as virus samples. In the adware space, there are even more problems, since there is a 
lot of copyrighted material in there, and nobody wants to exchange those.   
What I would recommend is to either get in touch with another university, or try to find a few sample cases in 
virus collections and magazines on the internet. This is not difficult to find.  
 For your test, if you work with viruses, I would recommend to use something like Funlove to start with. This 
small virus is also a network share infector, and it was everywhere at one point of time. This is a simple virus 
to profile, based on behaviors.  
 Then, there are the more difficult types, such as Zmist, which integrates themselves into the executable. 
They might not always get call from the file, and they are not at an obvious location either.  
 Viruses right now are not the greatest issue. Yet, there are cases like polymorphic viruses on the Wildlist. 
Reading Virus Bulletin, you can see the names of these threats. The real issue today is malware profiling. 
There were over 3 million threats released last year, and most of them are not self replicating threats. They 
install themselves often, like real applications, and do their tricks that way.  
 Depending on which types of threats you need for your test (there are many types in genres) you would need 
a honeypot project to capture samples, or have connections to honeypot circles. Real time capturing of 
malware, such as worms, bots, trojans is done with virtual machines, or real machines using vulnerable 
services connected to the internet. The captures are made on these boxes. This model helps you to get a lot of 
malware in a very short time, and allows you to do further research on the classes of interest. This would be 
my main recommendation.  
 There are free honeypot/honeynet projects which you can deploy easily on boxes and collect samples with 
them. I wish you good luck collecting the samples, and I apologies, and need your understanding that I 
cannot give you live samples of malware code, even for phd research. But having at least 6 million variants 
of malware out there, with about 200-300.000 a month, this should not be a problem for you. If nothing, you 
could follow the logs of AV at your university to see what comes in, and try to ask your department to save 
these samples.  
This is how I started.  
 
Best, Peter  
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Appendix-2 
 
Codes used throughout building ACC model 
 
Code-1; Indexing API functions with positive real number 
% This Code can read a list of API Functions that extracted for a PE 
% application (Suspected) and can convert it to its equivalent index 
 
clear all; 
clc; 
 
%Reading the reference file of API functions and their Indexes 
 
[num1,txt1,raw1] = xlsread('ReferenceOfFunctions.xlsx'); 
m=size(txt1,1); 
 
%Reading the sequnce of API function for the suspected file 
 
[num2,txt2,raw2] = xlsread('ExtractedFunction.xlsx'); 
%================================================================= 
 
%Creating the vector X 
 
n = size (txt2,1); 
X=zeros (n,1); 
 
% Searching for indexing 
 
for i=1:n 
for j = 1:m 
if isequal (txt2(i,1),txt1(j,1)) 
            X(i)= num1(j); 
 
end 
end 
end 
 
============================================ 
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Code-2; converting vector X to matrix X1 
clc; 
clear all; 
 
data = xlsread ('1xl APIVector.xlsx')'; 
 
v= zeros (1,6); 
x = size(data,2); 
 
for i = 1:x-5 
    v(i,1:6) = data(1,i:i+5); 
end 
 
xlswrite('nxm APIMAtrix-1.xlsx',v); 
 
========================================== 
 
Code-3; converting vector X to matrix X2 
clc; 
clear all; 
 
data = xlsread ('1xl APIVector.xlsx')'; 
 
 x= size (data,1); 
 
g1 = zeros (1); t1=1; 
g2 = zeros (1); t2=1; 
g3 = zeros (1); t3=1; 
g4 = zeros (1); t4=1; 
 
for i = 1:x 
for j = 1:6 
 
if v(i,j)>1 && v(i,j)<2 
            g1(t1)=v(i,j);t1=t1+1; 
 
elseif v(i,j)>2 && v(i,j)<3 
            g2(t2)=v(i,j);t2=t2+1; 
 
elseif v(i,j)>3 && v(i,j)<4 
            g3(t3)=v(i,j);t3=t3+1; 
 
elseif v(i,j)>4 && v(i,j)<5 
            g4(t4)=v(i,j);t4=t4+1; 
end 
end 
end 
 
X2 = [g1;g2;g3;g4]; 
xlswrite('nxm APIMAtrix-2.xlsx',X2); 
 
========================================== 
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Code-4; Training and testing the ANN classifier 
clc; 
clear all; 
 
%%Training phase input data: 
indata = xlsread ('Indata.xlsx','indata'); 
Din= indata(1:18526,1:6); 
Dtr=indata(1:18526,7:7); 
 
%%Vector Normalization of the input data: 
DinN = normc(Din); 
DinN=DinN'; 
Dtr=Dtr'; 
 
%% Building the ANN (FeedForward Back-Probagation): 
net = newff(DinN,Dtr,[20 10]); 
 
%% Training ANN: 
net = train(net,DinN,Dtr); 
 
%% Finding error during training (As a cross-validation)for the first  
%  half part of the dataset 
Dout = net(DinN); 
errors = Dout - Dtr; 
perf = perform(net,Dout,Dtr)  
 
%% To test the ANN with second part of data: 
Indata2 = xlsread ('Indata.xlsx','Testing'); 
Dn2= indata2(1:3000,1:6); 
Dn2t= indata2(1:3000,7:7); 
 
Dm2=indata2(3001:6000,1:6); 
Dm2t= indata2(3001:6000,7:7); 
 
 
%%Vector Normalization of the input data: 
DnN = normc(Dn2); 
DmN = normc(Dm2); 
Dn=DnN'; 
Dm=DmN'; 
 
%% Testing the ANN classifier with the second half of the dataset 
Doutn = net(Dn); 
Doutm = net(Dm); 
Plot (Dn2t, Doutn,’o’, Dm2t, Doutm,’x’); 
 
%% Obtaining RMSE: 
 
RMSEdoutn = mse(doutn); 
RMSEdoutm = mse(doutm) 
Doutall= mse ([doutn;doutm]); 
RMSEn = sqrt (RMSEdoutn); 
RMSEm = sqrt (RMSEdoutm); 
RMSEall = sqrt (Doutall); 
 
========================================= 
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Code-5; Threshold boundaries identification 
 
clc; 
clear all; 
 
 %% Identifying the upper and the lower boundaries for the  
%  the proposed areas. 
 
U1 = input('What is the first upper limit of threshold value '); 
U2 = input('What is the second upper limit of threshold value '); 
L1 = input('What is the first lower limit of threshold value '); 
L2 = input('What is the secondlower limit of threshold value '); 
 
%% Reading the results that obtained in the ANN 
 
indata = xlsread ('ANNRMSEResults.xlsx','1'); 
out= indata(1:6000,1:1); 
MA=zeros(1);M=1; 
NA=zeros(1);N=1; 
DA=zeros(1);D=1; 
 
%% Based on the input boundaries values, RMSE for each area calculated. 
 
for i = 1:6000 
if out(i)>=L1 && out(i)<=L2 
         NA(N)=out(i);N=N+1; 
         area1=sqrt(mse(NA)); 
else 
if out(i)>=U1 && out(i)<=U2 
            MA(M)=out(i);M=M+1; 
            area2=sqrt(mse(MA));  
else 
             DA(D)=out(i);D=D+1; 
             area3=sqrt(mse(DA)); 
end 
end 
end 
 
 
 
========================================= 
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Code-6; Measuring the similarity indicator 
clc; 
close all; 
clear all; 
 
data = xlsread ('allsimilar.xlsx'); 
in=data (1:50,1:6); 
 
 
s1=zeros(1,1); 
s2=zeros(1,1); 
s3=zeros(1,1); 
 
n=1; 
 
for i = 1:size(in,1); 
 
for k = 1:size(in,1) 
 
for j = 1:size (in,2); 
 
        s1(n,j) = in(i,j) * in(k,j); 
        s2(n,j) = in(i,j) * in(i,j); 
        s3(n,j) = in(k,j) * in(k,j); 
 
 
end 
 
     n=n+1;  
 
end 
 
end 
 
a = sum(s1')'; 
b = sqrt(sum(s2'))'; 
c = sqrt(sum(s3'))'; 
 
for i = 1:(size(in,1)*(size(in,1))) 
    sim(i)  = (a(i) /(b(i) * c(i)));         
 
end 
 sim = sim';        
AverageSimilarity= sum(sim)/size(sim,1); 
MaximumSimilarity = max(sim); 
MinimamSimilarity = min(sim); 
Cs1=zeros(1); 
Cs2=zeros(1); 
n=1; 
m=1; 
for i = 1:size(sim,1) 
 
if sim(i)>AverageSimilarity 
        Cs1(n)=sim(i); n=n+1; 
else 
        Cs2(m)=sim(i);m=m+1; 
end 
end 
 
==============================================================  
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Code-7; Confirmation (Costimulation) Achievement  
clc; 
clear all; 
close all; 
% ======= 
% Doubtful, g1, and g11 groups vector similarity measuring process 
 
ndata = xlsread ('123.xlsx','df'); % Doubtful vectors 
df = ndata(:,1:6); 
% %  
g1 = xlsread ('123.xlsx','g1'); % malware vectors of application 
behaviour. 
g11= xlsread ('123.xlsx','g11'); % Normal vectors of Application 
Behaviour. 
 
%=========== 
% Finding distance between each vector in df with all vectors in g1; 
 
z1=zeros(0); % to collect the distance measures 
k1=0; %  
sum1=zeros(0); % to collect sum of similarity for each vector in df 
M=0;  
ave1=zeros(0); % collect [average of distances] 
t1=zeros(0); % collect [df g1 distances] 
f1=1; 
mtrx1=zeros(0); % to collect [df ave1] 
n=0; % Number of vectors that have greater similarity than average 
n1=zeros(0); 
 
for i = 1:size(df,1) 
 
for j = 1:size(g1,1) 
 
        z1(i,j) = dist(df(i),g1(j)'); 
        t1(f1,1:13)=[df(i,1:6) g1(j,1:6) z1(i,j)];f1=f1+1; 
end 
 end 
 
%Finding the sum of all distance similarities for each vector in df with 
g1; 
for i = 1: size(df,1) 
 
for j = 1+M:size(g1,1)+M 
 
    k1=k1+t1(j,13); 
if t1(j,13)>= 0.893 
        n=n+1; 
else 
        n=n; 
end 
end 
    sum1(i) = k1; k1=0; M=M+size(g1,1); 
    n1(i) = n; n=0; 
end 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
%Finding the Average of all distance similarities for each vector in df 
with g1; 
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for i = 1: size(df,1) 
 
    ave1(i) = sum1(i)/size(df,1); 
    mtrx1(i,1:9)=[df(i,1:6) ndata(i,7) ave1(i) n1(i)]; 
end 
 
%====================================== 
 
% Finding distance between each vector in df with all vectors in g11; 
 
z11=zeros(0); % to collect the distance measures 
k11=0; %  
sum11=zeros(0); % to collect sum of similarity for each vector in df 
M=0;  
ave11=zeros(0); % collect [average of distances] 
t11=zeros(0); % collect [df g1 distances] 
f11=1; 
mtrx11=zeros(0); % to collect [df ave1] 
n=0; % Number of vectors that have greater similarity than average 
n11=zeros(0); 
 
for i = 1:size(df,1) 
 
for j = 1:size(g11,1) 
 
        z11(i,j) = dist(df(i),g11(j)'); 
        t11(f11,1:13)=[df(i,1:6) g11(j,1:6) z11(i,j)];f11=f11+1; 
end 
end 
 
%Finding the sum of all distance similarities for each vector in df with 
g11; 
 
for i = 1: size(df,1) 
 
for j = 1+M:size(g11,1)+M 
 
    k11=k11+t1(j,13); 
if t11(j,13)>= 0.812 
        n=n+1; 
else 
        n=n; 
end 
end 
    sum11(i) = k11; k11=0; M=M+size(g11,1); 
    n11(i) = n; n=0; 
end 
 
 
%Finding the Average of all distance similarities for each vector in df 
with g11; 
 
for i = 1: size(df,1) 
 
    ave11(i) = sum11(i)/size(df,1); 
    mtrx11(i,1:9)=[df(i,1:6) ndata(i,7) ave11(i) n11(i)]; 
end 
 
 
 
% Comparison between df and g1 with g11 
% ============================ 
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for i = 1:size(df,1) 
 
if (mtrx1(i,8)>=0.893) && (mtrx11(i,8)=<0.812) && (mtrx1(i,9)>=73)... 
&& (mtrx11(i,9)=<81) 
        mtrx1(i,7)=mtrx1(i,7)+mtrx1(i,8)-mtrx11(i,8); 
elseif (mtrx11(i,8)>=0.812) && (mtrx1(i,8)=<0.893) && 
(mtrx11(i,9)>=81)... 
&& (mtrx1(i,9)=<73) 
        mtrx1(i,7)=mtrx1(i,7)+mtrx11(i,8)-mtrx1(i,8); 
else 
        mtrx1 (i,7)=mtrx1(i,7); 
end 
end 
 
%==================Group g2 and g22 =========================== 
 % Finding distance between each vector in df with all vectors in g2; 
 
z2=zeros(0); % to collect the distance measures 
k2=0; %  
sum2=zeros(0); % to collect sum of similarity for each vector in df 
M=0;  
ave2=zeros(0); % collect [average of distances] 
t2=zeros(0); % collect [df g1 distances] 
f2=1; 
mtrx2=zeros(0); % to collect [df ave1] 
n=0; % Number of vectors that have greater similarity than average 
n2=zeros(0); 
 
for i = 1:size(df,1) 
 
for j = 1:size(g2,1) 
 
        z2(i,j) = dist(df(i),g2(j)'); 
        t2(f2,1:13)=[df(i,1:6) g2(j,1:6) z2(i,j)];f2=f2+1; 
end 
 end 
 
%Finding the sum of all distance similarities for each vector in df with 
g2; 
 
for i = 1: size(df,1) 
 
for j = 1+M:size(g2,1)+M 
 
    k2=k2+t2(j,13); 
if t2(j,13)>= 0.0.914 
        n=n+1; 
else 
        n=n; 
end 
end 
    sum2(i) = k2; k2=0; M=M+size(g2,1); 
    n2(i) = n; n=0; 
end 
 
 
 
 
%Finding the Average of all distance similarities for each vector in df 
with g2; 
 
for i = 1: size(df,1) 
 
    ave2(i) = sum2(i)/size(df,1); 
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    mtrx2(i,1:9)=[df(i,1:6) ndata(i,7) ave2(i) n2(i)]; 
end 
 
%====================================== 
 
% Finding distance between each vector in df with all vectors in g22; 
 
z22=zeros(0); % to collect the distance measures 
k22=0; %  
sum22=zeros(0); % to collect sum of similarity for each vector in df 
M=0;  
ave22=zeros(0); % collect [average of distances] 
t22=zeros(0); % collect [df g1 distances] 
f22=1; 
mtrx22=zeros(0); % to collect [df ave1] 
n=0; % Number of vectors that have greater similarity than average 
n22=zeros(0); 
 
for i = 1:size(df,1) 
for j = 1:size(g22,1) 
 
        z22(i,j) = dist(df(i),g22(j)'); 
        t22(f22,1:13)=[df(i,1:6) g22(j,1:6) z22(i,j)];f22=f22+1; 
end 
end 
 
%Finding the sum of all distance similarities for each vector in df with 
g22; 
 
for i = 1: size(df,1) 
for j = 1+M:size(g22,1)+M 
 
    k22=k22+t1(j,13); 
if t22(j,13)>= 0.835 
        n=n+1; 
else 
        n=n; 
end 
end 
    sum22(i) = k22; k22=0; M=M+size(g22,1); 
    n22(i) = n; n=0; 
end 
 
 
%Finding the Average of all distance similarities for each vector in df 
with g22; 
 
for i = 1: size(df,1) 
    ave22(i) = sum22(i)/size(df,1); 
    mtrx22(i,1:9)=[df(i,1:6) ndata(i,7) ave22(i) n22(i)]; 
end 
 
 
 
 
 
 
%Comparison between df and g2 with g22 
% ============================ 
for i = 1:size(df,1) 
 
if (mtrx2(i,8)>=0.914) && (mtrx22(i,8)=<0.835) && (mtrx2(i,9)>=73)... 
&& (mtrx22(i,9)=<81) 
        mtrx2(i,7)=mtrx2(i,7)+mtrx2(i,8)-mtrx22(i,8); 
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elseif (mtrx22(i,8)>=0.835) && (mtrx2(i,8)=<0.914) && 
(mtrx22(i,9)>=81)... 
&& (mtrx2(i,9)=<73) 
        mtrx2(i,7)=mtrx2(i,7)+mtrx22(i,8)-mtrx2(i,8); 
else 
        mtrx2(i,7)=mtrx2(i,7); 
end 
end 
 
%===================== group g3 and g33  ======================= 
% Finding distance between each vector in df with all vectors in g3; 
 
z3=zeros(0); % to collect the distance measures 
k3=0; %  
sum3=zeros(0); % to collect sum of similarity for each vector in df 
M=0;  
ave3=zeros(0); % collect [average of distances] 
t3=zeros(0); % collect [df g1 distances] 
f3=1; 
mtrx3=zeros(0); % to collect [df ave1] 
n=0; % Number of vectors that have greater similarity than average 
n3=zeros(0); 
 
for i = 1:size(df,1) 
 
for j = 1:size(g3,1) 
 
        z3(i,j) = dist(df(i),g3(j)'); 
        t3(f3,1:13)=[df(i,1:6) g3(j,1:6) z3(i,j)];f3=f3+1; 
end 
end 
 
%Finding the sum of all distance similarities for each vector in df with 
g3; 
for i = 1: size(df,1) 
 
for j = 1+M:size(g3,1)+M 
 
    k3=k3+t3(j,13); 
if t3(j,13)>= 0.876 
        n=n+1; 
else 
        n=n; 
end 
end 
    sum3(i) = k3; k3=0; M=M+size(g3,1); 
    n3(i) = n; n=0; 
end 
 
 
 
 
 
 
%Finding the Average of all distance similarities for each vector in df 
with g3; 
 
for i = 1: size(df,1) 
 
    ave3(i) = sum3(i)/size(df,1); 
    mtrx3(i,1:9)=[df(i,1:6) ndata(i,7) ave3(i) n3(i)]; 
end 
 
%====================================== 
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% Finding distance between each vector in df with all vectors in g33; 
z33=zeros(0); % to collect the distance measures 
k33=0; %  
sum33=zeros(0); % to collect sum of similarity for each vector in df 
M=0;  
ave33=zeros(0); % collect [average of distances] 
t33=zeros(0); % collect [df g1 distances] 
f33=1; 
mtrx33=zeros(0); % to collect [df ave1] 
n=0; % Number of vectors that have greater similarity than average 
n33=zeros(0); 
 
for i = 1:size(df,1) 
 
for j = 1:size(g22,1) 
 
        z33(i,j) = dist(df(i),g33(j)'); 
        t33(f33,1:13)=[df(i,1:6) g33(j,1:6) z33(i,j)];f33=f33+1; 
end 
end 
 
%Finding the sum of all distance similarities for each vector in df with 
g33; 
 
for i = 1: size(df,1) 
 
for j = 1+M:size(g33,1)+M 
 
    k33=k33+t1(j,13); 
if t33(j,13)>= 0.817 
        n=n+1; 
else 
        n=n; 
end 
end 
    sum33(i) = k33; k33=0; M=M+size(g33,1); 
    n33(i) = n; n=0; 
end 
 
%Finding the Average of all distance similarities for each vector in df 
with g33; 
 
for i = 1: size(df,1) 
 
    ave33(i) = sum33(i)/size(df,1); 
    mtrx33(i,1:9)=[df(i,1:6) ndata(i,7) ave33(i) n33(i)]; 
end 
 
 
 
 
 
%Comparison between df and g3 with g33 
% =========================== 
for i = 1:size(df,1) 
 
if (mtrx3(i,8)>=0.876) && (mtrx33(i,8)=<0.817) && (mtrx3(i,9)>=64)... 
&& (mtrx33(i,9)=<59) 
        mtrx3(i,7)=mtrx3(i,7)+mtrx3(i,8)-mtrx33(i,8); 
elseif (mtrx33(i,8)>=0.817) && (mtrx3(i,8)=<0.876) && 
(mtrx33(i,9)>=59)... 
&& (mtrx3(i,9)=<64) 
        mtrx3(i,7)=mtrx3(i,7)+mtrx33(i,8)-mtrx3(i,8); 
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else 
        mtrx3(i,7)=mtrx3(i,7); 
end 
end 
 
%===================== group g4 and g44  ======================= 
 % Finding distance between each vector in df with all vectors in g4; 
 
z4=zeros(0); % to collect the distance measures 
k4=0; %  
sum4=zeros(0); % to collect sum of similarity for each vector in df 
M=0;  
ave4=zeros(0); % collect [average of distances] 
t4=zeros(0); % collect [df g1 distances] 
f4=1; 
mtrx4=zeros(0); % to collect [df ave1] 
n=0; % Number of vectors that have greater similarity than average 
n4=zeros(0); 
 
for i = 1:size(df,1) 
 
for j = 1:size(g4,1) 
 
        z4(i,j) = dist(df(i),g4(j)'); 
        t4(f4,1:13)=[df(i,1:6) g4(j,1:6) z4(i,j)];f4=f4+1; 
end 
end 
 
%Finding the sum of all distance similarities for each vector in df with 
g4; 
 
for i = 1: size(df,1) 
 
for j = 1+M:size(g4,1)+M 
 
    k4=k4+t4(j,13); 
if t4(j,13)>= 0.883 
        n=n+1; 
else 
        n=n; 
end 
end 
    sum4(i) = k4; k4=0; M=M+size(g4,1); 
    n4(i) = n; n=0; 
end 
 
 
 
 
 
%Finding the Average of all distance similarities for each vector in df 
with g4; 
 
for i = 1: size(df,1) 
 
    ave4(i) = sum4(i)/size(df,1); 
    mtrx4(i,1:9)=[df(i,1:6) ndata(i,7) ave4(i) n4(i)]; 
end 
 
%====================================== 
 
% Finding distance between each vector in df with all vectors in g44;  
z44=zeros(0); % to collect the distance measures 
k44=0; %  
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sum44=zeros(0); % to collect sum of similarity for each vector in df 
M=0;  
ave44=zeros(0); % collect [average of distances] 
t44=zeros(0); % collect [df g1 distances] 
f44=1; 
mtrx44=zeros(0); % to collect [df ave1] 
n=0; % Number of vectors that have greater similarity than average 
n44=zeros(0); 
 
for i = 1:size(df,1) 
 
for j = 1:size(g44,1) 
 
        z44(i,j) = dist(df(i),g44(j)'); 
        t44(f44,1:13)=[df(i,1:6) g44(j,1:6) z44(i,j)];f44=f44+1; 
end 
end 
 
%Finding the sum of all distance similarities for each vector in df with 
g44; 
 
for i = 1: size(df,1) 
 
for j = 1+M:size(g44,1)+M 
 
    k44=k44+t1(j,13); 
if t44(j,13)>= 0.827 
        n=n+1; 
else 
        n=n; 
end 
end 
    sum44(i) = k44; k44=0; M=M+size(g44,1); 
    n44(i) = n; n=0; 
end 
 
 
%Finding the Average of all distance similarities for each vector in df 
with g44; 
 
for i = 1: size(df,1) 
 
    ave44(i) = sum44(i)/size(df,1); 
    mtrx44(i,1:9)=[df(i,1:6) ndata(i,7) ave44(i) n44(i)]; 
end 
 
 
 
%Comparison between df and g4 with g44 
% ============================ 
for i = 1:size(df,1) 
 
if (mtrx4(i,8)>=0.883) && (mtrx44(i,8)=<0.827) && (mtrx4(i,9)>=69)... 
&& (mtrx44(i,9)=<76) 
        mtrx4(i,7)=mtrx4(i,7)+mtrx4(i,8)-mtrx44(i,8); 
elseif (mtrx44(i,8)>=0.827) && (mtrx4(i,8)=<0.883) && 
(mtrx44(i,9)>=76)... 
&& (mtrx4(i,9)=<69) 
        mtrx4(i,7)=mtrx4(i,7)+mtrx44(i,8)-mtrx4(i,8); 
else 
        mtrx4(i,7)=mtrx4(i,7); 
end 
end 
%======================================================= 
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Code-8; Training SVM classifier model to detect malicious API calls 
 
clc; 
clear all; 
close all; 
 
 
indata= xlsread ('Indata.xlsx','Normaliz(indata)'); 
 
in=indata(1:18526,1:6); 
tr=indata(1:18526,7:7); 
testin=indata(18527:24526,1:6); 
testout=indata(18527:24526,7:7); 
 
 
 
svmStruct = svmtrain(in, tr); 
 
 
classes = svmclassify(svmStruct,testin); 
 
 
 
 
========================================== 
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Code-9; SOM Classifier model 
 
clc; 
clear all; 
Close all; 
 
 
% Solve a Clustering Problem with a Self-Organizing Map 
% Script generated by NCTOOL 
% 
% This script assumes these variables are defined: 
% 
%   simpleclusterInputs - input data. 
 
num = xlsread ('nxm APIMAtrix-1.xlsx'); 
num = num (:, 1:6)'; 
 
% Create a Self-Organizing Map 
dimension1 = 2; 
dimension2 = 2; 
net = selforgmap([dimension1 dimension2]); 
 
% Train the Network 
[net,tr] = train(net,num); 
 
% Test the Network 
d = net(num)'; 
 
xlswrite('A.xlsx', d, 1, 'A1'); 
 
figure (1),plotsomhits(net,num) 
 
=========================================== 
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Code-10; Measuring the accuracy of k-means algorithm to classify API 
calls  
 
clc; 
clear all; 
close all; 
 
indata= xlsread ('k-meandata.xlsx','4'); 
X=indata(1:2000,1:6); 
 
opts = statset('Display','final'); 
 
[idx,ctrs] = kmeans(X,2,... 
'Distance','city',... 
'Replicates',5,... 
'Options',opts); 
 
 
plot(X(idx==1,1),X(idx==1,2),'b.','MarkerSize',12) 
hold on 
plot(X(idx==2,1),X(idx==2,2),'r.','MarkerSize',12) 
plot(ctrs(:,1),ctrs(:,2),'kx',... 
'MarkerSize',12,'LineWidth',2) 
plot(ctrs(:,1),ctrs(:,2),'ko',... 
'MarkerSize',12,'LineWidth',2) 
legend('Normal','Malware','Centroids',... 
'Location','NO') 
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Code-11; Similarity measure in statistical based (Frequently) Classifier 
model 
 
clc; 
clear all; 
close all; 
 
indata = xlsread ('StatVectors.xlsx','StatVector'); 
m=indata(1:1500,1:12); 
n=indata(1501:2000,1:12)'; 
z=zeros(1500,1);x=1; 
 
for i = 1:1500 
for j =1501:1550 
        z(x) = dist(m(i),n(j));x=x+1; 
end 
end 
 
g=zeros(1,1500); 
a=1;b=1500;k=1; 
c=z(1:750000,1:1); 
 
for j = 1:500 
 
for i = a:b 
 
g(j,k)= z(i,1);k=k+1; 
 
end 
    a=a+1500;b=b+1500;k=1; 
end 
 
ma=zeros(1);x=1; 
na=zeros(1);y=1; 
va=zeros(1);v=1; 
g2=zeros(1,3); 
 
for  i = 401:500 
for j = 1:1500 
if g(i,j)>=0.7 
           ma(x)=g(i,j);x=x+1; 
else 
if g(i,j)<=0.3 
           na(y)=g(i,j);y=y+1; 
else 
               va(v)=g(i,j); 
end 
end 
end 
 
    g2(i,1:3)=[size(ma,2),size(na,2),size(va,2)]; 
 
end 
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Code-12; Similarity measure in statistical based (Probability) Classifier 
model 
======================================== 
% This Code can read a list of API Functions that extracted for a PE 
% with their probability measure. The Code can compare the probability of  
% these function with the known malicious probability rate of them 
%   ================================================================ 
clear all; 
clc; 
%% 
% Reading the reference file of Malicious rate Probability 
[num1,txt1,raw1] = xlsread('MProbabilityOfFunctions.xlsx'); 
m=size(txt1,1); 
%% 
% Reading the probability rate of each API function that might be called  
% by the suspected file 
[num2,txt2,raw2] = xlsread('ProbaOfExtractedFunction.xlsx'); 
%================================================================= 
 
% Creating the vector X 
n = size (txt2,1); 
m = size (txt1,1); 
X= {n,m}; 
M=0;  
 
% Searching for indexing 
 
for i=1:n 
for j = 1:m 
if isequal (txt2(i,1),txt1(j,1)) && num1(i,1) >=num2(i,1) 
          X{i,1}= (txt2(i,1));X{i,2}=(num2(i,1));M=M+1; 
 
end 
end 
end 
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Appendix-3: True and False rates in tested models included ACC 
 
Models Tests TP TN FP FN Accuracy 
ANN K1 2561 2489 439 511 84.17% 
  K2 2443 2362 557 638 80.08% 
  K3 2431 2469 569 531 81.67% 
  K4 2511 2615 489 385 85.43% 
  K5 2574 2483 426 517 84.28% 
  K6 2570 2646 430 354 86.93% 
  K7 2378 2477 622 523 80.92% 
  K8 2342 2448 658 552 79.83% 
  K9 2525 2548 475 452 84.55% 
  K10 2464 2665 536 335 85.48% 
Median   2488 2486 513 514 84.23% 
SVM K1 2509 2625 491 375 85.57% 
  K2 2525 2574 475 426 84.98% 
  K3 2372 2426 628 574 79.97% 
  K4 2494 2542 506 458 83.93% 
  K5 2362 2449 638 551 80.18% 
  K6 2594 2419 406 581 83.55% 
  K7 2579 2469 421 531 84.13% 
  K8 2533 2581 467 419 85.23% 
  K9 2371 2511 629 489 81.37% 
  K10 2354 2607 646 393 82.68% 
Median   2502 2527 499 474 83.74% 
SOM K1 2379 2476 621 524 80.92% 
  K2 2296 2315 704 685 76.85% 
  K3 2281 2176 719 824 74.28% 
  K4 2398 2509 602 491 81.78% 
  K5 2344 2442 656 558 79.77% 
  K6 2153 2356 847 644 75.15% 
  K7 2305 2541 695 459 80.77% 
  K8 2269 2387 731 613 77.60% 
  K9 2249 2506 751 494 79.25% 
  K10 2491 2201 509 799 78.20% 
Median   2301 2415 700 586 78.73% 
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Models Tests TP TN FP FN Accuracy 
K-mean K1 2399 2464 601 536 81.05% 
  K2 2218 2397 782 603 76.92% 
  K3 2267 2336 733 664 76.72% 
  K4 2275 2384 725 616 77.65% 
  K5 2409 2597 591 403 83.43% 
  K6 2276 2360 724 640 77.27% 
  K7 2322 2558 678 442 81.33% 
  K8 2304 2359 696 641 77.72% 
  K9 2273 2526 727 474 79.98% 
  K10 2399 2240 601 760 77.32% 
Median   2290 2391 710 610 77.69% 
Statistical: 
Frequency 
K1 73 78 27 22 75.50% 
  K2 79 77 21 23 78.00% 
  K3 67 74 33 26 70.50% 
  K4 73 76 27 24 74.50% 
  K5 78 79 22 21 78.50% 
  K6 73 78 27 22 75.50% 
  K7 76 78 24 22 77.00% 
  K8 76 79 24 21 77.50% 
  K9 72 69 28 31 70.50% 
  K10 74 71 26 29 72.50% 
Median   74 78 27 23 75.50% 
Statistical: 
Probability 
K1 81 78 19 22 79.50% 
  K2 75 80 25 20 77.50% 
  K3 79 72 21 28 75.50% 
  K4 77 82 23 18 79.50% 
  K5 79 77 21 23 78.00% 
  K6 75 81 25 19 78.00% 
  K7 76 79 24 21 77.50% 
  K8 81 72 19 28 76.50% 
  K9 76 75 24 25 75.50% 
  K10 78 77 22 23 77.50% 
Median   78 78 23 23 77.50% 
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Models Tests TP TN FP FN Accuracy 
ACC K1 2749 2659 251 341 90.13% 
  K2 2517 2576 483 424 84.88% 
  K3 2727 2641 273 359 89.47% 
  K4 2691 2801 309 199 91.53% 
  K5 2781 2638 219 362 90.32% 
  K6 2782 2801 218 199 93.05% 
  K7 2552 2652 448 348 86.73% 
  K8 2463 2485 537 515 82.47% 
  K9 2749 2720 251 280 91.15% 
  K10 2720 2802 280 198 92.03% 
Median   2724 2656 277 345 90.23% 
 
 
 
